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Abstract 
This bound volume describes four significant public health problems in Australia and the 
Pacific Island Countries of Fiji and American Samoa. The four main epidemiological 
components are: 
1) Australian vaccine preventable disease epidemiological review series: varicella-zoster 
virus infections, 1998–2015. The review was conducted to assess the impact of the national 
varicella immunisation program and provide a baseline for monitoring the impact of the national 
herpes zoster immunisation program. The national varicella immunisation program led to 
significant reductions in varicella. In Australia, the burden of herpes zoster is substantial, and 
high quality and timely surveillance will be crucial to assess the impact of the national herpes 
zoster immunisation program. 
2) Investigation into increased lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) in New South Wales, 
Australia. LGV is a sexually transmitted infection (STI) caused by L1-L3 serovars of 
chlamydia, and can lead to irreversible complications. LGV is notifiable condition in New 
South Wales (NSW). Following a noticeable increase in number of LGV notifications, I 
conducted a retrospective case series of all cases diagnosed between 1 January 2016 and 31 
March 2017. During this period, all reported cases were among men who have sex with men. 
This chapter examines factors contributing to increase in LGV cases in NSW in 2016. It also 
describes the challenges associated with investigating STI outbreaks in NSW. 
3) An evaluation of an early warning alert and response system (EWARS in a Box) 
implemented after Cyclone Winston, Fiji 2016. The World Health Organization recommends 
implementation of early warning systems for timely disease surveillance and early detection of 
outbreaks during humanitarian emergencies. This chapter describes the EWARS system, and its 
usefulness at timely monitoring of communicable diseases trends during a national health 
emergency. Findings include strengths and limitations of the system at conducting surveillance, 
along with practical recommendations for improving surveillance using EWARS. 
4) Identifying residual transmission of lymphatic filariasis in post-mass drug 
administration surveillance phase: Comparing school-based versus community-based 
surveys – American Samoa, 2016. This study compares the effectiveness of two cross-
sectional survey designs, a school-based and a community-based survey, for assessing 
transmission of lymphatic filariasis. Under the Global Programme for Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis, American Samoa conducted seven rounds of mass drug administration (MDA) from 
 viii 
2000-2006. The World Health Organization recommends systematic post-MDA surveillance for 
epidemiological assessment of recent lymphatic filariasis transmission. Finger prick blood 
samples were collected from study participants to measure the prevalence of circulating filarial 
antigen (CFA). I recruited 1143 grade 1 and 2 school students from 29 elementary schools. For 
the community survey, 30 out of 70 villages were randomly selected, from which 2507 
community members were recruited. The school survey was cheaper and logistically easier to 
implement. The estimated CFA prevalence by school survey was 0.7%, and was significantly 
lower than the community survey (6.2%). The community survey was more effective for 
collecting information required for identifying residual transmission of lymphatic filariasis. 
Both surveys provided evidence of ongoing lymphatic filariasis transmission in American 
Samoa.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
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Island Dreaming: Applied Epidemiology in the Pacific Region 
As the title suggests, this bound volume describes my work and experiences in the Pacific 
Region while undertaking the Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program. 
I use the word Island in the context of my work in Australia and other Pacific Island Countries. 
The word Dreaming is adopted from the Aboriginal Dreamtime, in my aspiration to understand 
the world’s public health issues and tell great stories. The MAE has augmented my long-term 
passion for global health, encouraged me to conduct science that makes a difference and 
anticipate the “So what?”. 
My field placement was at the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
(NCIRS). NCIRS is co-located with the Kids Research Institute and is situated next door to the 
Children's Hospital at Westmead. NCIRS conducts epidemiological, clinical and social research 
into vaccine preventable diseases. NCIRS provides technical support to the Australian 
Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) and for the Australian Immunisation 
Handbook. NCIRS’s research is aimed at reducing the incidence of vaccine preventable disease 
and improving vaccine uptake in Australia. At NCIRS, I had the opportunity to interact and 
learn from experts in the field of immunisation and epidemiology of vaccine preventable 
diseases. I participated in regular meetings and seminars. I also presented at the Centre’s journal 
clubs and internal seminar series. 
 At NCIRS, I completed one major project on the epidemiology of varicella (chicken pox) and 
herpes zoster (shingles) in Australia. I analysed notification, hospitalisation and mortality data 
for varicella and herpes zoster for the years 1998 to 2015. In 2005, the National Immunisation 
Program implemented a vaccine to prevent varicella, for children aged 18 months. In 2016, the 
National Immunisation Program implemented a vaccine for herpes zoster for adults aged 70-79 
years. I assessed the impact of the varicella vaccine and provided a baseline for herpes zoster for 
monitoring the impact of the herpes zoster vaccine. The findings from this work were 
summarised for publication in the Communicable Diseases Intelligence and are presented in 
Chapter 2. An additional piece of work was published in the Medical Journal of Australia on the 
6
th
 November 2017 (Appendix 2A). The latter compared hospitalisation rates for herpes zoster 
in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with other Australians. I reported that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people were hospitalised at almost double the rate at a younger age of 
60 years. Considering only a small proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
live beyond the age of 70 years, the data presented in the short report provided evidence for 
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vaccinating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders at a younger age. These findings were also 
presented to ATAGI for review of the funding policy for herpes zoster immunisation program. 
NCIRS has a close relationship with the Western Sydney Public Health Unit (PHU), which is 
co-located in the Westmead Complex (Cumberland Hospital). In January 2017, I worked with 
the infectious diseases team performing everyday public health activities such as follow up of 
notifiable diseases including typhoid, hepatitis A, invasive meningococcal disease, influenza 
and other notifiable diseases. The Western Sydney PHU services a densely populated area, with 
many migrants and visitors from countries where the incidence of infectious disease is high. 
Therefore, this was a perfect environment to learn about routine public health activities but also 
about the contribution of imported diseases on New South Wales’ public health system. At the 
Western Sydney PHU, I investigated the Western Sydney measles outbreak in March-April 
2017. During the period 1 January 2017 to 20 April 2017, NSW Health reported 23 confirmed 
cases of measles, of which 17 were locally acquired. All cases were geographically clustered in 
Western Sydney but epidemiological links could not be established for all the cases. As part of 
the outbreak investigation, I performed contact tracing of persons who might have been exposed 
to measles, participated in team meetings and assisted with running of the measles 
immunisation clinic at the Hillsong Church in Baulkham Hills, New South Wales. 
From April-November 2017, I completed a part time placement with the Communicable 
Diseases Brach of Health Protection New South Wales. I was placed within the Blood Borne 
Virus and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) team with whom I investigated the 2016 
lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) outbreak in New South Wales. All LGV cases were 
diagnosed in men who have sex with men, residing mostly in metropolitan Sydney. I conducted 
a retrospective case series of all LGV cases diagnosed between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 
2017. This was a challenging experience as I was unaware of the complexities and cultural 
sensitives of working in the field of STIs. Further, limitations under the New South Wales 
Public Health Act 2010 and societal stigma against STIs often limit the scope of public health 
response. The outcomes and challenges I faced during this outbreak investigation are 
summarised in Chapter 3 
In April-May 2016, I was deployed with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN) to the World Health Organization’s Division of the Pacific Technical Support (WHO 
DPS), Fiji. I worked as an Early Warning and Alert Response Surveillance (EWARS) 
epidemiologist within the Emergency Surveillance and Response team of WHO DPS. My 
primary responsibility was to provide technical support to the Fiji Centre for Communicable 
Diseases Control (FCCDC) for communicable diseases surveillance after Cyclone Winston. In 
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addition to undertaking surveillance activities, I evaluated the EWARS system. The surveillance 
system and the findings of the evaluation are summarised in Chapter 4. During that period, 
FCCDC reported five deaths in pregnant women at the Colonial War Memorial hospital, the 
main tertiary hospital in Suva, Fiji. All of the patients were diagnosed with influenza A (H1N1) 
pdm09 related severe acute respiratory infection. Subsequently, FCCDC initiated an outbreak 
response and was assisted by the WHO DPS. As part of the response team, I analysed 
surveillance data from the Fiji Syndromic Surveillance System, virological influenza 
surveillance (laboratory testing of suspected ILI cases) and intensive care unit register at the 
Colonial War Memorial hospital. I compiled the data into a brief epidemiological review, which 
was presented during a high level meeting (via teleconference) convened by the WHO DPS and 
MoHMS, and was attended by WHO Western Pacific Regional Office, WHO Headquarters 
Geneva, Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention and Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory, to assess the severity of the outbreak. During the outbreak, I coordinated 
and collated the situational reports at WHO DPS. In response to the outbreak, the Western 
Pacific Regional Office of the WHO organised an immediate donation of 300 courses of 
Tamiflu. Targeted immunisation with seasonal influenza vaccine of high-risk individuals 
including pregnant women, health care workers and the elderly was facilitated by the WHO 
DPS. I used my experience in immunology and vaccine preventable diseases to provide advice 
and information on the use of seasonal influenza vaccines. A few weeks later, the FCCDC with 
assistance from WHO DPS also investigated an increase in paediatric severe acute respiratory 
infections across Fiji. Findings from this outbreak investigation were compiled for publication 
in the Western Pacific Surveillance and Response Journal by Ms Julie Collins, fellow MAE 
from the Hunter New England Population Health Unit. I participated in several other activities 
such as surveillance meetings at the Fiji Ministry of Health and Medical Services and WHO 
DPS; assisted with the workshop of ‘Training on Humanitarian Response Supply Chain 
Management’ and assisted with training of local surveillance officers.  
In September 2016, I travelled to American Samoa where I spent two months collecting data for 
my epidemiological project. Under the Global Programme for Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis, American Samoa conducted seven rounds of mass drug administration (MDA) from 
2000-2006. The WHO recommends systematic post-MDA surveillance using Transmission 
Assessment Surveys for epidemiological assessment of recent lymphatic filariasis transmission. 
My study was designed to compare the effectiveness of two survey designs for post-MDA 
surveillance: school-based Transmission Assessment Survey targeting children aged 6-7 years, 
and a community-based survey targeting individuals aged ≥8 years. My field experience and 
primary study findings are summarised in Chapter 5. During my placement in American Samoa, 
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I trained local field and laboratory teams, and managed the survey logistics. I was invited to 
present on the advancements in rheumatic heart disease at the national symposium, and judge 
the American Samoa’s national high school science symposium. In 2017, I have continued to 
support the high school science symposium remotely from Australia.  
During the MAE, I also received scholarships to participate in the Croucher Summer Course 
2016 on “Vaccinology for Public health and Clinical Practice in the 21st Century” held in Hong 
Kong in July 2016; and to attend the GOARN Outbreak Response Training held in Cairns in 
November 2017. Both were rewarding professional experiences and contributed to my MAE 
training. 
To conclude, the MAE has been a wonderful journey and reminds me of the quote by Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, “Life is a journey, not a destination”. Below are my key take home messages 
from the MAE: 
1. Be culturally sensitive and compassionate, but don’t be afraid to push the boundaries. 
2. Be resilient – don’t let people, politics or other circumstantial challenges prevent you 
from undertaking the work you have been assigned. 
3. Be a ‘good’ epidemiologist – collect good quality data, record as much information as 
possible and trust your intuition. Avoid the quick and dirty approach, and apply the 
academic rigour wherever possible. 
4. Be a leader – provide leadership wherever possible. Just because you are not the elected 
leader does not mean you cannot use your leadership skills. 
Summary of MAE program requirements  
Field projects 
1. Public health data analysis 
Australian vaccine preventable disease epidemiological review series: varicella-zoster 
virus infections, 1998–2015 
2. Field investigation of a public health problem 
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Investigation into increased lymphogranuloma venereum amongst men who have sex 
with men – New South Wales, Australia 2016 
3. Public health surveillance system establishment and evaluation 
An evaluation of an early warning alert and response system (EWARS in a Box) 
implemented after Cyclone Winston, Fiji 2016 
4. Epidemiological study 
Identifying residual transmission of lymphatic filariasis in post-mass drug administration 
surveillance phase: Comparing school-based versus community-based surveys – American 
Samoa, 2016 
Additional non-coursework related requirements 
1. Literature reviews were completed for each field project. 
2. Lay piece for a non-scientific audience 
I prepared lay language pieces as part of community awareness activities for the 
lymphatic filariasis study, which were used for radio advertisements in American 
Samoa. To raise awareness about lymphatic filariasis and about study, I organised and 
participated in mass media activities through radio and television. These activities led to 
a noticeable increase in the recruitment of study participants.   
3. Publications (selected only) 
Sheel M, Beard F, Dey A, Macartney K, McIntyre P. "Do higher rates of herpes 
zoster hospitalisation among Indigenous Australians warrant consideration of 
vaccination at a younger age?". The Medical Journal of Australia. Accepted 20 
February 2017 
Sheel M, Quinn H, Beard F, Dey A, Kirk M, Koehler A, Markey P, McIntyre P, 
Macartney K. “Australian vaccine preventable disease epidemiological review 
series: varicella-zoster virus infections, 1998–2015”. The Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence. Submitted June 2017 
4. Oral presentations (selected only) 
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Sheel M, Sheridan S, Gass K, Won K, Fuimaono S, Kirk M, Graves P, Lau C. 
Eliminating lymphatic filariasis: Comparing school-based Transmission 
Assessment Survey and a community-based survey, American Samoa, 2016. Paper 
presented at the 2017 FETP International Night held during 66
th
 Annual EIS Conference, 
Atlanta, Georgia, USA in April 2017. 
Sheel M, Quinn M, Dey A, Kirk M, Beard F, Macartney K. Hospitalisations and 
mortality associated with varicella and herpes zoster, Australia, 1999-2013. 
Presented at the Communicable Diseases Control Conference hosted by the 
Communicable Diseases Network of Australia, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia in June 
2017. 
Sheel M, Beard F, Dey A, Macartney K, McIntyre P. Higher zoster hospitalisations in 
Indigenous Australians: is vaccination at younger age warranted? Presented at the 
Communicable Diseases Control Conference hosted by the Communicable Diseases 
Network of Australia, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia in June 2017. 
Sheel M and Collin J. Post-emergency surveillance in a box: Evaluation of the 
WHO’s early warning and alert response system (EWARS in a Box) following 
Tropical Cyclone Winston, Fiji 2016. Presented at the National Centre for 
Epidemiology and Population Health Seminar Series, Canberra, Australia in August 
2017. 
5. Teaching to first year MAEs 
I coordinated MAE2016 cohort’s teaching activities during the course block 3. In 
collaboration with fellow MAE Ms Alyson Wright (lead facilitator), Mr Samuel 
McEwen and Ms Mica Hartley, I contributed to the group teaching exercise on ‘What’s 
wrong with that?’. The aim of the session was to develop critical thinking in 
participants when reviewing results and outcomes of studies. The objectives of the 
session were:  
 To understand the importance of questioning data.  
 To identify issues when interpreting data analysis. 
 To apply critical thinking techniques/terms to data analysis. 
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6. Teaching lesson from the field 
Conducing cross-sectional surveys in a resource limited setting. This session was taught 
via video-conference on 11 October 2017. The objectives of the session were: 
 To understand the key logistical and ethical considerations when implementing 
a survey in low resource settings such as American Samoa. 
 To estimate sampling and post-stratification weights required to undertake 
multi-stage cluster survey analyses. 
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Chapter 2: Public health data analysis 
 
Australian vaccine preventable disease 
epidemiological review series: varicella-zoster virus 
infections, 1998–2015 
 13 
Prologue 
My role 
One of the primary objectives of the National Centre for Immunisation Research and 
Surveillance (NCIRS) is to conduct surveillance for vaccine preventable diseases. As a part of 
their routine surveillance activities, NCIRS undertakes epidemiological reviews for vaccine 
preventable diseases for the Communicable Diseases Intelligence (CDI), the quarterly 
publication of the Office Health Protection, Commonwealth Department of Health, Australia. 
For my data analysis project, I conducted an epidemiological review of varicella-zoster virus 
related conditions including varicella (chicken pox) and herpes zoster (shingles) in Australia for 
the years 1998 to 2015. I was provided with three data sets, notification from the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), hospitalisations from the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) Hospital Morbidity Database and mortality data from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). I conducted data analyses using Stata13 and 
Microsoft Excel. With the support of my co-authors, findings from this data analyses were 
compiled for publication in CDI. The submitted manuscript is included in this chapter. 
Lessons learned 
This project was the first of four projects that I began working on during the MAE program, and 
was a steep learning experience. Previous to the MAE, I had no experience of working with 
administrative datasets containing routinely collected surveillance data. Understanding how the 
data was collected and working with these databases was a great learning experience and I am 
grateful to have acquired such a skill. Learning about the nuances of hospitalisation data was 
one of my most liked (yet hated) learning experiences. For example, 15 years of data was 
provided as four separate datasets, each of which had different coding for fields such Aboriginal 
status, date and time formats, age restrictions or checking data completeness for different fields. 
All of these had to be systematically recoded and appended in Stata. I undertook descriptive and 
analytical epidemiological review of varicella and herpes zoster for the study. I learnt about 
analysing count data and the use of different epidemiological tools including negative binomial 
and Poisson regression models. Traditionally, NCIRS utilises Poisson regression to analyse 
disease trends but following my experience we had several discussions around the use of 
different models for analyses of count data. I learnt about the role of epidemiological data 
analyses in influencing evidence based policy decisions and in identifying key public health 
messages. 
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Public health impact 
Although this report was prepared for the CDI, findings from this work were timely for several 
other purposes. The varicella vaccine was funded under the National Immunisation Program for 
children aged 18 months in 2005. This was the first study to evaluate the population-wide 
impact of the national immunisation program on the epidemiology of both varicella and herpes 
zoster. Some of the most significant findings are summarised below. 
A vaccine for herpes zoster for people aged 70-79 years was introduced in November 2016. We 
wanted to conduct a baseline epidemiological review for herpes zoster in order to monitor the 
impact of the national zoster immunisation program. An ancillary finding from this project was 
the higher hospitalisation rates of herpes zoster in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
at a younger age (60 years). We undertook this analysis after concerns were raised by our 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander stakeholders about inappropriately restrictive funding with 
regard to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations. The results from this study were 
accepted for publication in the Medical Journal of Australia (Appendix 2A). The findings were 
also submitted to the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation for policy review 
to fund the zoster vaccine for Aboriginal Australians at a younger age. Data from the 
epidemiological review were also presented by A/Prof Kristine Macartney to the Joint 
Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, United Kingdom as part of their review process 
for funding of a national varicella immunisation program. 
The findings from this work also highlighted the limitations of Australia’s current surveillance 
systems, which may not be suitable for monitoring the changing epidemiology of herpes zoster. 
In this paper, we advocate for improved herpes zoster surveillance systems in order monitor the 
impact of the national zoster immunisation program. 
I presented this work at the Communicable Diseases Conference hosted by the Communicable 
Diseases Network of Australia held in Melbourne, Australia in June 2017 and at the New 
Zealand Immunisation Conference held in Wellington, New Zealand in September 2017. 
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Abstract 
Introduction: In 2005, the National Immunisation Program implemented a varicella vaccine for 
children aged 18 months, and in 2016, a herpes zoster (HZ) vaccine for adults aged 70-79 years. 
This epidemiological review analyses national trends in varicella and HZ for the years 1998-
2015 to examine the impact of a funded varicella vaccine and provide a baseline for monitoring 
the impact of a funded HZ vaccine.  
Methods: Varicella and HZ notifications (2002-2015), hospitalisations (1999-2013) and deaths 
(1998-2013) were sourced. We stratified analyses by age, sex and Indigenous status, and 
estimated rates and incidence rate ratios. 
Results: Funded varicella vaccine led to a rapid decline in varicella notifications, 
hospitalisations and deaths. During the post-varicella vaccine period, hospitalisations declined 
in all age groups <40 years, with greatest reduction of 84% in children aged 18-59 months. 
Annual HZ hospitalisation rate was 10.8 per 100,000. HZ hospitalisation rates increased with 
age and were highest in persons aged ≥75 years (87.6 per 100,000). Post-herpetic neuralgia 
(PHN) was diagnosed in 32.5% HZ hospitalisations with highest hospitalisation rate in persons 
aged ≥75 years (32.1 per 100,000). Varicella and HZ hospitalisation rates were significantly 
higher among Indigenous Australians. Twenty one deaths were coded as due to varicella and 
340 deaths were coded as due to HZ in persons aged <40 years and ≥40 years, respectively. 
Conclusions: The national varicella immunisation program substantially reduced varicella 
associated morbidity and mortality. Burden of HZ and PHN is substantial, and timely and high 
quality surveillance will be crucial to assess the impact of the national HZ immunisation 
program. 
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Introduction 
Varicella-zoster virus (VZV) is a herpes virus and is the aetiological agent for varicella 
(chickenpox) and herpes zoster (shingles).
1
 Varicella is an acute and self-limiting disease with 
an average incubation period of 14-16 days (range from 10 to 21 days). The disease is highly 
contagious with a secondary attack rate of 90% in susceptible contacts of persons with 
varicella.
1, 2
 Varicella typically presents as a vesicular rash accompanied by fever and malaise 
but can occasionally be asymptomatic or have atypical presentations. Complications include 
secondary skin infections, pneumonia, meningitis and encephalitis. Primary infection with VZV 
usually provides long lasting immunity and further episodes of clinical disease are rare in 
immunocompetent individuals.
2, 3
  
VZV remains dormant for years in the dorsal root ganglia adjacent to the spinal cord: 
reactivation of the latent virus can lead to herpes zoster (HZ).  Characteristics of HZ include a 
vesicular rash with a unilateral dermatomal distribution which is usually accompanied with 
acute pain. Post-herpetic neuralgia (PHN) is the most common complication of HZ, and is 
defined as pain persisting 90 days or more from the onset of the rash. PHN is often debilitating 
and refractory to treatment.
4-6
  
In Australia, varicella vaccine was registered for use in 1999 and included on the National 
Immunisation Program (NIP) in November 2005 as a single dose at 18 months of age, along 
with a school-based single cohort catch-up program for 12-13 year olds.
7, 8
 Uptake of varicella 
vaccine assessed at 2 years of age was 76.1% in 2007, and increased to 84.4% in 2012.
7, 9, 10
 In 
July 2013, a combination vaccine (measles-mumps-rubella-varicella or MMRV) replaced the 
monovalent varicella vaccine at age 18 months; following which vaccine uptake increased to 
89.6% in 2014.
11
 A vaccine for HZ was registered in Australia in 2005, but was not widely 
available on private prescription or added onto the NIP until November 2016.
12
  Although the 
vaccine is registered for use in people aged ≥50 years, it is funded on the NIP for people aged 
70 years with a 5 year catch-up program for people aged 71-79 years.
12
 
Early assessment of the impact of inclusion of varicella vaccine on the NIP demonstrated a 
decline in hospitalisations due to varicella, especially in children less than 4 years of age, along 
with a reduction in severe outcomes of varicella, including congenital and neonatal varicella.
9, 13, 
14
 Several studies have documented increasing incidence of HZ in Australia, both before and 
after the introduction of the varicella vaccine.
15, 16
 Age-related increases in the risk of HZ are 
associated with a decline in cellular immunity to VZV, however, the underlying cause of the 
rising incidence (even after age adjustment) remains unclear.
16
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This study aims to review the epidemiology of varicella and HZ in Australia from 1998 to 2015, 
assess the impact of the national varicella immunisation program and provide a baseline for 
monitoring the impact of the national HZ immunisation program.  
Methods 
Data sources 
Notification data 
The National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) receives varicella and HZ 
notifications from all Australian states and territories (jurisdictions) except New South Wales 
(Table 1). Varicella and HZ became notifiable as early as 2002 in South Australia and as late as 
2009 in Victoria. 
Table 1: Proportions (varicella, herpes zoster or not elsewhere classified) of total 
varicella zoster virus (VZV) related conditions reported through the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), by state or territory, Australia 
2002-2015.  
Jurisdiction  
(state or territory) 
Year 
notification 
commenced 
Notified 
by 
laboratory 
Follow-up 
laboratory 
notification 
VZV-related conditions (percentage 
of total notifications) 
    Varicella Herpes 
zoster 
Not 
elsewhere 
classified 
New South Wales N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Victoria 2009 Yes No 13.2 19.8 66.9 
Queensland 2006 Yes No 7.1 3.8 89.1 
South Australia 2002 Yes Yes 24.1 66.3 9.7 
Western Australia 2006 Yes No 17.1 38.9 44 
Tasmania 2006 Yes No 11.4 63.8 24.8 
Northern 
Territory 
2006 Yes Yes 41.9 56.4 1.8 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
2006 Yes No 12.7 26.5 60.7 
National 2006 - - 14.1 26.3 59.6 
 
National case definitions exist for varicella-zoster infection (chickenpox), varicella-zoster 
infection (shingles) and varicella-zoster infection (not elsewhere classified).
17
 For chicken pox 
and shingles, both confirmed and probable cases are required to be notified. Confirmed cases of 
shingles (HZ) and chickenpox (varicella) require laboratory definitive evidence and clinical 
evidence. Laboratory confirmation requires detection of VZV from a skin or lesion swab, or 
VZV-specific IgM in an unvaccinated person (for varicella). In case of varicella, a case is 
considered confirmed if clinical and epidemiological evidence of disease is available. For 
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probable cases of chicken pox and shingles, clinical evidence of disease is sufficient. Varicella-
zoster infection (not elsewhere classified) requires only laboratory confirmed definitive 
evidence of VZV. 
17
 
Notification data for the years 2006 to 2015 were sourced from the NNDSS database. South 
Australian notification data for the years 2002 to 2004 were sourced from the South Australian 
Department for Health and Ageing. Analysis of notification data was restricted to South 
Australia and Northern Territory, as these are the only jurisdictions that routinely follow up 
laboratory notifications of VZV infection for clinical and/ or epidemiological evidence and had 
a low proportion of ‘not elsewhere classified’ notifications (Table 1). 
Hospitalisation data 
We obtained national data from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) National 
Hospital Morbidity Database. All hospital admissions (public and private) in Australia are 
captured through this administrative database which collects demographic and clinical details. 
All eligible hospitalisations between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2013 were identified 
using the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, 10
th
 Revision, Australian 
Modification (ICD-10-AM) codes B01.0-B01.9 (varicella or its complications), B02.0-B02.9 
(HZ or its complications), where listed as the principal or other diagnosis. Cases of PHN were 
identified using ICD-10-AM codes B02.2 (PHN), G53.0 (PHN under cranial nerve disorders) 
and G53.1 (multiple cranial nerve palsies in infectious and parasitic diseases classified 
elsewhere).   
Mortality data 
Mortality data were obtained from the AIHW’s National Mortality Database (1998-2005) and 
the Australian Coordinating Registry (2006-2013). We restricted analysis to underlying cause of 
death (UCOD), which was identified using ICD-10-AM codes B01.0-B01.9 (varicella) and 
B02.0-B02.9 (herpes zoster). Age-specific analyses were limited due to the small cell size rule 
applied by the data custodians. In addition, the positive predictive value for varicella coded 
deaths is known to be poor and due to issues of misclassification of HZ and varicella,
18
 we 
restricted analyses to persons aged <40 and ≥40 years for varicella and HZ associated deaths, 
respectively.  
Population estimates 
National, jurisdictional and age-specific mid-year resident population estimates were obtained 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 
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Data analysis 
Annual crude and age-specific rates were calculated using ABS mid-year population estimates 
as the denominator and are expressed as rates per 100,000 total population or population in sex, 
geographical or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (from here on referred to as Indigenous) 
subgroups as appropriate. Reported rates refer to hospitalisations where the relevant condition 
was coded as the principal diagnosis, unless otherwise stated.  
We calculated varicella and HZ notification and hospitalisation rates for the period 1999 to 2015. 
To assess changes in disease epidemiology following introduction of the national varicella 
immunisation program, we undertook comparative analyses over two time periods: pre-vaccine 
(1999-2004) and post-vaccine (2007-2015). Analysis of HZ hospitalisation rates for older age 
groups was restricted to non-Indigenous populations as age-specific counts for Indigenous 
persons were unavailable for persons aged ≥75 years for the latter years of the study period.  
Summary statistics including median and range were calculated for length of hospital stay. P-
values were derived using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Incidence rates and 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) were calculated for the total population, non-Indigenous and 
Indigenous populations at the national level and relevant jurisdictional groupings, as indicated, 
assuming a negative binomial distribution. Negative binomial regression was used to analyse 
yearly trends in rates of hospitalisation and calculate the incidence rate ratios (IRR). All 
analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel 2010 and STATA software (version 13.1; 
StataCorp, College Station, Texas USA). 
Indigenous hospitalisation data 
We restricted analyses to the four  jurisdictions (Queensland, Western Australia, South 
Australia and Northern Territory) with adequate Indigenous data quality prior to 2007,
19
 with 
supplementary analyses incorporating data from New South Wales and Victoria for the years 
2007 to 2013. Hospitalisations with missing information on state of residence (<1% of total) 
were excluded.  
Ethics approval was not required as de-identified aggregated population-based data were used 
for routine public health surveillance purposes only. 
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Results  
Notifications of varicella and herpes zoster 
Varicella 
Varicella notification rates in South Australia declined from 41.8 per 100,000 (95% CI 38.6–
45.2) in 2002 to 26.3 per 100,000 (95% CI 23.4–28.9) in 2015 (Figure 1A). Varicella 
notification rates in the Northern Territory reduced from 92.3 per 100,000 (95% CI 79.8–106.3) 
in 2006 to 48.2 per 100,000 (95% CI 39.4–57.8) in 2015.  
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
(C) 
 
Figure 1: Notification rates for varicella by jurisdiction [South Australia (SA) and 
Northern Territory (NT)] (A) and age group (B and C), 2002- 2015 
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Declines in age-specific varicella notification rates were observed in both South Australia and 
the Northern Territory (Figures 1B and 1C). In South Australia, varicella notification rates in 
persons aged 0-4 years reduced by 63% during the post-vaccine (2007-2015) period (IRR 0.37; 
95% CI 0.23-0.59). Reduced varicella notification rates were also observed in other age groups 
<40 years during the post-vaccine period (data not shown).   
Herpes zoster 
In contrast to varicella, HZ notification rates increased over time in both South Australia and in 
the Northern Territory (Figure 2A). In South Australia, HZ notification rates increased steadily 
from 23.1 per 100,000 (95% CI 20.7–25.6) in 2002 to 136.9 per 100,000 (95% CI 131.4–142.6) 
in 2015. In the Northern Territory, HZ notification rates increased from 38.2 per 100,000 
(95%CI 30.3–47.6) in 2006 to 148.4 per 100,000 (95% CI 133.5–164.5) in 2015. Similar trends 
were also observed in age-specific rates with the highest incidence in persons aged ≥70 years, 
both in South Australia and the Northern Territory (Figures 2B and 2C). Fluctuations in 
notification rates in the Northern Territory are likely to be associated with its small population 
size, especially in older age groups.  
Varicella and herpes zoster associated hospitalisations 
Varicella 
There were 18,615 episodes of varicella associated hospitalisation between January 1999 and 
December 2013, of which 12,824 (68.9%) had a principal diagnosis of varicella. The annual 
varicella hospitalisation rate reduced from 6.9 per 100,000 (95% CI 6.3–7.1) in 1999 to 2.1 per 
100,000 (95% CI 1.9–2.3) in 2013. 
The average annual hospitalisation rate for the period 1999-2013 was 4.2 per 100,000 (95% CI 
3.4–5.3). Hospitalisation rates were similar in females (3.3 per 100,000; 95% CI 2.6-4.1) and 
males (4.5 per 100,000; 95% CI 3.5–5.6). There was a rapid decline in hospitalisation rates after 
the varicella vaccine was added onto the NIP in 2005 (Figure 3A). Hospitalisation rates were 
41% lower in 2007 compared to 2005 (IRR 0.59; 95% CI 0.53–0.65).  
Age-specific trends in hospitalisation rates are presented in Figure 3B. During 1999-2013, 
hospitalisation rates were highest in children aged ≤17 months (30.3 per 100,000; 95% CI 23.0–
40.0) and lowest in adults aged ≥40 years (1.5 per 100,000; 95% CI 1.4–1.6). 
There were significant reductions in hospitalisation rates for all age groups <40 years during the 
post-vaccine period (2007-2013) compared to the pre-vaccine period (1999-2004) (Table 2). 
The largest decreases were seen in children aged 18-59 months (IRR 0.16; 95% CI 0.12–0.23), 
and in those aged ≤17 months (IRR 0.33; 95% CI 0.26–0.40). Despite the rapid decline during 
the first  
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(B) 
 
(C) 
 
Figure 2: Notification rates for herpes zoster, by jurisdiction [South Australia (SA) 
and Northern Territory (NT)] (A) and age group (B and C), 2002- 2015 
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(B) 
 
Figure 3: Varicella hospitalisation (principal diagnosis) rates (A) and by age 
group (B), Australia, 1999-2013 
 
  
Table 2 Varicella associated hospitalisations, Australia, 1999-20132 
  Pre-varicella vaccine 
1999-2004 
Post-varicella vaccine 
2007-2013 
  
 Age group Hospitalisations (n) Rate
3
 (95% CI) Hospitalisations (n) Rate
‡
 (95% CI) IRR
4
 (95% CI) 
Principal varicella in all Australians 
0-17 months 1020 45.2 (41.6-49.1)  454 14.8 (12.1-18.1)  0.33 (0.26-0.40)  
18-59 months 2188 40.7 (35.1-47.2)  458 6.7 (5.0-8.9)  0.16 (0.12-0.23) 
5-9 years 713 8.9 (7.82-10.2)  338 3.6 (2.5-5.0)  0.40 (0.27-0.58)  
10-14 years 269 3.3 (2.9-3.9)  202 2.1 (1.8-2.4)  0.63 (0.52-0.76)  
15-19 years 291 3.6 (3.1-4.2)  165 1.6 (1.4-1.9)  0.45 (0.36-0.56)  
20-29 years 913 5.6 (5.2-6.1)  432 2.0 (1.6-2.3)  0.35 (0.29-0.41)  
30-39 years 850 4.8 (4.4-5.3)  584 2.7 (2.3-3.2)  0.56 (0.46-0.68)  
≥40 years 690 1.4 (1.3-1.5)  1105 1.6 (1.4-1.7)  1.15 (1.01-1.30)  
All ages 6934 6.0 (5.5-6.5)  3738 2.4 (2.2-2.7)  0.41 (0.35-0.47)  
All varicella in all Australians 
0-17 months 1421 62.9 (56.8-69.7)  592 19.3 (15.4-24.2)  0.31 (0.24-0.39)  
18-59 months 2455 45.6 (40.1-52.0)  529 7.7 (5.5-10.1)  0.17 (0.12-0.25)  
5-9 years 1129 14.1 (12.5-15.9)  525 5.5 (4.0-7.6)  0.39 (0.27-0.56)  
10-14 years 420 5.2 (4.6-5.8)  302 3.1 (2.8-3.9)  0.60 (0.52-0.69)  
15-19 years 409 5.1 (4.2-6.1)  228 2.2 (1.9-2.6)  0.44 (0.35-0.56)  
20-29 years 1366 8.4 (7.6-9.3)  648 2.9 (2.4-3.5)  0.35 (0.28-0.43)  
30-39 years 1205 6.8 (6.3-7.4)  821 3.8 (3.4-4.3)  0.55 (0.48-0.64)  
≥40 years 1236 2.4 (2.3-2.6)  2369 3.4 (3.0-3.8)  1.37 (1.18-1.59)  
All ages 9641 8.3 (7.6-9.1)  6014 3.9 (3.6-4.2)  0.47 (0.42-0.53)  
 
                                                          
2
 Age-specific hospitalisations identified using ICD-10-AM code B01.0-B01.9 
3
 Average annual hospitalisation rate per 100,000 population 
4
 Incidence rate ratio between hospitalisation rates during pre and post-varicella vaccine periods 
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five years after varicella vaccine was introduced under the NIP, limited additional decline in 
hospitalisation rates was observed in more recent years (Figure 3A and 3B). Similar findings 
were observed on analyses of hospitalisations where varicella was recorded in any diagnosis 
field (Table 2). Trends in hospitalisation rates by jurisdiction were broadly similar (Figure 4). 
Between 1999 and 2013, there were 47,477 bed days recorded for hospitalisations coded as due 
to varicella. The overall median length of stay was 2 days with length of stay longest in those 
aged ≥40 years (5 days). 
Herpes zoster 
There were 80,960 episodes of HZ associated hospitalisations during 1999-2013. Of these, 
33,549 (41.4%) episodes had a principal diagnosis of HZ. Over this period, the average annual 
HZ associated hospitalisation rate was 10.8 per 100,000 (95% CI 10.5–11.1). The HZ 
hospitalisation rate increased from 9.7 per 100,000 (95%CI 9.2–10.1) in 1999 to 11.4 per 
100,000 (95% CI 11.0–11.9) in 2013 (Figure 5A), an average annual increase of 1% (IRR 1.01; 
95% CI 1.01-1.02). Over this period, the HZ hospitalisation rate for females (30.0 per 100,000; 
95% CI 28.7–31.3) was higher than for males (21.8 per 100,000; 95% CI 20.7–22.9). The 
difference was most pronounced in females ≥75 years with a hospitalisation rate of 95.1 per 
100,000 (95% CI 92.6–97.6) compared to males (76.4 per 100,000; 95% CI 73.6–79.2). 
HZ hospitalisation rates increased with age (Figure 5B). Hospitalisation rates were highest in 
persons aged ≥75 years (87.6 per 100,000; 95% CI 85.9–89.4), followed by those aged 70-74 
years (37.4 per 100,000; 95% CI 35.8–39.0) and lowest in those aged 0-49 years (2.4 per 
100,000; 95% CI 2.3–2.4). Amongst non-Indigenous populations, for whom data were available 
for older age groups (Figure 5C), people aged ≥85 years old had the highest hospitalisation rate 
of 129.0 per 100,000 (95% CI 124.3–134.0) (Table 3).  
When we compared hospitalisation rates during the post-varicella vaccine period (2007-2013) to 
the pre-varicella vaccine period (1999-2004) in non-Indigenous people, the IRR was 1.08 (95% 
CI 1.03–1.13) for all ages, 0.94 (95% CI 0.88–1.02) for those aged 70-74 years, and 0.89 (95% 
CI 0.84–0.95) for those aged 75-79 years (Table 3). 
Post-herpetic neuralgia (PHN) 
Almost a third (32.5%) of all hospitalisations (principal) coded as HZ also had a diagnosis of 
PHN recorded in the diagnostic field (within the first 30 diagnostic fields). The overall rate of 
PHN hospitalisations remained stable (Figure 6A) for the years 1999-2013 (IRR 1.00; 95% CI 
0.99-1.01), with the highest rate in those aged ≥75 years (32.1 per 100,000) followed by people 
aged 70-74 years (14.1 per 100,000). PHN-associated hospitalisations increased  
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 Figure 4: Varicella hospitalisation rates, by state or territory, Australia, 1999-
2013 
  
Table 3: Herpes zoster associated hospitalisations, Australia, 1999-20135 
  Study period 
1999-2013  
Pre-varicella vaccine 
1999-2004 
Post-varicella vaccine 
2007-2013 
  
 Age groups Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
6
 (95% CI) Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
†† 
(95% CI) Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
†† 
(95% CI) IRR
7
  
(95% CI) 
Principal herpes zoster in all Australians 
0-49 years 5103 2.4 (2.3-2.4) 1982 2.4 (2.3-2.6) 2458 2.3 (2.2-2.4) 0.97 (0.91-1.04) 
50-59 years 3115 8.1 (7.7-8.5) 1084 7.8 (7.3-8.4) 1619 8.3 (7.7-9.0) 1.07 (0.96-1.20) 
60-69 years 5079 18.6 (18.0-19.3) 1620 17.7 (16.7-18.9) 2828 19.3 (18.5-20.0) 1.09 (1.02-1.16) 
70-74 years 3720 37.4 (35.8-39.0) 1438 38.2 (36.8-39.6) 1780 35.9 (33.4-38.6) 0.94 (0.86-1.02) 
≥75 years 16532 87.6 (85.9-89.4) 5846 87.1 (84.9-89.4) 8492 87.9 (84.8-91.2) 1.01 (0.96-1.06) 
All ages 33549 10.8 (10.5-11.1) 11970 10.3 (10.0-10.6) 17177 11.1 (10.7-11.6) 1.08 (1.03-1.14) 
All herpes zoster in all Australians 
0-49 years 10009 4.6 (4.5-4.8) 3907 4.7 (4.6-4.9) 4771 4.5 (4.3-4.8) 0.96 (0.89-1.03) 
50-59 years 6898 17.9 (17.2-18.6) 2463 17.7 (17.0-18.4) 3490 17.9 (16.7-19.3) 1.01 (0.93-1.10) 
60-69 years 11852 43.2 (41.4-45.0) 3724 40.8 (38.7-43.0) 6656 45.3 (42.8-47.8) 1.11 (1.03-1.20) 
70-74 years 9002 90.2 (86.3-94.3) 3478 92.4 (89.4-95.5) 4428 88.9 (81.6-96.9) 0.96 (0.87-1.06) 
≥75 years 43199 228.1 (221.9-234.5) 14796 220.4 (216.9-224.0) 22788 235.5 (225.4-246.2) 1.07 (1.01-1.12) 
All ages 80960 25.9 (25.0-27.0) 28368 24.4 (23.0-24.8) 42133 27.3 (25.8-28.9) 1.12 (1.05-1.19) 
Principal herpes zoster in non-Indigenous Australians
8
 
70-74 years 3689 37.4 (35.8-39.0) 1427 38.2 (36.3-40.2) 1763 35.8 (33.3-38.6) 0.94 (0.88-1.02) 
75-79 years 4787 59.4 (57.4-61.6) 1938 62.7 (60.0-65.6) 2181 56.1 (53.8-58.5) 0.89 (0.84-0.95) 
80-84 years 5349 92.0 (89.0-95.1) 1886 94.0 (88.8-99.5) 2746 90.9 (86.6-95.4) 0.97 (0.90-1.04) 
≥85 years 6340 129.0 (124.3-134.0) 2011 126.5 (118.5-135.1) 3528 130.8 (123.7-138.3) 1.03 (0.95-1.13) 
All ages 33007 10.9 (10.6-11.2) 11805 10.4 (10.2-10.7) 16867 11.3 (10.9-11.7) 1.08 (1.03-1.13) 
All herpes zoster in non-Indigenous Australians
§§
 
                                                          
5
 Age-specific hospitalisations identified using ICD-10-AM code B02.0-02.9 
6
 Average annual hospitalisation rate per 100,000 population 
7
 Incidence rate ratio between hospitalisation rates during pre and post-varicella vaccine periods 
8
 Hospitalisations for Indigenous Australians were excluded. 
  
  Study period 
1999-2013  
Pre-varicella vaccine 
1999-2004 
Post-varicella vaccine 
2007-2013 
  
 Age groups Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
6
 (95% CI) Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
†† 
(95% CI) Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
†† 
(95% CI) IRR
7
  
(95% CI) 
70-74 years 8931 90.2 (86.2-94.4) 3457 92.5 (89.5-95.7) 4386 88.9 (81.3-97.0) 0.96 (0.87-1.06) 
75-79 years 12145 150.8 (146.3-155.3) 4808 155.7 (148.7-163.0) 5729 147.3 (142.0-152.9) 0.95 (0.89-1.00) 
80-84 years 13759 236.4 (228.0-245.1) 4636 231.7 (220.0-243.9) 7204 238.3 (224.7-252.6) 1.03 (0.95-1.11) 
≥85 years 17184 348.2 (338.1-358.6) 5330 335.8 (325.5-346.4) 9779 361.5 (347.8-375.7) 1.08 (1.02-1.14) 
All ages 79874 26.4 (25.4-27.4) 28069 24.8 (24.5-25.2) 41487 27.7 (26.1-29.4) 1.12 (1.05-1.19) 
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
(C) 
 
Figure 5: Herpes zoster hospitalisation rates (A), herpes zoster hospitalisation 
rates (principal diagnosis) by age group in all Australians (B) and in older non-
Indigenous people (C), Australia, 1999-2013  
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 6: Hospitalisation rates for post-herpetic neuralgia [PHN] and herpes 
zoster [HZ] (A) and by age groups (B), Australia, 1999-20139  
  
                                                          
9
 Analyses restricted to episodes where HZ was recorded as a principal diagnosis and PHN was 
recorded within the first 30 diagnostic fields. Principal HZ includes episodes of PHN. 
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disproportionately with age, where 26.7% HZ hospitalisations in those aged 50-59 years had an 
episode of PHN compared to 36.6% in those aged ≥75 years (Figure 6B). 
Between 1999 and 2013, there were 226,276 bed days for hospitalisation coded as due to HZ. 
The overall median length of stay was 4 days with length of stay increasing with age. Median 
length of stay per admission was 4 days and 6 days for people aged 70-74 and ≥75 years, 
respectively. HZ hospitalisations in which a diagnosis for PHN was also recorded were 
associated with a higher median length of stay (5 days) compared to those not also recorded as 
having PHN (4 days) (p<0.05). 
VZV associated hospitalisations in Indigenous Australians  
Varicella  
We compared varicella hospitalisation rates in Indigenous people over the pre- and post- 
vaccine periods using data from four jurisdictions (Queensland, Western Australia, Northern 
Territory and South Australia). We observed significant decreases in hospitalisation rates in all 
age groups, with the greatest reduction of 89% (IRR 0.11; 95% CI 0.06-0.22) in children aged 
18-59 months (Table 4). Similar findings were observed when we compared varicella 
hospitalisation rates in children aged 18-59 months from the four jurisdictions for the pre-
vaccine period (38.1 per 100,000; 95% CI 29.8-48.7) to hospitalisation rates in Queensland, 
Western Australia, South Australia, Northern Territory, New South Wales and Victoria for the 
post-vaccine period (6.3 per 100,000; 95% CI 3.1-12.3).  
For Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory in the pre-
vaccine period, the hospitalisation rate in Indigenous children aged 18-59 months was 36% 
higher compared to non-Indigenous children (IRR 1.36; 95% CI 1.01–1.83) but similar during 
the post-vaccine period (IRR 0.91; 95% CI 0.42–1.96). Similar trends were also observed in 
children aged 0-17 months, with the IRR for Indigenous versus non-Indigenous populations 
during the post-vaccine period 1.52 (95% CI 0.99-2.33), compared to 1.69 (95% CI 1.30-2.19) 
in the pre-vaccine period (Figure 7A). Indigenous Australians had higher varicella 
hospitalisation rates compared to non-Indigenous Australians in all other age groups (Tables 2 
and 4).  
Herpes zoster 
When we analysed data from six jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South 
Australia, Northern Territory and Western Australia) for the years 2007-2011, we found HZ 
hospitalisation rates in Indigenous people to be almost double those in non-Indigenous people 
 37 
aged 50-59 years (IRR 1.87; 95% CI 1.29-2.71) and 60-69 years (IRR 1.77; 95% CI 1.27-2.48) 
(Figure 7B). However, no significant difference was observed in people aged 70-79 years (IRR 
0.83; 95% CI 0.51-1.36).  
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 7: Incidence rate ratios for varicella (A) 10 and herpes zoster (B)11 
hospitalisation rates between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians by age 
groups, Australia, 1999- 2013 
  
                                                          
10
 Analyses restricted to Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory. Pre-varicella vaccine=1999-2004 and post-varicella vaccine=2007-2013. 
11
 Analyses restricted to New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory for the years 2007-2011. 
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Table 4: Varicella hospitalisations (principal diagnosis) by age groups and 
vaccine period in Indigenous populations, Australia, 1999- 201312,13 
 Pre-varicella vaccine 
1999-2004 
Post-varicella vaccine 
2007-2013 
  
Age 
group 
 Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
14
 
(95% CI) 
Hospitalisations 
(n) 
Rate
‡‡‡ 
(95% CI) 
IRR
15
 
(95% CI) 
0-17 
months 
69 73.0  
(57.7-92.5) 
25 21.1 
(12.6-35.3) 
0.29 
(0.18-0.46) 
18-59 
months 
64 38.1  
(29.8-48.7) 
9 4.3 
(1.7-11.0) 
0.11 
(0.06-0.22) 
5-9 
years 
38 15.6  
(11.4-21.4) 
11 3.5 
(1.9-6.2) 
0.22 
(0.11-0.43) 
10-14 
years 
9 4.2  
(1.7-10.8) 
19 6.2 
(4.0-10.0) 
1.49 
(0.66-3.33) 
15-19 
years 
4 2.2  
(0-5.8) 
7 2.5 
(0-6.6) 
1.17 
(0.29-4.71) 
20-29 
years 
13 4.3  
(2.5-9.3) 
6 1.4 
(0-3.0) 
0.32 
(0.12-0.84) 
30-39 
years 
7 2.6  
(1.2-5.4) 
10 2.9 
(1.4-6.1) 
1.12 
(0.39-3.24) 
≥40 
years 
8 2.9  
(1.1-4.4) 
12 2.0 
(1.0-3.8) 
0.90 
(0.36-2.24) 
All ages 212 11.5 
(10.0-13.1) 
99 3.8 
(2.7-5.2) 
0.33 
(0.25-0.44) 
 
                                                          
12
 Analyses restricted to Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory 
13
 Age-specific hospitalisations identified using ICD-10-AM code B02.0-02.9 
14
 Average annual hospitalisation rate per 100,000 population 
15
 Incidence rate ratio between hospitalisation rates during pre and post-varicella vaccine 
periods 
 40 
Varicella and herpes zoster associated mortality  
During the period 1998-2013, there were 21 deaths with varicella coded as the underlying cause 
of death (UCOD). In people aged <40 years the number of deaths was two-thirds lower in the 
post-vaccine period (2007-2013; 5 deaths) compared to the pre-vaccine period (1998-2004; 15 
deaths). In children aged <10 years, the number of deaths reduced from 6 deaths in 1998-2004 
to <4 deaths in 2007-2013.  
During the same period, there were 340 deaths where HZ was coded as the UCOD with an 
overall crude mortality rate of 0.23 per 100,000 (95% CI 0.21-0.26) in those aged ≥40 years. Of 
these deaths, 5 (1.5%) were in people 40-59 years of age, 7 (2.1%) in those aged 60-69 years, 40 
(11.8%) in those aged 70-79 years and 288 (84.7%) in those aged ≥80 years. The number of 
HZ-related deaths recorded for females (230, 67.6%) was twice that of males (110, 32.4%).   
Discussion 
Introduction of the national varicella immunisation program in 2005 for children aged 18 
months was associated with a rapid and significant decline in varicella hospitalisation rates in 
Australia, particularly in children aged ≤10 years. While the varicella vaccine was available 
through the private market from 2000 and was recommended for use in 2003,
2
 the vaccine did 
not have significant impact on hospitalisation rates until it was introduced under the NIP in 
2005 as a single dose at 18 months of age with no formal catch-up program. Previously 
published data on varicella hospitalisations until 2010 reported 70% and 60% reductions in the 
age groups of 1-4 year olds and <1 year olds, respectively.
9
 By December 2013, we found 84% 
reduction in hospitalisation rates in the post-varicella vaccine period in children aged 18-59 
months, most of whom would have received the vaccine. Significant herd effect with 67% 
reduction in varicella hospitalisation rates was evident in children aged <18 months, who are not 
eligible for varicella immunisation. In the 20-29 years and 30-39 years age groups, varicella 
hospitalisation rates also reduced by 65% and 44%, respectively, suggesting that the herd 
protection effects of universal childhood immunisation also extend to adults of childrearing age, 
who are susceptible to more severe disease than children.
20-22
 Similar impacts following one-
dose varicella immunisation programs have been documented in other countries including the 
USA, Canada, Italy, Germany, Taiwan and Uruguay.
23
 Hospitalisation rates in those aged ≥40 
years did not decline during the post-vaccine period (IRR 1.15; 95% CI 1.01–1.30), most likely 
due to naturally acquired VZV-specific immunity in this age group and possible 
misclassification of HZ as varicella.
18, 24
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Despite the relatively high vaccine coverage and rapid initial decline in hospitalisation rates, 
little change in varicella hospitalisation rates was observed from 2010 onwards. Approximately 
300 varicella hospitalisations continue to occur each year in those aged <40 years. Two recent 
Australian studies, one in Queensland and one nationally across all sentinel sites in the 
Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) network, have shown a single dose 
of varicella vaccine to have moderate effectiveness against varicella-associated hospitalisations 
of 81.9% and 64.6%, respectively.
25, 26
 Further decreases in hospitalisation rates and interruption 
of community-wide transmission will likely require a second dose of vaccine.
27
 In the USA, 
continuing varicella outbreaks and episodes of breakthrough disease were documented, despite 
high coverage attained under their one-dose varicella immunisation program, and prompted a 
switch to a two-dose program in 2006. 
28-31
 Introduction of a second dose led to a greater than 
40% decline in hospitalisations during the years 2006-2010 compared to 2002-2005, as reported 
from two sentinel surveillance sites, and was accompanied by reduction in severe disease and 
outbreaks.
32-34
 Similar to the USA, where overall deaths reduced by 66% in the first 6 years 
following the introduction of the one-dose program,
35
 we found a 67% reduction in varicella-
attributable deaths in people aged <40 years during the post-vaccine period. In 2007, addition of 
a second dose of varicella vaccine to the NIP was deemed not cost-effective by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee.
36
 However, our findings suggest that it may be 
time to re-examine the potential for NIP funding of a second dose in the childhood schedule, if 
Australia is to achieve any further significant reductions in varicella-associated morbidity and 
mortality.
37
  
A national HZ immunisation program, using the live attenuated zoster vaccine, was introduced 
in Australia in November 2016 for people aged 70-79 years. Our report focussed on HZ-related 
hospitalisations – although only around 3% of HZ cases are hospitalised,38 hospitalisation rates 
are a measure of severe disease posing a significant economic burden on the health system.
39, 40
 
Consistent with other studies, our results demonstrate higher hospitalisation rates and mortality 
associated with HZ in older people (associated with immunosenescene) and in females (in 
whom a different response to latent VZV infection has been identified).
38, 41
 We found similar 
HZ hospitalisation rates between the pre- and post-varicella vaccine periods, including in those 
aged 70-74 years (IRR 0.94; 95% CI 0.86–1.02) and ≥75 years (IRR 1.01; 95% CI 0.96–1.06), 
but an increasing trend in the HZ notification rate in South Australia and the Northern Territory. 
While this increase in notifications may be partly due to increased testing, similar to that seen 
with influenza and pertussis,
42
 several studies have documented increases in community-based 
consultations and emergency department presentations for HZ, which may be due to a 
combination of ageing of the Australian population, greater use of immunosuppressive 
 42 
medications and reduced natural boosting to VZV since the introduction of universal childhood 
varicella immunisation.
16, 43-45
  
One third of all hospitalised cases in our study had PHN recorded in a diagnostic field, with the 
highest hospitalisation rate (32.1 per 100,000) in people aged ≥75 years. In Australia, the 
economic burden of HZ and PHN are significant, with an estimated total cost of 32.8 million 
Australian dollars each year to the health care system.
40
 Pain associated with PHN is often 
refractory to treatment and can have substantial negative impact on the health-related quality of 
life.
12, 46, 47
 
During the pre-vaccine period, Indigenous children aged 18-59 months had higher varicella 
hospitalisation rates compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts. Funded childhood varicella 
immunisation has contributed towards ‘closing the gap’— during the post-vaccine period, 
Indigenous children aged 18-59 months had similar varicella hospitalisation rates compared to 
their non-Indigenous counterparts. However, Indigenous people overall continue to be 
hospitalised due to varicella and HZ at almost double the rate compared to non-Indigenous 
people. Our recent work demonstrated that Indigenous Australians aged 60-69 years had higher 
HZ hospitalisation rates compared to non-Indigenous Australians aged 70-79 years, who are 
currently eligible for funded HZ immunisation.
48
 
High quality disease surveillance strategies are imperative for monitoring the population-wide 
impact of immunisation programs and driving evidence-based policies. Our study highlights a 
number of limitations of using notification and hospitalisation data for surveillance of varicella 
and HZ. While varicella and HZ are considered to be nationally notifiable diseases, differences 
in reporting mechanisms, the inherent challenges in reporting of these diseases (related to 
reliance on clinical/ epidemiological information rather than solely laboratory diagnosis) and 
absence of routine reporting from New South Wales to the NNDSS significantly limit 
interpretation of the data. South Australia and the Northern Territory are the only jurisdictions 
that routinely follow up laboratory notifications of VZV in order to be able to align cases with 
national case definitions. Both notification and hospitalisation data considerably underestimate 
the true burden of varicella and HZ, as both diseases are generally self-limiting and only a small 
proportion are likely to be tested for, notified and/or hospitalised. Notification data may be 
influenced by changes in testing practices over time. Surveillance using hospitalisation data is 
not timely and data may be influenced by access to hospitals over time, coding practices and 
misclassification between varicella and HZ.
18, 24, 49
  
 43 
Other industrialised countries with national HZ immunisation programs have implemented a 
variety of surveillance systems targeted at capturing cases of HZ. In the UK, enhanced 
surveillance using sentinel GP clinics and pain clinics was established to monitor the 
effectiveness of their HZ immunisation program.
50, 51
 Several other European countries conduct 
active surveillance for HZ including sentinel surveillance. 
52
 In the USA, active sentinel 
surveillance sites initially established for varicella surveillance were also successful at 
monitoring the epidemiology of HZ after the introduction of HZ vaccine in 2006.
53, 54
 
In conclusion, introduction of a national varicella immunisation program in 2005 substantially 
reduced varicella associated morbidity and mortality in Australia. Minimal decline has been 
observed during recent years and further reductions in disease incidence will most likely require 
a second dose of varicella vaccine to be added on the NIP. A vaccine for HZ was introduced 
under the NIP in 2016. Timely and high quality surveillance, including data on HZ encounters 
at the primary health care level, will be crucial to evaluate the population-wide impact of this 
program.  
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Chapter 3: Field investigation of a public health problem 
 
Investigation into increased lymphogranuloma 
venereum amongst men who have sex with men – 
New South Wales, Australia 
 49 
Prologue 
My role  
In March 2017, I was nominated to lead an investigation into a potential outbreak of 
lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) in New South Wales in 2016. LGV is a severe sexually 
transmitted infection caused by L1, L2 and L3 serovars of Chlamydia trachomatis. Rectal LGV 
is more commonly observed in men who have sex with men (MSM) and very few outbreaks 
have been reported in Australia. In 2016, 58 cases of LGV were reported compared to 17 cases 
in 2015. The last LGV in New South Wales (NSW) was reported in 2010. Large outbreaks of 
LGV have been recently reported in the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe. In order to 
investigate the outbreak, I was seconded to the Blood Borne Virus/ Sexually Transmitted 
Infections (BBV/STI) team within the Communicable Diseases Branch at Health Protection 
New South Wales (NSW).  
The investigation was conducted under the leadership of Dr Christine Selvey, and I was assisted 
by the BBV/STI epidemiologist Ms Tove Fitzgerald (MAE2014). As this was not a ‘regular’ 
outbreak, my supervisors proposed that my role will be to first establish if the reported increase 
was a real outbreak and secondly, identify possible causes for the observed increase in LGV 
cases. The investigation was conducted over a six month period. I organised and visited the 
public health laboratory and the public health units. I communicated with all the stakeholders 
involved in this outbreak response. I led the design of the retrospective case series, the patient 
survey and drafted the final report enclosed in this chapter.  
Lessons learned 
One of the main lessons learned during this public health investigation was the political nature 
and sensitivities around working with STIs in Australia. HIV is co-infection is common in 
people with STIs including LGV. People with HIV often experience severe stigma and 
discrimination. Subsequently, the NSW Pubic Health Act 2010 (the Act) has strict privacy 
provisions around the disclosure of HIV status. Therefore investigations of STIs have limited 
scope and are often ‘unsuccessful’. For this reason, STI investigations are often also perceived 
as not important by other public health professionals. LGV and other rectal STIs are more 
common amongst a sub-group of MSM, who are involved in high risk activities such as group 
sex, sharing of group sex toys, fisting, and are involved in receptive anal intercourse, often 
under the influence of drugs and rarely use condoms. This is often perceived as personal choice 
and not truly ‘high-risk’. Despite that, are we as public health professionals not ethically obliged 
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to care and to work towards disease prevention, even though it might be difficult? As part of 
this investigation, I learned how to interpret the Act, and how public health investigations are 
bound by the Act. I learned about the rising incidence of bacterial STIs as we improve our 
efforts at preventing STIs caused by blood-borne viruses including HIV and Hepatitis C.  
As detailed in this chapter, one of the main challenges was communication with clinicians and 
their overall lack of support of public health response. This was particularly concerning when 
directors of publicly funded sexual health clinics were not supportive of the investigation. Other 
public health professionals who have worked on STIs shared similar thoughts around liaising 
with clinicians. STI investigations are faced with much greater resistance compared to other 
notifiable infectious diseases. While there are several possible reasons which may influence this 
including high work load, fear of ‘breakdown’ of doctor-patient relationships, sensitive nature 
of STIs, it also highlight a lack of coordination and collaboration between stakeholders. 
Similarly, there may have been occasions where the public health authorities did not provide 
feedback to data providers including clinicians and public health laboratories; hence not closing 
the ‘surveillance feedback loop’.  
Public health impact 
One of the first steps of any outbreak investigation is ‘confirm the existence of an outbreak’. In 
order to do, I visited the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology (CIDM), the public 
health laboratory in NSW responsible for testing of all LGV specimens. Although the aim of 
visit was to source the testing denominator data, I identified additional cases of LGV for 
previous years that were not recorded in the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information 
Management System (NCIMS). On further investigation, I found out that these cases were 
misclassified as chlamydia in NCIMS. Subsequently, the total number of case count for 2015 
was 34. Since then, several other issues were identified with LGV surveillance, including how 
laboratories notify the public health units and the requesting clinician. These findings are 
expected to help strengthen the LGV surveillance system.  
We were unable to obtain sufficient data to identify the exact causes of the increase in LGV, but 
did obtain evidence of infection in HIV-negative MSM using pre-exposure prophylaxis, and 
also identified one case of asymptomatic infection. Prior to this, Health protection NSW did not 
have any evidence of LGV amongst HIV-negative persons or asymptomatic LGV infections. It 
is hoped that this information will provide impetus for further investigation to understand the 
risk factors driving LGV transmission in NSW. 
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The enclosed chapter will be used as a report to Health Protection NSW. An abridged version of 
the report will be circulated to clinicians who participated in the investigation, community 
support groups (ACON and Positive Life), CIDM and to study participants.  
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Abstract 
Introduction: Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) is caused by Chlamydia trachomatis (Ct) 
serovars L1, L2 and L3. Common co-infections include human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
syphilis and other sexually transmissible infections (STIs). In men who have sex with men 
(MSM), rectal LGV can lead to severe clinical presentation and sequelae, enhanced HIV 
transmission and increases the risk of community-wide transmission. LGV is a laboratory 
notifiable condition in NSW. In 2016, Health Protection NSW reported a noticeable increase in 
the number of LGV cases compared to 2015. Following this, Health Protection NSW launched a 
public health investigation to identify the factors that were contributing to the increased LGV. 
Methods: LGV notification data for the study period 1 January 2016 to 31 March 2017 were 
extracted from the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information Management System (NCIMS). In 
order to identify symptoms and risk-factors associated with this increase, we conducted a 
retrospective case series. For this, we designed an electronic questionnaire in NCIMS, which 
was administered to all cases diagnosed with LGV during the study period, and for whom 
contact details were available.  
Results: During the study period, there were 66 LGV notifications for NSW residents. All 
notifications were in males, of which 22 (33.3%) were in those aged 30-39 years. Most cases 
(74.2%) resided in Sydney metropolitan region. Of the 66 cases, contact details were available 
for 20 patients. We administered the electronic questionnaire to all 20 cases, of which 11 
responded. Ten participants completed the survey. All 10 cases were symptomatic, and reported 
participating in high-risk sexual activities including condomless anal intercourse with male sex 
partners. Five respondents self-reported their HIV status as negative and reported having used 
PrEP at the time of LGV diagnosis.   
Conclusions: All survey participants engaged in high-risk sexual behaviour, but due to the 
overall poor response rate (15%), we were unable to identify the exact reasons for the increase 
in LGV. The investigation found LGV surveillance to be sub-optimal and identified 
inconsistencies with the surveillance process. This report summarises the key challenges 
encountered by the investigation team, lessons learnt and includes practical recommendations 
for improving future public health response to LGV.  
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Introduction 
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) is caused by Chlamydia trachomatis (Ct) serovars L1, L2 
and L3. Common co-infections include human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), syphilis and 
other sexually transmissible infections (STIs) such as, gonorrhoea and chlamydia caused by 
non-LGV serovars.
1, 2
 In heterosexual people, the most common initial clinical manifestation of 
LGV is unilateral tender inguinal and/or femoral lymphadenopathy.
2
 A self-limited genital ulcer 
or papule sometimes occurs at the site of inoculation. In women with rectal exposure and men 
who have sex with men (MSM), rectal LGV classically presents as proctitis (stage I), which can 
progress to more severe sequelae including fluctuant bubo (localised enlargement of the lymph 
nodes in the groin area), lymphadenitis and intra-abdominal or retroperitoneal lymphadenopathy 
(stage II).
3
 Recent studies have also reported asymptomatic rectal infection with LGV-causing 
Ct.
4
 The infection can be treated with a 21 days course of doxycycline, however if left untreated 
can advance to chronic proctitis, fistulae, strictures and/or genital oedema.
5
  
Traditionally, LGV was endemic in heterosexual people in parts of Africa, the Caribbean and 
Asia, but recent studies have reported increased LGV amongst MSM populations in 
industrialised nations including Australia,
6
 Europe,
7-9
 United States
10
 and United Kingdom.
4, 11
 
In the UK, more than 2000 cases were reported during an LGV outbreak in 2003-2012.
12
  No 
clear reasons have been identified for this recent emergence of LGV amongst MSM populations, 
but increasing incidence has been frequently associated with high-risk sexual activities amongst 
a subgroup of MSM, and declining use of condoms especially for anal intercourse.
6, 13
 High-risk 
sexual behaviours include group sex, use of shared sex toys and fisting prior to receptive anal 
intercourse, often associated with the use of recreational drugs. The risk of transmission is 
particularly increased in HIV-positive MSM who have condomless anal intercourse with others 
who have the same HIV status (serosorting).
14
 Efforts have been made to sequence and 
determine genetic variability in LGV-causing serovars, with L2b being the most commonly 
circulating serovar overseas
15
 and in Australia.
16
 Despite increasing incidence of LGV, there 
exist several gaps in our knowledge of risk factors associated with the increase in LGV and its 
transmission.  
In Australia, LGV is not a nationally notifiable condition but is required to be notified to public 
health authorities in New South Wales (NSW), Queensland, Western Australia, the Northern 
Territory and Tasmania. In January 2017, Health Protection NSW reported a noticeable increase 
in the number of notifications of LGV during 2016. In 2016, there were 58 notifications 
compared to 17 notifications in 2015.
17
 The observed increase was considered to be amongst 
MSM and most cases resided in metropolitan Sydney.
18
 Increased notifications were observed 
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simultaneous with the implementation and expansion of a large-scale trial of pre-exposure 
prophylaxis (PrEP) [EPIC-NSW] for the prevention of HIV in persons at high risk of HIV 
infection. As of 26 March 2017, a total of 5320 participants were enrolled in EPIC-NSW. EPIC-
NSW participants undergo three monthly screening for anal, rectal and pharyngeal chlamydia 
and gonorrhoea, syphilis and HIV. In NSW, increases were also observed in the number of 
notifications of other STIs including chlamydia, gonorrhoea and syphilis; however it was not 
clear whether the increase in STI notifications was due to increased screening or an increase in 
disease incidence. For these reasons, we wanted to examine 1) if this increase was a true 
increase in LGV or an artefact of increased STI screening amongst MSM populations; 2) if this 
increase was associated with the use of PrEP. 
In December 2016, Health Protection NSW convened an expert group to discuss the increase in 
LGV. Experts included public health physicians, sexual health clinicians and epidemiologists. 
The expert group agreed to formally investigate the increase in LGV cases and explore ideal 
study designs. Following this meeting, NSW Health issued an alert for all NSW sexual health 
clinicians, s100 GPs and gastroenterologists noting an ongoing increase in LGV, requesting 
LGV testing in patients with proctitis and emphasising the need for testing of sexual contacts.
18
   
Like any other outbreak investigation, active case-finding and identifying risk factors are 
important for STI control. NSW Health’s Communicable Disease Branch has a responsibility to 
investigate sources of infection and control outbreaks of communicable diseases. As HIV co-
infection is common in high-risk populations with STIs, especially bacterial STIs such as 
chlamydia, syphilis, gonorrhoea and LGV, gaining information on HIV status is critical to 
inform prevention and control strategies. Follow-up of LGV is particularly important because of 
its frequently severe clinical presentation and sequelae, the possible consequence of enhanced 
HIV and hepatitis C transmission in those with LGV and the risk of community-wide 
transmission.
1
 However, section 56(3) of the NSW Public Health Act 2010 (the Act), prohibits 
medical practitioners from disclosing whether a patient has or has been tested for HIV. 
Although sub-section 4 specifies some circumstances under which such disclosure is allowed, 
this does not include disclosure to public health authorities.
19
 Additionally, section 56(1) of the 
Act requires that HIV notifications are made only in a de-identified form, which means that 
Health Protection NSW is unable to determine the HIV status of people notified with an STI. 
Historically, LGV was rare in NSW.
20
 In 2010, NSW Health observed a dramatic increase in 
LGV notifications, following which enhanced surveillance was conducted from May 2010 to 
April 2012.
6
 A public health investigation was launched, however due to the restrictions on 
disclosure of a person’s HIV status as described above, and the need to collect information on 
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HIV status of people notified with LGV, ethics approval was considered necessary. Ethics 
approval was sought from the Illawarra Shoalhaven, South Eastern Sydney and Sydney Local 
Health Districts (LHDs) to obtain HIV status of LGV cases in a de-identified manner from the 
medical practitioners. However, obtaining HIV status from the clinicians was not approved by 
the ethics committees. Subsequently, enhanced surveillance consisting of doctor and patient 
interviews was conducted. Doctor and patient interviews were conducted to collect information 
on symptomatology and sexual risk factors, and patient interviews were specifically used for 
determining the HIV status. During the investigation period, 88 LGV notifications were 
received. As part of the enhanced surveillance, the investigation team were able to contact 37 
doctors who had diagnosed 67 (76%) of the LGV infections. The doctors granted permission to 
contact 30 (45%) cases directly and of those, successful contact was made with 22 (73%) 
patients. Of the 22 cases, all reported participating in condomless anal intercourse in the months 
prior to being diagnosed with LGV and 18 (82%) self-reported they were HIV-positive.
6
 The 
high proportion of HIV-positive people in the 2010 study emphasises the need to know the HIV 
status of an individual during a LGV investigation. The outbreak subsided without any targeted 
intervention, and no specific causes for the reported increase were identified.  
The aim of this investigation was to determine if the 2016 LGV increase represented an 
outbreak and to identify factors contributing to increased notifications of LGV in NSW between 
1
st
 January 2016 and 31
st
 March 2017. 
Methods 
LGV notification 
In NSW, laboratories are required to notify a positive LGV test. As per the NSW Health case 
definition, a confirmed case requires demonstration of Chlamydia trachomatis serovars L1 to 
L3 in fluid aspirated from a fluctuant bubo or from a genital lesion by immunofluorescence (IF), 
enzyme immunoassay (EIA), DNA probe, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), culture or by 
specific micro-IF serological tests.
21
  
After a LGV case is notified, follow-up of notifications by PHUs is not generally conducted. 
Laboratory confirmed LGV notifications are entered into the NSW Notifiable Conditions 
Information Management System (NCIMS), a confidential state-wide database. LGV 
notifications in NSW residents for the period 1 January 2010 to 31 March 2017 were extracted 
from NCIMS. In NSW, eight LHDs (Central Coast, Illawarra Shoalhaven, Nepean Blue 
Mountains, Northern Sydney, South Eastern Sydney, South Western Sydney, Sydney, Western 
Sydney) cover the Sydney metropolitan region and seven (Far West, Hunter New England, Mid 
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North Coast, Murrumbidgee, Northern NSW, Southern NSW, Western NSW) cover rural and 
regional NSW. 
Laboratory testing 
In NSW, all LGV testing is performed at the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology 
(CIDM), Westmead, Australia. The 2014 Sexually Transmissible Infections in Gay Men Action 
Group (STIGMA) guidelines recommend LGV testing for symptomatic individuals only. In 
NSW, there is no clear indication of LGV testing patterns. A small number of laboratories refer 
all chlamydia positive anal swabs to CIDM for LGV testing independent of clinician referral, 
while most seek LGV testing only when requested by the clinicians. To better understand LGV 
testing patterns, we sourced testing numerator and denominator data from CIDM. Percentage 
positive were calculated for each year as the number of LGV positive samples divided by total 
number of specimens tested for LGV.  
LGV specimens are tested using an in-house validated real time (RT) PCR protocol based on 
previously published protocol.
22
 Briefly, all specimens received by the CIDM public health 
laboratory are tested using a multiplex RT-PCR using consisting of degenerate primers which 
target the outer membrane protein-I (omp-I) gene for species-specific detection of Ct, in 
combination with primers targeting the polymorphic membrane protein H (pmp-H) gene for 
specific LGV detection. CIDM does not sequence-type LGV serovars as part of routine LGV 
testing. 
Stakeholder engagement 
During April-August 2017, we (Health Protection NSW) conducted this investigation in 
collaboration with Sydney and South Eastern Sydney PHUs, the LHDs with the majority of 
LGV cases. We also consulted with community support groups, Positive Life NSW and ACON 
prior to commencing the LGV investigation described below.  
Patient questionnaire 
As the privacy provision under the Act does not permit the diagnosing or treating doctors to 
disclose the HIV status of their patients,
19
 we conducted a retrospective case series using patient 
questionnaire. We designed an electronic survey (Appendix 3A) in NCIMS, which was 
administered via text messages to mobile phones or via email, depending on the patient’s 
preference. Survey design was based on previous questionnaires used during the 2010 LGV 
outbreak investigation. Feedback on survey questions and appropriate language use was sought 
from representatives from ACON and Positive Life NSW. We collected information on 
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demographic details, symptoms, history of PrEP use at the time of LGV diagnosis, and HIV 
status. 
As the current notification form only contains a field for postal address, patient contact details 
(mobile phone number or email address), were requested from the diagnosing clinicians or 
directors of the health service. We requested diagnosing clinicians/ health services to also 
ensure that patients were aware of their diagnosis and inform them of this investigation.  
Data analyses 
We conducted descriptive epidemiology using notification data recorded on NCIMS including 
date of specimen collection, age, sex, postcode and site of infection. For the survey, crude 
numbers and proportions (where appropriate) were reported. All analyses were conducted in 
Microsoft Excel.  
Ethics approval was not sought as the investigation was conducted by Health Protection NSW 
as a public health activity aligned with the objectives of the Act.  
Results 
LGV notifications  
During our study period of 1 January 2016-31 March 2017, there were 66 notifications for LGV, 
of which 58 were reported during 2016.  
In 2015, Health Protection NSW initially reported 17 cases of LGV. During the first month of 
this investigation, we visited the CIDM laboratory, where we identified an additional 17 cases 
of LGV in 2015 that were misclassified as non-LGV chlamydia in NCIMS, increasing the total 
count of LGV cases to 34. Figure 1 shows the updated epidemic curve for LGV for the years 
2010 to Quarter 1, 2017.  
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Figure 1: Number of LGV notifications by year and quarter, New South Wales, 
2010-2017. Bars in black represent cases that were misclassified as non-LGV 
chlamydia. Data source: NSW Notifiable Conditions Information Management 
System (NCIMS).  
During the study period, all (66) LGV notifications were in males, of which 22 (33.3%) were in 
those aged 30-39 years (Figure 2). The median age was 37 years (range 19-70 years). Of all 
LGV cases, 49 (74.2%) were residents of Sydney and South Eastern Sydney LHDs (Figure 3), 
with the remainder of cases residing in other NSW LHDs.  
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Figure 2: LGV notifications by age group and year, New South Wales, 1 January 
2016-31 March 2017. Data source: NSW Notifiable Conditions Information 
Management System (NCIMS). 
 
 
Figure 3: LGV notifications by local health districts (LHD), New South Wales, 1 
January 2016-31 March 2017. Central Coast, Illawarra Shoalhaven, Nepean Blue 
Mountains, Northern Sydney, South Eastern Sydney, South Western Sydney, 
Sydney, Western Sydney cover the Sydney metropolitan region. Far West, 
Hunter New England, Mid North Coast, Murrumbidgee, Northern NSW, Southern 
NSW, Western NSW cover rural and regional NSW. Data source: NSW Notifiable 
Conditions Information Management System (NCIMS). 
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Laboratory results 
Of the 66 notifications, 57 (86.4%) specimens were isolated from the anus and rectum, one 
(1.5%) from a bubo, four (6.1%) from the genitourinary tract and four (6.1%) whose specimen 
site was unknown.  
In 2016, CIDM tested 614 specimens for LGV, of which 61 (9.9%) were confirmed for L1-L3 
Ct (LGV positive), of which 58 notifications were for NSW residents. In 2015, CIDM tested 
398 specimens for LGV, of which 37 (9.3%) were LGV positive. Of the 37 tests that were LGV 
positive, 34 notifications were for NSW residents. Percentage positivity remained the same 
between 2015 and 2016, but greater numbers of tests were performed during 2016. Percentage 
positivity reduced to 3.5% during January-June 2017 (data not shown). 
In 2014, CIDM tested 1090 specimens for LGV, of which 20 (1.3%) were LGV positive. Prior 
to 2015 and prior to the revision of the STIGMA guidelines in 2014, South Eastern Area 
Laboratory Services (SEALS) requested LGV testing on all rectal specimens that tested positive 
for chlamydia. In 2014, SEALS requested 811 LGV tests compared to 47 in 2015. In 2015, with 
the revision of STIGMA guidelines, SEALS stopped routine referral of all chlamydia positive 
rectal specimens for LGV testing, which could explain the reduced number of LGV tests 
performed in 2015.  
Survey results 
We sourced details of the diagnosing clinicians from CIDM, as this information is not routinely 
entered into NCIMS. Of the 66 LGV cases, the majority were diagnosed at publicly funded 
sexual health clinics or private GPs known to have a high case load of MSM (Table 1). Over a 
period of four weeks, 10 of the 15 diagnosing health services provided contact details for some 
patients. These services had diagnosed/treated 35 (53%) of the 66 cases LGV. Permission was 
provided to contact 20 (30.3%) patients. Nine patients did not provide permission to be 
contacted and six could not be successfully contacted by the health services. Of the remaining 
five health services, which had diagnosed 31 cases, two responded to our initial request for 
assistance but only one agreed to contact patients to seek permission and provide us with patient 
contact details. This health service provided contact details approximately eight weeks after our 
initial request; and permission to contact was only granted for one out of the 15 cases diagnosed 
at this clinic. Due to this delay, we were unable to administer the survey to this patient. For the 
health services who did not respond to our request, we do not have information on whether 
these health services attempted to contact their patients.  
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Table 1: Summary of LGV cases by health service provider type, New South 
Wales, 1 January 2016 - 31 March 201716 
Prescriber type Number 
of 
services 
Number of 
responding 
services 
Number of 
cases diagnosed 
Number of 
cases for 
whom 
permission 
to contact 
was 
obtained 
Publicly funded sexual 
health services 
8 5 37 8 
Private s100 clinics 3 2 25 11 
Private hospitals 2 1
17
 2 1 
Non s100 General 
Practice 
2 2 2 0 
 
We administered the electronic questionnaire (via text message/ email) to all 20 cases who 
granted permission to be contacted. Surveys were administered soon after we obtained consent. 
If a response was not received within 48-72 hours, cases were re-sent the survey. If no response 
was obtained within 48-72 hours after the second attempt, we attempted to call the patients for 
whom phone numbers were available. We received complete responses from 10 cases (50%), of 
whom one case preferred to be interviewed on the phone. The nine remaining cases completed 
the survey using the electronic questionnaire, two of whom responded after receiving the phone 
reminder. One case declined by directly responding to the text message. Key results are 
summarised in Table 2. All 10 participants identified as neither Aboriginal nor Torres Strait 
Islander and identified as males at the time of birth. All respondents reported participating in 
condomless intercourse and having multiple sexual partners (Table 2). 
  
                                                          
16
 Initial request for assistance was on 9 August 2017. Results are up to date as of 1 October 2017 
17
 One case was referred for follow-up to a private s100 clinic. 
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Table 2: Summary data from of LGV survey participants (N=10), New South 
Wales, 1 January 2016-31 March 2017 
Questionnaire variable Number 
Local Health District area  
Sydney 2 
Northern Sydney 3 
South Eastern Sydney 5 
Country of birth  
Australia 6 
Overseas 3 
Unknown 1 
Sexual identity  
Gay or homosexual 8 
Bisexual 2 
Intersex  
Yes 1 
No 9 
HIV status  
Positive 5
18
 
Negative 5 
Condom use for anal (or vaginal) sex with casual partner  
Never 2 
Less than half the time 4 
More than half the time 3 
Always (not counting breakages) 1 
Condom use for anal (or vaginal) sex with regular partner  
Never 4 
Less than half the time 2 
More than half the time 2 
Always (not counting breakages) 2 
Sex of partner  
Male 9 
Male and Female 1 
Number of sex partners Median (range) 
3 months 15 (2-60) 
12 months 65 (7-600) 
 
All 10 survey participants were symptomatic and proctitis was common. Symptoms of proctitis 
included rectal pain, tenesmus (continuous feeling of bowel movement), pain with bowel 
movement, rectal discharge and mucus discharge (Figure 3). We included a question to ask the 
participants their reason for visiting the doctor if they were asymptomatic. It’s likely that this 
question was unclear to several participants, as four symptomatic survey participants answered 
the question. Of the four cases who responded to the question asking reasons for visiting the 
doctor, three indicated they attended their health service for routine sexual health screening 
(even though they were symptomatic), and one attended after being identified as a sexual 
contact of someone who had been diagnosed with LGV. Of the 10 participants, two reported 
having at least one STI including gonorrhoea and chlamydia at the time of LGV diagnosis. All 
                                                          
18
 One patient reported HIV diagnosis date as 4 months after LGV diagnosis 
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survey participants reported receiving treatment for LGV. Only five participants reported 
informing their sexual partners of their LGV diagnoses, using specialised partner notification 
text messaging services and in-person.  
 
Figure 3: Presenting symptoms as reported by LGV survey participant (N=10), 
New South Wales, 1 January 2016-31 March 2017 
Of the 10 survey participants, five cases reported being HIV-positive, one of whom was 
diagnosed with HIV approximately four months after the LGV diagnosis. This LGV case, who 
was later diagnosed with HIV, reported having used post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) at the 
time of LGV diagnosis. At the time of LGV diagnosis, self-reported HIV status of five cases 
was negative. All five HIV-negative LGV cases reported having been using PrEP at the time of 
LGV diagnosis. One HIV-positive patient reported use of PEP, but we believe they may have 
confused this with antiretroviral therapy.  
In order to obtain permission to contact the patients, we contacted health services either via 
email or via phone. In some cases, depending on availability, we were able to speak directly 
with the diagnosing doctor. Amongst those cases who did not agree to be contacted but whose 
doctors responded, two were symptomatic with proctitis and one was asymptomatic (as reported 
by diagnosing doctor). The asymptomatic case was identified through routine STI screening. 
The diagnosing doctor did not request a test for LGV, and reported not being notified of the 
diagnosis by the laboratory.  
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Discussion  
NSW experienced an increase in LGV notifications during 2016. During the study period of 1 
January 2016-31 March 2017, there were 66 LGV notifications, compared to 34 notifications in 
2015. In order to gain an insight into factors contributing to this increase, we designed a survey 
to retrospectively collect information from cases. We were able to administer an electronic 
questionnaire to 20 cases. Of the 20 cases that were administered the questionnaire, 11 
responded, of whom 10 completed the survey, resulting in an overall response rate of 15%. In 
addition, we obtained symptomatology information for another three cases from the diagnosing 
doctors. 
Our findings from the survey should be considered in light of the overall poor response rate. 
Using the online survey, we identified five HIV-negative cases, all of whom were using PrEP at 
the time of LGV diagnosis. The remaining five cases were HIV-positive, of whom one was 
diagnosed with HIV four months after being diagnosed with LGV. Collectively, through the 
survey and on speaking with the diagnosing doctors, we identified a total of 12 symptomatic 
cases and one asymptomatic case. High risk behaviours including condomless anal intercourse 
with casual and regular partners, as well as having high numbers of sexual partners were 
commonly reported.  
As this investigation was conducted retrospectively for all cases between 1 January 2016 and 31 
March 2017, it was most likely affected by several biases. Recall bias around remembering 
LGV symptoms, number of sexual partners, and co-infection with other STIs after a prolonged 
period of time is possible. However, considering proctitis is highly uncomfortable, it is unlikely 
that patients would not recall symptoms associated with LGV. In addition, due to the risk of 
recall bias, we did not ask about the number of sexual partners at the time of LGV diagnosis, 
but asked about the number of sex partners in the previous three or 12 months as an indicator of 
sexual risk. The National Gay Periodic Survey uses >10 male sex partners in the previous six 
months as a key indicator in determining risk-behaviour.
23
 Half of the survey participants 
reported not informing their sexual contacts of their LGV diagnosis (data not shown). Although 
this finding might be biased by recall and by the small sample size, it indicates that contact 
tracing might not always be undertaken. Contact tracing should be done comprehensively for all 
LGV cases. According to the current LGV guidelines, the treating doctor is responsible for 
contact tracing.
21
 However, this is reliant on the patient providing details of sexual contacts to 
the treating doctor. Finally, the fact that five out of the ten survey respondents reported being 
HIV-negative, and due to the stigma associated with being HIV-positive, it is possible HIV-
negative persons may have been exposed to selection bias. Consequently, HIV-negative persons 
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may have been more likely to respond to the request of the health service providers and to the 
survey.  
We were unable to estimate the notification rates for LGV by sex, age group, and by LHD as 
correct information on denominator data is not available. For instance, we do not know the 
proportion of MSM living in each LHD or where infection was acquired, and as observed 
majority of cases geographically resided in metropolitan Sydney (Figure 3). Although 
population data for males in New South Wales could be used as denominator, we believe this 
may not be a correct representation of the results. 
HIV co-infection is common amongst people with LGV, globally and in NSW. A systematic 
review of a small number of studies reported HIV prevalence of 67%-100% among LGV 
cases.
14
 Furthermore, MSM with LGV had 8.19 times odds of acquiring HIV (95% CI 4.68-
14.33) than those who had non-LGV chlamydia infections.
14
 Although the LGV investigation 
conducted in response to the outbreak in NSW in 2010 was limited by its sample size and the 
poor response rate, it found 18 (82%) out of 22 LGV cases (from a total of 88 notifications) 
were HIV-positive.
6
 In the UK, of the 434 confirmed LGV cases in 2014, 312 (74%) were HIV-
positive, of which 313 (98%) were diagnosed with HIV before or at the same time as their LGV 
diagnosis.
24
 Some biological association between HIV positivity and LGV infection has been 
suggested, but needs further research. Serosorting amongst HIV-positive MSM with high-risk 
sexual behaviours might contribute to high HIV prevalence amongst LGV positive persons.
14
 
However, the introduction of HIV prevention strategies such as PrEP may influence partner 
selection and risk behaviours based on a person’s HIV status. In our study, despite the small 
numbers, the presence of LGV infection amongst HIV-negative people may indicate changing 
epidemiology. A meta-analysis showed the introduction of PrEP might have led to unintended 
increase in other STIs including chlamydia, gonorrhoea and syphilis in MSM using PrEP 
compared to those not using PrEP.
25
 Similarly, increased notifications of STIs including LGV is 
most likely due to a combination of factors including reduced condom use and increased 
number of sexual partners among PrEP users. It is also likely to be influenced by increased 
detection of STIs in high-risk MSM who are HIV-negative and are on PrEP, who may not have 
previously sought quarterly clinical care or STI screening.  
The investigation of laboratory data suggested that the number of specimens tested for LGV 
during 2016 was 1.5 times higher than in 2015, but the percentage positivity remained the same 
(~9%). Given that most labs do not routinely refer all chlamydia positive rectal specimens for 
LGV testing and all of the survey respondents were symptomatic, it is unlikely the reported 
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increase in LGV was associated with increased sexual health screening amongst MSM but may 
have been a real increase. 
Our data do not provide any conclusive evidence on what may have led to the increase in LGV 
notifications, but it highlights the need for further public health investigation to inform future 
prevention and control strategies. We identified numerous reasons that are likely to have 
resulted in an overall low response rate. Key challenges and lessons learned are described below, 
so as to improve future outbreak investigations and public health response.  
Challenges in designing the investigative approach 
At the beginning of the investigation period, we explored several alternative approaches to 
conducting this investigation. The first of these was linking of LGV notification data with HIV 
notification data through the NSW Health’s Communicable Diseases Register (CDR), 
maintained by the Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence, with the aim of identifying the 
proportion of LGV cases with diagnosed HIV infection. However, the data linkage could not be 
completed in the required time frame. Data linkage would provide de-identified data on HIV 
status of the 2016 LGV cases but would not have provided information on PrEP use or 
symptomatology in LGV patients. 
We also explored whether diagnosing clinicians could be interviewed, as was done during the 
2010 investigation.
6
 As discussed above, due to the HIV privacy provision in the Act,
19
 treating 
doctors would have been unable to disclose the HIV status of their patients, as only the cases 
can be directly questioned about their HIV status. In addition, PHUs indicated that it is difficult 
to engage with busy doctors, therefore requesting data from doctors might not be efficient, and 
would not align with the timelines of this investigation. We considered other methods to collect 
de-identified patient data, but due to the small number of LGV cases, ethics approval 
requirements and time limitations, these alternative approaches were not deemed practical. We 
were unable to identify a suitable alternative approach to the investigation, so in consultation 
with collaborators and stakeholders, a retrospective case series of all LGV cases was considered 
the most suitable study design. Considering the delays in designing a study and lack of clarity 
around acceptable public health investigation supports the need for review of STI outbreak 
investigation processes.  
Challenges in conducting the investigation   
Two key reasons are likely to have resulted in the overall poor response rate of 15%; 1) this 
investigation was conducted retrospectively for cases diagnosed in 2016 and in early 2017. 
Therefore people may perceive this as a ‘research study’ rather than a public health 
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investigation and are less likely to be motivated to participate. 2) Limited/ delayed information 
provided by health service providers, that was required to conduct this public health 
investigation. Of the 66 cases, we administered the survey to all 20 (30%) patients who agreed 
to be contacted. Nine patients were contacted by their doctor, but did not agree to be contacted 
by Health Protection NSW. We could not contact the remaining LGV cases as phone or email 
contact details were not available. Similar obstacles were experienced by PHU staff during the 
NSW 2010 LGV outbreak, wherein permission to contact patients directly was obtained for 
only 30 out of the 67 LGV cases (45%). Despite being conducted prospectively, of the 30 cases, 
22 (73%) were successfully interviewed by the PHUs resulting in an overall response rate of 
25%.
6
  
At present, notification forms do not contain a field for mobile phone numbers, and hence 
providing that information is not mandatory for disease notification. As a result, NCIMS does 
not contain patients’ phone or email contact details. Although postal address is required for 
disease notification, and under the Act, could have been obtained from the health services, 
sending letters via post would not have been ideal for timely public health response. Further this 
was not considered practical as people may no longer reside at their reported address. 
During our investigation, we had to request health services to provide patients’ mobile phone 
numbers. As reporting mobile phone numbers is not required as part of the notification process, 
health services were required to seek permission from their patient to provide their contact 
details to the health authorities. While the latter is applicable to most other notifiable conditions, 
obtaining mobile phone numbers of patients from doctors is usually not as prohibitive. The 
process of contacting patients is time consuming and onerous for already busy diagnosing 
doctors/ health services, resulting in non-provision of information and delays in timely public 
health response. This may also impact the doctor-patient relationship, which in the context of 
STIs can be particularly sensitive in nature.  
If the notification process included reporting mobile phone numbers, public health authorities 
would not have to rely on health services for obtaining patients’ contact details. In order to not 
adversely impact the relationship between a doctor and their patient, doctor’s assent to contact 
their patient would still be recommended, but would not be a limiting a factor. As per the Act, 
this would allow public health authorities to directly contact the patient and seek information on 
risk factors, improving the timeliness of the public health response. 
The above issues could be avoided if the Act was modified to provide an exemption that 
allowed diagnosing clinicians to disclose the HIV status of patient with a notifiable condition. 
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Such an exemption could only be authorised by the Chief Health Officer or NSW Health 
Secretary, during public health emergencies. If the above was permitted, then in instances such 
as the LGV outbreak, Health Protection NSW could obtain information on a patient’s HIV 
status along with symptomatology and key risk factors, directly from the diagnosing doctor. 
This would then eliminate the need for Health Protection NSW to contact the patient. 
It is also important to acknowledge the personal and sensitive nature of information sought in an 
STI investigation, which may have influenced the overall response rate. For example, a patient 
may not feel comfortable sharing the sex of their partners, the number of sexual partners, history 
of other STIs, HIV status etc.; particularly with public health authorities who are perceived as 
the ‘government’. Although important for public health practice and permitted under the Act, 
requesting risk factor information from doctors might be perceived as breaching patient 
confidentiality and trust. This is in contrast to other outbreak investigations such as for 
gastroenteritis, where patients and doctors might be comfortable and motivated to provide 
information of dining venues or history of foods consumed, that can then help identify the 
source of the outbreak. 
In order to minimise any further delays to the public health investigation that had already been 
delayed because of the time taken to consider the most feasible approach and consult with 
stakeholders, the survey was not piloted. The wording around some questions could have been 
improved, for example, we asked reasons for visiting the doctor if the participant was 
asymptomatic (Question 6.25). In retrospect, we should have asked reasons for visiting the 
doctor irrespective of the symptoms. We also identified technical issues with the survey design 
as this was the first time an electronic questionnaire was designed in NCIMS. The NCIMS 
online survey was not easy to design and was not very intuitive or interactive. For instance, we 
were unable to provide links to LGV fact sheets and sexual health information for those 
accessing the survey. We used electronic surveys in preference to phone interviews, as STI 
research suggests people are more likely to respond and provide more accurate data using 
electronic surveys.
26, 27
 In our study, three participants completed the survey after receiving a 
reminder via a phone call. While electronic surveys might be preferred, people may forget 
receiving a text message resulting in poor response rate. Some of the survey non-responders 
accessed the survey but did not complete it, and may have later forgotten receiving the text. 
Furthermore the text messages/emails containing the survey link were accompanied by a generic 
NSW Health template and not a personalised message, which may have impacted the response 
rate. For future investigations, the current electronic survey should be re-designed using 
sophisticated platforms, which are easy to use, affordable and allow secure data storage (for 
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example Red Cap, Qualtrics and Secure Data Kit). In order to minimise the workload on public 
health professionals, automated but personalised reminders could be utilised.  
Issues with LGV surveillance 
As was identified during the first month of this investigation, surveillance for LGV was sub-
optimal with 17 LGV cases diagnosed in 2015 misclassified on NCIMS as non-LGV chlamydia. 
In 2016, epidemiologists from Health Protection NSW coordinated the data entry process with 
CIDM and the PHUs to ensure all LGV notifications were entered into NCIMS. The laboratory 
testing patterns for LGV in 2014 were not clear, i.e. we were unable to exactly determine if 
some laboratories were routinely referring all chlamydia positive rectal specimens to CIDM for 
LGV testing. Prior to 2014, SEALS also conducted diagnostic testing for LGV. Collating the 
data for previous years was beyond the scope of this investigation. As a result, we were unable 
to validate the data prior to 2015. 
These inaccuracies in reporting highlight the need for a standardised operating procedure for 
LGV surveillance. The protocol should identify reporting requirements for all those contributing 
to the surveillance system, including clinicians, public health laboratories and surveillance 
officers. A formal evaluation of the LGV surveillance system would be beneficial, and will help 
identify simple strategies for improved surveillance. 
Testing guidelines 
Current STIGMA guidelines do not recommend LGV testing as part of routine sexual screening 
or for asymptomatic cases.
28
 During our investigation, we identified one asymptomatic case. 
During an outbreak investigation of LGV in Michigan USA, proctitis was found in 50% of LGV 
cases.
10
 In a UK-based study, LGV was asymptomatic in 27% of cases, which included rectal, 
urethral and pharyngeal infections.
4 
Asymptomatic carriage of LGV serovars has been observed 
in other industrialised countries including the Netherlands.
29, 30
 Introducing LGV testing as part 
of routine STI screening might not be cost-effective, but detecting asymptomatic infection, 
particularly rectal infection may be warranted to prevent onward transmission. This is especially 
important as two of our cases reported being bisexual and one case was reported asymptomatic 
by their doctor.  
Case definition 
The current NSW Health case definition requires Chlamydia trachomatis serovars L1 to L3 in 
fluid aspirated from a fluctuant bubo or from a genital lesion.
21
 The current case definition 
doesn’t include rectal LGV and should be revised such that a confirmed case is laboratory 
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definitive evidence of Chlamydia trachomatis serovars L1 to L3 irrespective of the site of 
specimen collection.  
Conclusions and future directions 
The increase in LGV is most likely due to a combination of factors including increased use of 
PrEP, reduced condom use, increased numbers of sexual partners, and increases in other high-
risk sexual behaviour. These risk factors are not mutually exclusive and have all been associated 
with increases in bacterial STIs globally.
14
 Although the number of LGV notifications in 2017 
has reduced, it continues to be higher than the numbers in 2014. Enhanced surveillance is 
critical to understand the risk factors and PrEP use amongst LGV cases. Determining the 
prevalence of asymptomatic LGV is important to understand the transmission dynamics and 
prevent ongoing transmission. LGV testing could be included in routine STI screening but will 
still require follow-up of laboratory notifications to obtain information on symptomatology. For 
the 2016 outbreak, whole genome sequencing (WGS) could be explored to identify any 
epidemiologically linked cases in order to better understand transmission of LGV in NSW, and 
differentiate locally and overseas acquired cases. WGS is increasingly utilised to identify 
epidemiological links between cases of foodborne illnesses and other communicable diseases 
such as Legionnaires’ disease and tuberculosis, and could be useful for LGV. 
Our experience should be communicated to other states and territories, especially where PrEP 
has been introduced, so timely public health response, health promotion messages around 
condom use and safe sex practices can be bolstered. For example, in Queensland, as of 
September 2017, 15 LGV notifications were received compared to the 2012-2016 year to date 
mean of 3.9.
31
 The Queensland PrEP study (QPrEPd) has enrolled 800 participants. In Victoria, 
where another large PrEP trial (VicPrEP) is currently underway, LGV is not notifiable as a 
separate condition, and is only captured under chlamydia notifications. As LGV is not 
nationally notifiable, there are no standardised national guidelines for monitoring and 
responding to LGV. With travel and movement amongst MSM populations, spread of LGV is 
highly likely.  
As LGV re-emerges as a disease of public health importance, improving preparedness for future 
STI outbreaks should be prioritised. In contrast to other transmissible communicable diseases, 
LGV affects a small number of people with high-risk sexual behaviour; however LGV holds the 
potential of causing a wide-spread outbreak amongst MSM, as has been observed in the UK and 
in parts of Europe.
24, 32
 A multi-country evaluation of the European Surveillance of Sexually 
Transmitted Infections Network demonstrated varied levels of preparedness for responding to 
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STI outbreaks, and little experience was noted with managing STI outbreaks compared to 
threats like avian flu, SARS, or bioterrorism.
33
 In addition to a standardised approach to 
surveillance and outbreak management, collaboration between public health authorities and 
health services, strategies for prompt treatment and continued promotion of safer sexual 
behaviour are needed. Finally, if we want to reduce the community-wide prevalence of STIs, we 
must continue to work towards reducing the stigma associated with being diagnosed with HIV 
or other STIs. 
Recommendations for improving public health response to LGV in 
NSW 
1. Revise current case definition for LGV. 
2. Strengthen the existing LGV surveillance system by developing and implementing 
standard operating procedures. Standard operating procedures must indicate operational 
process and required actions for all those contributing to the LGV surveillance process. 
3. Determine the prevalence of asymptomatic LGV infection. This will also assist with 
developing appropriate testing (STIGMA) guidelines.  
4. Revise the NSW Health LGV control guidelines, and develop a preparedness plan for 
future LGV outbreaks, particularly in relation to identifying an investigative approach 
that can be implemented rapidly. 
5. Consider enhanced surveillance using simple electronic tools so as to minimise the 
workload on staff in public health units. Enhanced surveillance will help understand the 
transmission of LGV, asymptomatic infection and risk factors associated with increased 
LGV; and assist with timely outbreak investigations. 
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Chapter 4: Public health surveillance system establishment and 
evaluation 
 
An evaluation of an early warning alert and response 
system (EWARS in a Box) implemented after 
Cyclone Winston, Fiji 2016 
 79 
Prologue 
My role 
In April-May 2016, I was deployed as an epidemiologist with the Global Outbreak Alert and 
Response Network (GOARN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Division of Pacific 
Technical Support (DPS) to provide technical support to the Fiji Centre for Communicable 
Diseases Control (FCCDC). With the help of WHO DPS, the Fiji Ministry of Health and 
Medical Services (MoHMS) implemented Early Warning, Alert and Response System EWARS 
in a Box and was an up-scaled version of the Fiji Syndromic Surveillance System. This was the 
first ever implementation of the system in a Pacific Island Country. EWARS in a Box (hereafter 
referred to as EWARS) is an automated ‘field-ready’ kit that includes the hardware and software 
required for rapid deployment of surveillance systems.  
My primary responsibility was to support surveillance following Tropical Cyclone Winston. 
With the help of my supervisors, I proposed an evaluation of EWARS in a box. The evaluation 
was conducted in collaboration with Julie Collins (MAE Scholar at Hunter New England 
Population Health Unit), who arrived two weeks later. 
The MMWR guidelines on Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems have limited 
applicability for evaluating surveillance systems in developing countries particularly during 
humanitarian emergencies. Keeping this in mind, I designed the evaluation framework based on 
the MMWR guidelines as well as previously published evaluations of the Pacific and Fiji 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems, WHO guidelines on surveillance in health emergencies and 
the guidelines developed by European Centre for Disease Control. A final report containing 
evaluation outcomes and recommendations both for Fiji and for improvement of EWARS 
system were submitted to the Fiji MoHMS in July 2016. 
Specifically, I drafted an initial evaluation proposal containing a framework for evaluating 
EWARS. I described the system and the surveillance process. I conducted stakeholder 
interviews, and evaluated timeliness, completeness, stability, representativeness, costs and 
Event Based Surveillance. Ms Julie Collins designed a cross-sectional survey of the focal points 
at health facilities and the surveillance officers; and evaluated some of the key attributes 
associated with the system experience (acceptability, usefulness, flexibility, data validity and 
simplicity). I led the drafting of the final report and collated comments from the Australian 
collaborators. I have compiled the key findings from the evaluation into a manuscript. Feedback 
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on an early draft was provided by Dr Eric Nilles. The manuscript is enclosed in the main body 
of this chapter along with the final report submitted to the Fiji MoHMS (Appendix 4A). 
 
Ms Mere Taufa, Ms Julie Collins and Dr James Flint (left to right) conducting 
review of clinic registers during EWARS site visit, Fiji, May 2016 
In addition to conducting EWARS related surveillance and the evaluation, I supported other 
surveillance activities, and assisted with an outbreak investigation of severe acute respiratory 
infection (SARI). My contributions to this work are summarised in Chapter 1. 
 
 
EWARS surveillance officers, Ms Mere Taufa and Ms Emi Colaimima along with 
DR Meru Sheel, reviewing paediatric ICU registers, CWM Hospital, Fiji, May 2016 
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Lessons learned 
Overall, this was a great opportunity where I learned about disease surveillance in a developing 
country following a natural disaster. The experience offered professional growth in several 
aspects including leadership, politics of public health and the role of diplomacy when working 
with national health authorities. I learned about navigating difficult situations in the field, 
managing personality clashes and keeping calm even when overworked and sleep deprived.   
Some of my key professional lessons learned are summarised below: 
1. Politicised nature of public health and its implication on public health activities: one of 
the first things that I learned was the political nature of public health, which often requires a 
strategic approach and diplomacy skills. For example, planning EWARS evaluation, in theory, 
sounded simple but I soon realised that going into another country, and suggesting an evaluation 
is not that straightforward. Even though WHO DPS was supportive, for the MoHMS an 
evaluation appeared like something might be 'wrong'. For that reason, it was important to 
identify the rationale and usefulness of the evaluation for Fiji MoHMS. I identified the needs of 
the MoHMS and the National Advisor for Communicable Diseases (Dr Mike Kama), and 
suggested the outcomes that would improve future implementation of EWARS in Fiji and 
globally. At meetings, I referred to the proposal as an assessment rather than an ‘evaluation’. 
Slight change in approach and highlighting the benefits of an ‘assessment’ led to the National 
Advisor permitting the study as a joint collaboration between FCCDC and WHO DPS.  
2. Leadership in public health is vital: I was sent on this mission within the first six weeks 
of the MAE. While I had previously worked in some challenging environments, this experience 
was very different, and initially I felt like a novice (imposter syndrome perhaps!). After arriving 
in Fiji, it was clear that if I was to conduct the evaluation, I was going to have to take charge 
and make it happen. I learned engaging everyone is crucial and can be highly beneficial (albeit 
creates more work, but is worthwhile!). I established an evaluation working party (based on the 
National Advisor’s recommendations) and a project steering group. I designed the framework 
based on feedback received from members of the working party and the surveillance team. 
Some of the members were also involved in the governance and implementation of EWARS, 
and provided insight into some of the issues, and preempted some of the problems that we might 
encounter. The National Advisor was very supportive and provided leadership in conducting 
this evaluation. He directed his team to assist us with field visits and interviews, and his support 
set an example of effective public health leadership. Overall, it was clear that in-country 
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partners had the best working knowledge of the health systems, and working in collaboration 
was essential to navigate difficult channels and conduct the evaluation effectively.  
Public health impact 
1. At the request of the National Advisor for Communicable Diseases, preliminary 
findings and recommendations were presented at a meeting hosted by the MoHMS on 27 May 
2016. The meeting was held at the WHO DPS office in Suva, Fiji and was attended by EWARS 
surveillance officers, MoHMS members and EWARS teams from Central, Western and 
Northern division. Prof John Aaskov (Queensland University of Technology) and Prof Kim 
Mullohand (Murdoch Children’s Research Institute) were also present at the request of Dr Mike 
Kama. Both Prof Aaskov and Prof Mullohand are global health experts, and were delighted to 
learn about the potential of EWARS, and its potential to overcome some of the common 
challenges experienced by surveillance systems during humanitarian emergencies. 
2. The final evaluation report was submitted to the MoHMS and WHO DPS in August 
2016. The report contained recommendations that would enable Fiji to integrate EWARS into 
routine surveillance, and that would strengthen surveillance if the system was re-activated 
during another natural disaster. EWARS-specific recommendations were also provided to WHO 
DPS and WHO Geneva for system-specific improvements. Fiji MoHMS continues to use 
EWARS for routine surveillance, and the EWARS platform has been expanded to support the 
Pacific Syndromic Surveillance System. Based on these recommendations, several 
modifications have been made to improve the performance of EWARS, surveillance continues 
and EWARS has now been adopted into routine surveillance activities.  
3. One of the incidental findings of the evaluation highlighted the contribution of the 
EWARS surveillance officers during the post-disaster surveillance process. The surveillance 
officers were critical in ensuring timely reporting and follow-up of alerts. Following our 
recommendations, the surveillance officers’ continue to be employed and support surveillance 
through EWARS. The evaluation also demonstrated the capacity building offered by the in-
coming WHO epidemiologists and recommendations were made for FCCDC to employ full-
time epidemiologists.  
4. In order to share the lessons learned with the global health community and public health 
practitioners working in humanitarian emergencies, I have adapted the final report into a 
manuscript.  
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An evaluation of an early warning alert and response system 
(EWARS in a Box) implemented after Cyclone Winston, Fiji 2016 
Abstract 
Background: In February 2016, after Cyclone Winston affected Fiji, public health assessments 
recognised several epidemic-prone diseases capable of causing outbreaks. As part of the World 
Health Organization’s core commitments an early warning and alert response system for 
outbreak detection was implemented two weeks after the cyclone. The system, EWARS in a 
Box (EWARS) is a smartphone-based automated system consisting of hardware and software 
required for rapid deployment during health emergencies. Fiji EWARS consisted of Indicator-
based Surveillance (IBS) and Event-based Surveillance (EBS). We evaluated the system’s 
performance during the post-disaster period of epidemiological weeks 10-21, with the aim of 
providing practical recommendations for future use. 
Methods: We conducted semi-structured stakeholder interviews and a cross-sectional survey of 
focal points at EWARS sites and surveillance officers to assess their experience of the system. 
We extracted data from the EWARS database to assess the system’s performance during the 
study period.  
Findings: EWARS-IBS recorded 34 113 cases for the nine syndromes under surveillance from 
326 861 total consultations. Four confirmed outbreaks were detected through EWARS-EBS. 
Automated processes for collation, analysis and dissemination of data reduced the burden on 
surveillance teams and subsequently saved human resources, minimised human error and 
ensured EWARS surveillance teams focused on public health response. EWARS was acceptable 
by public health practitioners, and was perceived to be useful for timely monitoring of diseases 
trends and outbreak detection. The system was simple, stable and flexible meeting the core 
criteria for rapid deployment during health emergencies.  
Conclusions: EWARS provides ready tools for standardised implementation and reporting of 
post-disaster early warning surveillance; and can improve the detection of outbreaks while 
minimising the reporting burden on the public health system.     
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Introduction 
Humanitarian emergencies including conflicts and natural disasters increase the risk of 
communicable disease outbreaks. Effective and timely surveillance and response measures can 
mitigate risks,
1
 but public health systems are frequently disrupted during humanitarian 
emergencies, particularly in developing countries where existing surveillance systems are 
fragile.
2
 Early Warning and Alert Response Networks (EWARN) were designed to enhance 
surveillance and response capacities during complex humanitarian emergencies or after major 
disasters. 
Acknowledging the importance of robust early warning surveillance and response mechanisms, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) developed EWARN Guidelines and supported the 
development and implementation of EWARN systems during humanitarian emergencies in a 
number of developing countries
3
 including the Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) after the 
2005 earthquake in Pakistan, Surveillance in Post Extreme Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) 
following 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines,
4
 and after the 2013 tsunami in the Solomon 
Islands
5
 and Cyclone Pam in 2015 in Vanuatu.
6
   
Few developing countries have preparedness plans for enhanced surveillance following disasters 
or other humanitarian emergencies, and therefore most emergency surveillance systems are 
rapidly developed during crises and lack standardized data collection, management and analysis 
methods.
4
 Further, the collection, analysis and reporting of large volumes of surveillance data is 
a burden to public health systems that are already struggling to address other urgent priorities.
5, 
7-10
 To address these challenges, WHO developed a tool kit known as ‘EWARS in a Box’ 
(hereafter EWARS) that includes the hardware and software necessary to rapidly deploy an 
early warning surveillance system during major humanitarian emergencies. EWARS was first 
implemented in South Sudan in 2015.
11
   
In February 2016, Cyclone Winston, one of the most powerful storms recorded in the South 
Pacific made landfall in Fiji. The storm affected almost 400,000 people, damaged 
approximately 40,000 homes and displaced nearly 55,000 persons. As part of the public health 
response, the Fiji Ministry of Health and Medical Services (MoHMS) and WHO conducted a 
rapid public health risk assessment to identify key public health priorities.
12
 The assessment 
identified multiple factors associated with increased risk of disease transmission and outbreaks 
including large numbers of displaced persons, overcrowded emergency shelters, limited access 
to clean water, disruption of hygiene and sanitation infrastructure, and increased potential 
exposure to mosquitos and other disease vectors. Several epidemic-prone diseases were 
recognised as moderate to high-risk for causing outbreaks, including leptospirosis, diarrhoea 
(including dysentery), typhoid, dengue, chikungunya, Zika virus and acute respiratory 
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infections.
12
 Subsequently, the MoHMS with assistance from the WHO, implemented EWARS 
two weeks after the cyclone.  
Prior to Cyclone Winston, Fiji’s early-warning disease surveillance – the Fiji Syndromic 
Surveillance System (FSSS), reported five syndromes (diarrhea, influenza-like illness, 
prolonged fever, acute fever and rash, and dengue-like illness) on a weekly basis from 12 
sentinel health facilities.
13
 EWARS was implemented at 34 health facilities that reported nine 
diseases/syndromes, in addition to reporting ad hoc health events. EWARS sites were selected 
based on population density, proximity to severely affected areas and displaced persons, and 
access to transport and telecommunication; 11 of the 12 FSSS sites were used as EWARS sites. 
Figure 1 shows the path of Cyclone Winston, population density in each region and EWARS 
sites.  
In addition to weekly reporting of cases meeting a specific case definitions (indicator-based 
surveillance or IBS), Fiji EWARS included a component of event-based surveillance (EBS). 
EBS is the structured reporting of events that may not meet the criteria for reporting through the 
IBS, but may have important medical and public health implications.
14
 For example, a cluster of 
unusual neurological disease that does not meet any of the pre-specified case definitions or does 
not exceed a threshold in the IBS system (and therefore would not trigger an alert) may indicate 
the start of a serious outbreak and would typically be reported through EBS system. With a few 
exceptions, prior EWARN systems have primarily relied on IBS for the early detection of 
outbreaks.
14
 
As EWARS is a novel concept and continues to evolve based on field-level feedback, we 
conducted a detailed evaluation of the Fiji EWARS system (Box 1). This paper describes the 
system’s performance in Fiji. We summarize the findings and key lessons learnt (Box 2) with 
the aim of providing practical insight for improving the system, its implementation and 
operation for surveillance in humanitarian emergencies.  
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Figure 1: Path of Cyclone Winston, EWARS surveillance sites, total population 
and population density for each province in Fiji, 2016.1920  
  
                                                          
19
 Projected population figures for 2016 were provided by the Fiji Ministry of Health and Medical 
Services (MoHMS), estimated using 2007 census conducted by Fiji Bureau of Statistics and 
MoHMS divisional boundaries. 
20 Image developed Paul Jaskierniak, World Health Organization Division of the Technical 
Pacific Support. 
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Box 2: Key lessons learnt during surveillance using EWARS in a Box following Cyclone 
Winston in Fiji, 2016 
- Improving the use of EWARS weekly bulletin by customizing the layout in a country-
specific manner will assist in improved public health response. 
- The syndromes under surveillance should be selected based on risk assessments conducted 
following a disaster. Where possible, thresholds should be set using baseline 
epidemiological data. 
- Event Based Surveillance for outbreak detection, particularly for conditions not captured 
for Indicator Based Surveillance is encouraged. 
- Building sustainable public health workforce and surge capacity, by providing ongoing 
technical support for focal points at health facilities and surveillance officers is highly 
recommended. Training should be conducted in ‘train the trainer’ format. Further emphasis 
should be laid upon conducting alert verification, understanding surveillance data and 
outbreak investigations. 
- Enhanced crisis leadership during public health emergencies is critical. In order to achieve 
sustainable surveillance, greater interaction between all those involved in surveillance 
activities is encouraged.  
 
Box 1: Evaluation Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this evaluation was to assess the overall performance of EWARS in a Box, 
following Cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016.  
Objectives of the evaluation were: 
- Assess the ability of EWARS to monitor communicable diseases trends and signal early 
warnings for suspected outbreaks of epidemic-prone diseases to generate timely public 
health action. 
- Identify current gaps in disease surveillance under EWARS. 
- Assess the utility of data in influencing public health actions. 
- Provide recommendations for strengthening of surveillance using EWARS. 
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System description 
EWARS is a portable field-ready kit containing mobile phones, laptops, mobile (local) server 
and solar chargers, enabling the system to be self-powered for approximately 24 hours 
(http://ewars-project.org/).11 During implementation, three joint MoHMS/ WHO teams 
consisting of one MoHMS surveillance officer and one WHO epidemiologist with expertise in 
EWARS, conducted standardized two-hour training workshops at each EWARS site. 
Smartphones with EWARS software application were provided to designated surveillance focal 
points at each EWARS site. Training included background on the importance of early outbreak 
detection and response, syndromes and diseases under surveillance, case definitions, use of the 
smartphone and EWARS application (including trouble shooting), and reporting times and 
protocols. Data could be entered into the EWARS application regardless of connectivity, but 
transmission to the central EWARS database required mobile or internet connection. Figure 2 
describes in detail the operational process flow for EWARS (IBS and EBS).  
For IBS, each EWARS site reported age-stratified case counts (<5 years and ≥5 years) weekly 
against nine syndromes or suspected diseases (acute fever and rash, prolonged fever, influenza-
like illness, watery diarrhoea, bloody diarrhoea, acute jaundice syndrome, suspected dengue, 
suspected meningitis and zika-like illness). Standard case definitions were used (Table 1). Total 
weekly consultations were reported to determine proportional morbidity. Syndromes were 
monitored using thresholds that were initially established based on standard thresholds and 
subsequently calculated using aberration detection algorithms (Table 1).
13
 EWARS sites also 
reported unusual public health events for example clusters of deaths, unusually severe disease, 
an animal, bird or fish die-off, etc.
14
 These EBS events were immediately reported by phone or 
email to a dedicated surveillance officer, who could be contacted via a toll free number at any 
time. An “alert” was defined as (i) an increase in cases of a specific syndrome or suspected 
disease above the threshold for that site or (ii) any event perceived by health care worker at 
EWARS sites to have potential adverse public health implications and was reported through 
EBS. EWARS uses automated algorithms to compile and analyse data. If surveillance 
thresholds were exceeded or EBS reports received, alert verification was initiated and emails to 
the designated surveillance team members were auto-generated. Weekly epidemiological 
bulletins were automatically generated and emailed to pre-specified recipients. All data 
collected as part of EWARS is owned by the national health authorities and is stored in a secure 
database. 
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Figure 2: Operational flow of data for EWARS in a Box, Fiji 2016 
  
  
Table 1: EWARS syndromes, case definitions, thresholds and surveillance outputs, epidemiological weeks 10-21, Fiji.  
Syndrome Case definition Thresholds Number of cases  Incidence = cases/ total 
consultations*100 
 
(%)
21
 
Acute fever and rash Fever either reported or measured (>38°C) plus 
non-blistering rash 
1 case 672 2 
Prolonged fever Any fever either reported or measured (>38°C) 
lasting three or more days 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
1461 4.3 
Influenza-like illness Fever either reported or measured (>38°C) plus 
cough and/or sore throat. 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
16426 48.2 
Acute watery 
diarrhoea 
Three or more loose or watery stools in 24hrs 
(non-bloody). 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
10054 29.8 
Acute bloody 
diarrhoea 
Any episode of acute bloody diarrhoea 3 cases in one location 
in 1 week or 
twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
293 0.7 
Acute jaundice 
syndrome 
Jaundice (yellow eyes or dark urine) and severe 
illness with or without fever. 
3 cases 71 0.2 
Suspected dengue Fever for at least 2 days plus at least two of the 
following symptoms: nausea or vomiting; 
muscle or joint pain; severe headache or pain 
behind the eyes rash; bleeding 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 3 weeks 
4,520 13.3 
Suspected 
meningitis 
Sudden onset of fever, plus one or more of the 
following: severe headache; neck stiffness; 
altered consciousness; petechial/puerperal rash. 
1 case 33 0.1 
Zika-like illness* Generalized maculopapular rash plus two or 
more of the following: arthralgia or myalgia; red 
eyes or non-purulent conjunctivitis; oedema of 
hands or feet; low grade fever (< 38℃); pain 
behind the eyes 
3 cases 583 1.7 
                                                          
21
 Total number of consultations for epidemiological weeks = 326 861 
* Zika-like illness was added in during week 13. 
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Evaluation methodology 
We designed an evaluation framework based on previously published evaluation methodologies 
15-19
 including evaluations of the Pacific Syndromic Surveillance System
13, 20-22
, the FSSS and 
previously outlined EWARN guidelines.
14
 Evaluation attributes along with their definitions and 
data sources are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2: Attributes used to evaluate EWARS in a Box, Fiji 2016. 
System attributes Definition Data sources 
Timeliness
22
 
 
Submission of data on time (Monday following 
week under surveillance) 
EWARS database 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Completeness
§
 Submission of data independent of the 
timeliness (Sunday following week under 
surveillance) 
EWARS database 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Data Validity
§
  Accuracy of data captured by the surveillance 
system 
EWARS database 
Site visits and retrospective 
review of clinic records  
Usefulness
§
 System’s contribution in monitoring diseases 
trends and early detection of signals that might 
lead to potential disease clusters or outbreaks 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Flexibility
§
 
 
Ability to adapt to changing information needs 
or operating conditions without significant 
time, staff contribution or funding 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Stakeholder interviews 
Simplicity
§
 Ease of operating the surveillance system Cross-sectional Survey 
Acceptability
§
 Willingness of users to participate in the 
surveillance process including data collection 
and analysis 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Stability Reliability of the system and its resilience to 
change 
EWARS database 
Cross-sectional Survey 
Costs Expenditure associated with equipment, and 
the implementation and operation of the 
system. 
Fiji Ministry of Health and 
Medical Services 
Fiji Health Sector Support 
Program  
WHO Division of the Technical 
Pacific Support 
Representativeness Geographical appropriateness and coverage Review of implementation 
protocol 
EWARS database 
Population data, Fiji Ministry of 
Health and Medical Services 
Stakeholder interviews 
 
  
                                                          
22
 These attributes were restricted to Indicator Based Surveillance. 
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Study period 
EWARS was evaluated for the period coinciding with the National State of Emergency: 7 
March 2016 to 29 May 2016 (epidemiological weeks 10 to 21).   
Stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholders were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires to examine the significance, 
strengths and weaknesses of the system. Stakeholders included staff from the MoHMS, WHO 
headquarters, the WHO Division of Pacific Technical Support (DPS), and the Fiji Health Sector 
Support Program, i.e. organisations involved in the design and implementation of the system or 
with an overarching role in the governance and performance of EWARS. Stakeholders also 
included members from partner organisations including other United Nation agencies and Red 
Cross Fiji, who were not directly involved but utilised information generated through EWARS.  
Data analyses 
We reviewed standard operating protocols and documentation used by WHO and MoHMS. 
System performance was evaluated using data collected via the EWARS database. System 
experience was evaluated using a cross-sectional survey of EWARS users. “Users” were 
persons submitting data into the system (focal points or doctors in-charge of the reporting site) 
and those monitoring the reporting (surveillance officers). Two self-administered online surveys 
were designed in SurveyMonkey® and distributed via email. All five surveillance officer and 
27/34 (79%) of focal points completed the survey. Unless otherwise specified, user survey 
results presented refer to responses of focal points at EWARS sites and summarised in 
Supplementary Table 1. 
Site visits 
We visited 11 EWARS sites across the Northern, Western and Central divisions of Fiji. Site 
selection was based on access and other logistical considerations. At each site, we reviewed the 
data collection and reporting processes and clinical records for epidemiological weeks 13 and 
17. Data collected from clinic reviews were compared to data extracted from the EWARS 
database for the same period.  
Ethics approval was obtained from the Fiji National Research Ethics Review Committee 
(2017.86.NW). 
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Results 
Indicator based surveillance 
Surveillance outputs 
EWARS was implemented in epidemiological week 9 of 2016. Zika-like illness was added in 
week 13. During epidemiological weeks 10-21, 34 113 cases that met one of the case definitions 
were reported from 326 861 total consultations (Table 1). Counts and proportional morbidity 
(number of new cases/total number of weekly consultations) for each syndrome under 
surveillance are presented in Figure 3. Influenza-like illness (ILI) was the most commonly 
reported syndrome (48.2%) (Table 1). From epidemiological week 14 we observed increasing 
trends of ILI. This increase was concomitant with increased laboratory-confirmed influenza 
cases and cases of severe acute respiratory infections. An outbreak investigation of influenza 
was initiated by MoHMS with support from WHO DPS.  
Except for the outbreak described above, IBS did not detect any major outbreaks. Several small 
clusters of watery diarrhoea and measles were identified, but weren’t always reported back 
through the EWARS (personal communication with subdivisional medical officer). 
Stakeholders felt that automated alerts were better at generating an outbreak response at the 
divisional and sub-divisional levels, compared to previous national emergencies.  
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Figure 3: National trends [A and B] and proportional morbidity23 [C and D] for 
influenza-like illness (ILI), acute watery diarrhoea (AWD), prolonged fever (PF) 
and dengue-like illness (DLI),  acute jaundice syndrome (AJS), acute bloody 
diarrhoea (ABD), acute fever and rash (AFR), suspected meningitis (Men) and 
Zika-like illness (ZLI)24as reported through EWARS, Fiji during epidemiological 
weeks 10 – 21, 201625  
                                                          
23
 Proportional morbidity = number of new cases / total number of weekly consultations *100 
24
 Zika-like illness began reporting from epidemiological week 13. 
25
 Data for week 21 may not be complete due to delayed reporting. 
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Timeliness and completeness 
The national average for timeliness and completeness of reporting was 64% and 90%, 
respectively, but intra-division variations in reporting trends and practices were observed 
(Figure 4). Eighty-eight percent of Users (21/24) experienced situations where they were unable 
to report on time (Supplementary Table 1). 
During the study period, 325 alerts were generated. On average, 88.2% (range 52-100%) alerts 
were verified. Three of the five surveillance officers indicated delays in alert verification were 
usually associated with the inability of surveillance officers to contact focal points.  
Data validity 
Due to logistical reasons, complete case counts for epidemiological weeks 13 and 17 could be 
obtained from only three sites. Site reviews highlighted heterogeneity and discrepancy in 
reporting, most likely due to variation in data collection and reporting practices. Inconsistencies 
were more common at larger EWARS sites with more medical providers.  
System usefulness 
Most Stakeholders and Users (25/27, 93%) were confident that EWARS was an effective early 
warning system for disease outbreaks. Eighty-nine percent (24/27) of Users thought the total 
number of syndromes were appropriate to capture syndromes that could lead to outbreaks in Fiji. 
In general, Stakeholders and Users (21/27, 77%) agreed that the weekly EWARS 
epidemiological bulletin was useful. Similarly, national-level public health authorities reported 
that the bulletins were helpful for providing updates and coordinating public heath response 
measures. Further, the bulletins facilitated information sharing between public health personnel 
and EWARS sites. 
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B) 
 
  
Figure 4: Timeliness [A] and completeness [B] of EWARS- IBS reporting at 
National and Divisional level through EWARS, Fiji, epidemiological weeks 10-21. 
Number of reporting sites (National= 34, Central = 12, Eastern = 2, Western = 12, 
Northern = 10)  
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Flexibility, simplicity and acceptability 
Stakeholders and Users were asked if reporting and surveillance processes were easy to amend, 
for instance when Zika-like illness was added in week 13. System developers and all five 
surveillance officers reported that the system was easily modified and processes adaptable. 
Similarly, most Users (25/27, 93%) reported the surveillance process easy to amend. Two Users 
(7%) who did not find the process amenable struggled to correctly apply the case definition for 
Zika-like illness. 
Reporting using the EWARS smartphone application was highly acceptable. Users (24/27, 89%) 
reported EWARS mobile application easy to use and preferred reporting with the EWARS 
application compared with email or telephone (24/26, 92%). Many Users (14/27, 52%) reported 
increased workload in addition to their routine activities, which contributed towards delayed 
reporting.  
As feedback to those collecting and submitting the data is crucial for good quality surveillance, 
we asked Users if they received feedback on the data provided or alerts generated from their 
health facility. Most Users (22/27, 81%) received feedback after an alert was generated, and 
19/27 (70%) received weekly bulletins. During the site visits, some Users expressed that 
aggregated data presented in the weekly bulletin was not easy to comprehend or not very useful. 
This was most likely due to limited understanding of epidemiological data. Four of the five 
surveillance officers found the EWARS website simple to navigate and easy to use. In general, 
focal points and surveillance officers were satisfied with the training and ongoing support 
provided by the EWARS team during the surveillance period.  
System Stability  
We assessed EWARS’ requirements for upgrades and outages using server logs extracted from 
the host server at Amazon Web Services. At the server level, EWARS had a constant stream of 
activity with regular spikes in activity (data not shown). From a user perspective, 15/27 (55%) 
Users reported experiencing some difficulty in accessing EWARS via its mobile application or 
website. Most of these problems were in the early phase after EWARS was implemented and 
were resolved by the system developers soon after the problem was identified.  
Representativeness 
EWARS was implemented at 34 sentinel sites across all four divisions of Fiji (Figure 1). 
Overall the system was largely representative and included most of the severely affected 
population (Supplementary Table 2). Due to limited access, some of the small and 
geographically remote islands in the Eastern Division may have been under-represented.  
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Event Based Surveillance 
Due to the immediate and ad hoc nature of EBS, we were unable to assess EBS using our 
evaluation framework, nonetheless it is important to acknowledge its impact. Ten alerts were 
triggered through EBS, all of which were verified. Of these, four were confirmed outbreaks, two 
of which were associated with large outbreaks of viral conjunctivitis (830 cases), one with 
typhoid and one with symptoms of prolonged fever but unknown aetiology. The time from 
reporting to initiating a public health response ranged from zero to four days.  
All Stakeholders and Users felt that EBS was useful but was under-utilised. Sixteen (59%) focal 
points indicated that they would directly contact the divisional medical officers (the most senior 
MoHMS staff in the administrative unit) if they encountered an unusual public health event and 
three (11%) indicated they would report the event using the EWARS toll free number.  The 
system under-utilisation was likely due to limited awareness and training on the EBS 
component of EWARS (versus IBS). 
EWARS associated costs 
During the study period, the total direct costs associated with implementation and operation of 
EWARS was approximately USD 185,000. This did not include the salaries of repurposed 
MoHMS staff (for example EWARS site focal points, who performed EWARS data collection 
and reporting, in addition to their routine activities) or repurposed WHO staff.  The EWARS 
equipment was a relatively small proportion of the total costs: smart phones, USD 7500; laptops 
for surveillance officers, USD 13,450. Other expenditures (USD 70,400) included salary 
support for surveillance officers, travel during the implementation phase, contractual services 
and transport. The largest costs were associated with consultant epidemiologist flights, fees, and 
other expenses. Of the total expenditure, MoHMS and the Fiji Health Sector Services Program 
contributed 3.5% and 7.5%, respectively; WHO contributed the remainder.  
Discussion 
We report the findings of an assessment of the early warning disease surveillance system 
implemented after Cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016. The system used, EWARS – is a low-cost 
tool kit developed by WHO that includes hardware and software for automated data collection, 
entry, analysis, alert generation, and reporting.
11
   
Overall, EWARS was acceptable and simple to use by public health professionals, and was 
perceived to be useful for timely monitoring of diseases trends. The system was simple, stable 
and flexible meeting the core criteria for rapid deployment during health emergencies. 
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Surveillance using mobile phones has been used in a number of settings
23
 including after natural 
disasters such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China.
24
 Highly automated surveillance 
systems in the context of natural disasters are relatively new and not routinely implemented.
25
  
One of the most important features of EWARS that could not be quantified was its automated 
elements, including data analyses, alert generation and distribution of weekly bulletins. Several 
authors of this paper have implemented EWARN systems in a range of post-disaster settings, 
many of which relied on traditional excel-based, email and telephone data reporting, required 
manual data analysis and dissemination of information. The effort and energy invested in these 
activities by surveillance teams was substantial, consuming large amounts of time, leaving little 
time for alert verification, rapid risk assessments, and outbreak investigations. EWARS saved 
substantial human resources, minimised human error and ensured EWARS surveillance teams 
focused on data collection, and management and response to alerts.
4, 5
  
Timely submission of surveillance data is crucial for timely outbreak detection and generating 
an appropriate public health response.
19
 Minimal delays in reporting were observed, and were 
mostly associated with increased workload at EWARS sites. It is difficult to identify the exact 
reasons for variable reporting trends from some sites, but is most likely influenced by specific 
staff motivation, training, and supervision. This is further evident from fatigue in reporting 
towards the end of the study period. Some reporting delays were due to insufficient mobile 
phone credit, but these occurrences were rare and easily resolved. These issues highlight the 
need for ongoing technical support and timely ‘feedback’ for all those involved in surveillance 
activities.
19
 
Whilst real-time surveillance is ideal, it is difficult to implement and most systems rely on 
weekly reporting.
13, 25
 In Fiji, weekly (IBS) reporting was complemented by ‘real-time’ EBS. 
EBS is specifically designed for outbreak detection and not for monitoring disease trends.
26
 It 
offered greater coverage and detected conditions not captured under IBS. Its capacity value was 
evident in its ability to detect an outbreak of conjunctivitis which would otherwise not have 
been captured by IBS-EWARS. The outbreak was verified by a designated medical surveillance 
officer with minimal delay (data not shown). Non-specific signals were further minimised by 
restricting the reporting to health care workers. Similar observations were made in Sierra Leone, 
where a community-based EBS established for Ebola virus disease in January 2015, detected 
low-level disease transmission at the village level.
27
 Even though EBS was not used to its full 
potential, we believe that EBS, if recommended to countries will be highly beneficial for 
outbreak detection during health emergencies and during routine surveillance.
26
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Like other post-disaster systems, EWARS and our evaluation had some limitations. 
Implementation of EWARS relied on access to affected areas and telecommunication services. 
For example, some islands of the Eastern Division were inadequately captured, and some 
outbreaks may have been undetected. While some of these obstacles are difficult to overcome 
during after a disaster, a portable and rapidly deployable system such as EWARS is likely to be 
advantageous once connectivity is re-established.
24
 We were unable to accurately measure the 
data quality, but several discrepancies around data reporting and case identification were 
identified through site reviews. Many of these issues are associated with syndromic surveillance 
and have been described previosuly.
4, 13, 21, 22
 Continued efforts should be made towards 
addressing concerns around data reporting, refinement of sensitive case definitions, 
misclassification of cases; and improved links to other systems such as laboratory 
surveillance.
22, 28, 29
 In order to improve the specificity of diagnosis and patient management, use 
of rapid tests or point-of-care tests is encouraged.
1
 The surveys were designed and collected 
with the assistance of MoHMS surveillance officers, which may have influenced responses of 
the EWARS focal points. As the surveys collected de-identified data and were administered 
using SurveyMonkey®, we believe the reporting bias to be minimal
30
.  
Regardless of these limitations, our findings suggest surveillance using EWARS was feasible, 
robust and met its objectives. EWARS offers potential for strengthened surveillance during 
health emergencies. Epidemics of infectious diseases are at heightened risks during 
humanitarian emergencies when populations are displaced, and resources are exhausted.
31
 
Sustaining surveillance beyond emergencies is a common challenge owing to the complexity of 
health systems, lack of resources and response capacities
8
 but the integration of automated 
aspects of EWARS into routine surveillance is expected to overcome some these difficulties.
32
 
After Fiji, EWARS was deployed in Nigeria and Ethiopia (Samara and Adama), and the 
platform was expanded to support the Pacific Syndromic Surveillance System. 
The early detection of disease outbreaks can be difficult under the best of circumstances. During 
humanitarian emergencies, particularly in developing counties, the challenges are magnified 
several-fold. Tools to facilitate and standardise the implementation and reporting of post-
disaster early warning surveillance, such as EWARS in a Box, can improve the detection of 
outbreaks while minimising the reporting burden on the public health system.    
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Supplementary Table 1: Summarised results from cross-sectional survey of 
Focal Points, EWARS, Fiji 201626 
Q EWARS site location 
Number (% 
response rate) 
 
Central 
Eastern 
Northern 
Western 
Total 
12 (100) 
2 (100) 
5 (50) 
8 (80) 
27 (79) 
Q 
What do you think is the purpose of EWARS?  
(>1 response per respondent) 
  
 
Theme: outbreak detection 
Theme: outbreak response 
Theme: general disease surveillance or monitoring 
18 (67) 
9 (33) 
12 (44) 
Q 
How well do you think EWARS is able to signal an early warning for 
potential disease outbreaks? 
  
 
Very well 
Somewhat well 
Not very well 
Not at all well 
18 (67) 
7 (26) 
2 (7) 
0 (0) 
Q Do you think EWARS has had any impact on public health in Fiji?   
 
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
20 (77) 
0 (0) 
6 (23) 
Q In your opinion, how easy is it to use EWARS on the mobile phone?   
 
Very easy 
Somewhat easy 
Not very easy 
Very difficult 
24 (89) 
3 (11) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Q 
Have you ever had difficulty accessing EWARS on the mobile 
phone? Application not working 
  
 
Yes 
How often did you experience difficulty 
- Very often (most weeks) 
- Somewhat often (> once a month) 
- Not very often (≤ once a month) 
- Not often (≤2 during study period) 
No 
Unsure 
15 (56) 
 
2 (13) 
6 (40) 
3 (20) 
4 (27) 
12 (44) 
0 (0) 
Q 
At your health facility, what is the process used to record patients 
who meet the case definitions? 
  
 
Medical officers record cases directly on the EWARS tally sheet at the 
time a patient is seen 
Medical officers record cases on an EWARS line list 
Weekly review of register or logbook by Medical Officer or Nurse 
Not known 
Other 
4 (20) 
1 (5) 
13 (65) 
0 (0) 
2 (10) 
                                                          
26
 For confidentiality reasons, qualitative data is not reported. 
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Q 
How do you send / transmit the EWARS weekly reports? (Tick all that 
apply) 
  
 
EWARS mobile phone application 
EWARS website (using computer) 
Email 
Telephone call 
SMS 
Other 
25 (93) 
1 (4) 
4 (15) 
8 (30) 
6 (22) 
3 (11) 
Q 
What is your preferred reporting method? (Ranked as first 
preference) 
  
 
EWARS mobile phone application 
EWARS website (using computer) 
Email 
Telephone call 
SMS 
24 (92) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
2 (8) 
0 (0) 
Q 
Have there been situations where you could not submit the EWARS 
weekly report on time (before Monday 6pm)? 
  
 
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
21 (88) 
3 (13) 
0 (0) 
Q 
What are the most common challenges for timely reporting? (Tick all 
that apply) 
  
 
Tally sheet not received on time from other staff 
No access to internet (no credit) 
No access to internet (no signal) 
No access to phone 
Not enough time / workload too busy 
Unsure 
Other 
11 (46) 
4 (17) 
11 (46) 
2 (8) 
14 (58) 
0 (0) 
4 (17) 
Q Are you aware of the EWARS case definitions?  
 
Yes 
No  
Unsure 
27 (100) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Q How easy is it to classify cases into the syndrome categories?  
 
Very easy 
Somewhat easy 
Not very easy 
Very difficult 
11(41) 
16 (59) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Q 
How easy was it to amend the reporting process when an additional 
syndrome (Zika-like illness) was added to EWARS? 
  
  
Very easy 
Somewhat easy  
Not very easy 
Reasons for difficulty  
Theme: similar case definitions and patient presentation 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 
12 (44) 
13 (48) 
2 (7) 
2 (100) 
0 (0) 
Q 
Have you received any feedback when an EWARS alert has been 
generated for your health facility? 
  
 
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
N/A 
22 (81) 
3 (11) 
1 (4) 
1 (4) 
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Q Do you receive the EWARS weekly bulletin?   
 
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
19 (70) 
7 (26) 
1 (4) 
Q 
How useful is the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin for your 
health facility? 
  
  
Very useful 
Somewhat useful 
Not very useful 
Not at all useful 
9 (33) 
12 (44) 
3 (11) 
Q How have you used the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin?   
  
  
Theme: information sharing 
Theme: to compare with other reporting areas 
Theme: to initiate preventive or responsive public health actions 
6 (32) 
5 (26) 
5 (26) 
Q How could the EWARS weekly bulletin be improved?   
   
Theme: include health facility specific surveillance data 
Theme: include outcome of previous week's case investigations 
Theme: increase access to other staff members at health facility 
3 (16) 
1 (5) 
2 (11) 
Q 
Do you ever distribute the information in the weekly bulletin to other 
persons or organisations? 
  
  
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
9 (35) 
16 (62) 
1 (4) 
Q Who do you distribute the information to?   
   
Theme: health facility colleagues 
Theme: community health care workers 
Theme: regional public health staff 
8 (89) 
3 (33) 
1 (11) 
Q 
How satisfied do you feel with the training that you received when 
EWARS was implemented? 
  
 
Very satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied 
Not very satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
11 (41) 
12 (44) 
3 (11) 
1 (4) 
Q 
How supported do you feel to be able to carry out your EWARS 
responsibilities? 
  
 
Very supported 
Somewhat supported 
Not very supported 
Not at all supported 
13 (48) 
14 (52) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Q Overall, how satisfied are you with EWARS?   
  
Very satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied  
Not very satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
16 (59) 
11 (41) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
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Supplementary Table 2: Population size and EWARS surveillance site coverage by Division, 
Fiji, 2016. 27 
Divisional 
region 
Population 
(%) 
Number of 
EWARS sites 
(%) 
Number of 
health 
facilities 
Percentage of health 
facilities captured by 
EWARS 
Central 361895  
(41.6) 
12  
(35.3) 
52 23.1 
Eastern 36870  
(4.2) 
2 
(5.9) 
52 3.8 
Western 344663  
(39.6) 
10 
(29.4) 
61 16.4 
Northern 127556  
(14.6) 
10 
(29.4) 
45 22.2 
National 870984  
(100) 
34 
(100) 
210 16.2 
 
                                                          
27
 Projected population figures for 2016 were provided by the Fiji Ministry of Health and 
Medical Services (MoHMS), estimated using 2007 census conducted by Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics and MoHMS divisional boundaries. 
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Chapter 5: Epidemiological study 
 
Identifying residual transmission of lymphatic 
filariasis in post-mass drug administration 
surveillance phase: Comparing school-based versus 
community-based surveys – American Samoa, 2016 
 113 
Prologue 
My role 
In September 2016, I was deployed to American Samoa as a field epidemiologist as part of an 
operational research project - Transmission Assessment Survey (TAS) Strengthening in 
American Samoa. The aim of this project was to compare the effectiveness for two survey 
designs for epidemiological assessment of transmission of lymphatic filariasis following mass 
drug administration (MDAs). 
This project was a joint collaboration between the Research School of Population Health, 
Australian National University (ANU), the Taskforce for Global Health (TFGH), the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the American Samoa Community College. 
I was the co-lead for the fieldwork component of this study. I spent a total of eight weeks in 
American Samoa, conducting the school and community-based surveys. My role in the field 
include coordinating a school and a community based survey, which involved interviewing 
study participants and collecting finger prick blood samples to test for circulating filarial antigen 
(CFA). The interviews were conducted using electronic questionnaires using mobile phones. 
We collected information on geospatial coordinates, demographics and risk factors. We also 
established follow-up clinics for treatment of study participants who had a positive test. I trained 
field and lab teams; managed the logistics and budgets including paying field teams; and 
participated in community activities including presenting at local symposiums and judging high 
school science competition, conducting TV and radio interviews. My role and reflections from 
the field are detailed in part one of this chapter. The field experience will be submitted to PLOS 
Blogs for publication.  
The main study components are summarised below: 
1. School-based survey – targeting school children aged 6-7 years 
2. Household members of antigen positive school children – follow-up of children from part 1. 
3. Community-based survey of persons aged ≥8 years 
a) 30 randomly selected villages 
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b) ‘Hotspot’ villages – two purposively selected villages, which were not randomly selected but 
were previously known to be foci of residual transmission 
For the analyses, I conducted the final cleaning and appending of all data sets. I performed 
multiple analyses including descriptive epidemiology, univariate logistic regressions and multi-
stage cluster survey analyses. Only the results comparing the school and community survey are 
enclosed in this chapter (primary hypothesis). I led the analyses and drafting of the manuscript 
enclosed in the second part of this chapter. I collated comments from supervisors Dr Colleen 
Lau, Professor Patricia Graves and Associate Professor Martyn Kirk. 
Lessons learned 
This project was an amazing learning, challenging and fun experience. While there are many 
aspects that helped me develop personally and professionally, my key lessons learnt are 
summarized below: 
1. Implementing cross-sectional surveys in a resource limited setting. I was involved in this 
project from the start of its implementation until the end. I learnt about planning and 
organization activities involved in surveys, shipment, employing and training staff in a 
developing country environment, and about how to effectively engage people. I learnt how to 
set-up follow up clinics in a resource limited setting, communicating with study participants and 
ensuring that they are comfortable with the information provided. 
2. Statistical analyses-While I was not involved in the original study design; I learnt how to 
design multi-stage cross-sectional surveys. I learnt how to conduct cluster survey analyses for 
multi- stage surveys  
3. Collaboration-All collaborators were excellent at information sharing, and it was evident that 
open and honest collaboration is the key to success public health programs. 
4. Leadership and project management – As the fieldwork leader, I learnt how to effectively 
lead in a resource limited setting. This was one of my favourite aspects of the work, as I was not 
only responsible for everyday coordination and logistics, but also supervision of local teams.  
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Public health impact 
The main purpose of our study was to compare the two surveys and identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of each for post-MDA for lymphatic filariasis. We found the community survey 
was more reliable and provided in depth information on high risk groups and was better at 
identifying ongoing transmission. These findings will help inform future WHO 
recommendations for post-MDA surveillance for lymphatic filariasis under the Global 
Programme. 
The key findings are summarized in a manuscript (enclosed in this chapter), and were presented 
to the TFGH and CDC, and to the Department of Health in American Samoa. Following on 
from that, discussions have begun between country partners to discuss the next steps in LF 
elimination.  
Additional recommendations specific to American Samoa and those aimed at improving post-
MDA surveillance have been discussed, and being implemented slowly. The project led to local 
capacity building – local staff members were trained and will be good human resources for 
future surveys. I worked with many of the staff, training and educating them on significance of 
good public health and concepts of public health.  
Although reporting on cases of LF-related morbidity was not a part of my role, I documented all 
cases of lymphoedema or elephantiasis that I witnessed. These observations were presented in a 
report to the TFGH and WHO, which initiated the development of a morbidity management 
program for American Samoa. We raised local awareness about LF through presentations and 
discussions with local clinicians, public health practitioners, and laboratory managers.  
We experienced several challenges with the rapid diagnostic tests (Filarial Test Strips). These 
issues were documented into a quality control report submitted to the TFGH and the kit 
manufacturer Alere
TM
. These findings are expected to assist in improving the design and utility 
of the test kits in the field.  
Presentations  
I presented the results at the annual FETP International Night hosted by TEPHINET in Atlanta, 
Georgia USA in April 2017, at the PHAA Communicable Diseases Conference, Melbourne, 
June 2017 and the Australasian Tropical Health Conference, Cairns, September 2017; and 
several other local seminars in Sydney and Canberra.  
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Dr Colleen Lau presented the preliminary results at the weekly meeting of the Department of 
Health in American Samoa and the WHO consultation meeting on post-elimination surveillance 
of neglected tropical diseases in Cambodia. 
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Leadership lessons from the field 
In September 2016, I was deployed to American Samoa to co-lead a field team in a cross-
sectional survey that was part of an operational research project – Transmission Assessment 
Survey (TAS) Strengthening in American Samoa. The project was collaboration between the 
Australian National University (ANU), the Taskforce for Global Health (TFGH), the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the American Samoa Community College.  
American Samoa is a chain of several small islands in the South Pacific Sea and has a tropical 
climate. It is comprised of a large main island known as Tutuila, the adjacent island of Aunu’u 
and a remote chain of islands known as the Manu’a islands. Pago Pago, the capital of American 
Samoa can only be accessed from Samoa and Hawaii. The total population of American Samoa 
is approximately 57,000 people who live in approximately 70 villages. The majority of the 
population lives on Tutuila and Aunu’u, which is where this study was conducted. People are 
mostly of Samoan origin, with a few Filipinos, Tongan, American and other Pacific Islander 
people. Despite being an unincorporated territory of the United States and having a strong 
American influence (especially American fast food), the culture continues to be mainly Samoan. 
 
Polynesian Airlines carrier connects Samoa to Pago Pago, the capital of 
American Samoa [left]. View of Pago Pago Harbour and the Rainmaker Mountain 
from Mt Alava [right]. 
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Typical Samoan house called fale (top row), fresh coconut being prepared for 
cooking at Tisa’s Barefoot Bar, a Samoan fish curry and locally grown bananas 
ripening in a participant’s house [from left to right]. 
On my arrival, I was greeted by Dr Colleen Lau (principal investigator) and other Australian 
collaborators Drs Patricia (Tricia) Graves and Sarah Sheridan. They designed the study and had 
been in American Samoa for the previous week piloting the survey and training local fieldwork 
teams. I spent the first week familiarising myself with island life (which included driving on the 
other side of the road!), meeting the field team, and getting up to speed with the survey 
methodology before my colleagues returned to Australia. Field epidemiology is not only about 
the data, but is also about the people, the culture, logistics and coordination and understanding 
the disease context. Below are some reflections of my experience in this leadership role and 
lessons learned. 
Study background 
The World Health Organization (WHO) launched the Global Programme for Elimination of 
Lymphatic Filariaisis in 2000. The Programme aims to eliminate lymphatic filariasis by 2020, 
firstly by stopping the spread of infection via mass drug administration or MDA, which involves 
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large-scale preventative treatment in communities with endemic disease; and secondly, by 
supporting those living with disability. In American Samoa, the Department of Health 
conducted several rounds of MDA between the years 2000 and 2006. WHO recommends 
conducting surveillance surveys after MDAs have been completed to confirm there is no 
ongoing disease transmission. Our study was designed to compare two survey (school and 
community) methodologies for surveillance of lymphatic filariasis. The survey involved 
interviewing study participants, collecting few drops of blood to test for filarial antigen and 
providing treatment to anyone who had a positive test.  
Lymphatic filariasis (LF), known as “mūmū tupa” in Samoan, is a mosquito-borne disease 
caused by the helminth worm, Wuchereria bancrofti. Repeated bites with infected mosquitos 
(Aedes sp.) can lead to elephantiasis or hydrocele, and are a major cause of permanent disability. 
Severe elephantiasis or hydrocele are not as common as they used to be, however people living 
with mild lymphedema or swelling of the leg can still be found. 
 
Study participants with lymphoedema in American Samoa. 
Project management in a resource limited setting 
My primary role was to coordinate the school and community survey. For both surveys, I would 
organise the visits a week in advance, with the aim of visiting at least one school and one village 
every day, Monday to Friday, and a remote village on Saturdays.  
We surveyed students from grades 1 and 2 from all elementary schools on the two main islands 
of American Samoa. For school surveys, I liaised with school principals to arrange the 
distribution and collection of consent forms, and arranged for us to visit the school to test the 
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children. Most school principals were extremely understanding and helpful. Some of the larger 
schools (with approximately 100-200 grade 1 and 2 students) required persistence, and took 
longer to coordinate and to recruit sufficient number of study participants. School children in 
American Samoa were extremely resilient to pain and only a handful of children were fearful of 
having a finger prick test. The students were also familiar with school-based vaccination 
programs, and would often excitedly chant “shots shots shots”. In one school, we recruited 
greater than 95% of the eligible students. Later I found out that the teacher showed pictures of 
elephantiasis to her students, and explained the advantage of early testing. She assured the 
students that finger pricks don’t hurt, and in order to make sure that the students weren’t scared, 
she mimicked a finer prick by poking the students’ finger with the pointed end of a pencil. 
Collectively, this might be why most of the students brought back signed consent forms and 
resulted in a high response rate.  
 
School students line up to get tested for lymphatic filariasis in American Samoa. 
School surveys, although logistically simple, recruitment can be difficult, and 
rely on coordination by the school teachers and principals. 
The community surveys were logistically more challenging. There are approximately 70 
villages on the two main islands, of which we visited 32 villages. American Samoa has a 
Paramount Chief, and each village has a mayor who is responsible for operational affairs of the 
village. As they are prominent community leaders, we obtained their permission prior to 
conducting the study. The visit to each village was organised in coordination with the village 
mayor (this was usually done by one of our senior field workers). While some mayors were 
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quite generous with their time and would walk around the village with us, others were happy for 
us to carry-on our work without them.  
 
With field team in one of the households while conducting community survey in 
Futiga, American Samoa. 
Our daily visits to the villages occurred between 3-8pm on weekdays and on Saturday mornings. 
At the start, we would have a quick de-brief, following which we would split into two teams, 
each of which were assigned a set of selected houses, which were marked on fieldwork maps. 
Each team comprised of a bilingual interviewer and a phlebotomist. I would alternate between 
the two teams, guiding and supporting them as and when needed. At each house, we would 
provide participants with information about the study, seek consent and test them. Sometimes 
we would spend extra time talking to participants and addressing their concerns; especially in 
instances where a family member was hesitant to allow the rest of their family or children to be 
tested. At the end of each day, I would count the number of samples, cross-check the data that 
was recorded with the paper consent forms, and correct any errors.  
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Curious villagers surround the field team as they conduct interview and test 
participants. 
In the mornings, I would visit our laboratory at the American Samoa Community College. This 
was a small room, on loan from one of the project collaborators, an American entomologist who 
has worked on the Island for over 15 years. At the lab, I would deliver the blood samples 
collected the day before, meet with the lab assistant and ensure everything was running 
smoothly. We were using a new rapid diagnostic kit (Filariasis Test Strips), which were easy to 
use but required regular monitoring for any irregularities and performance issues. I was required 
to conduct regular quality checks and monitor any operational challenges. I would undertake a 
quick stock-take of supplies and re-stock our field kits before heading out on another school and 
village visit. Despite all the planning – en route to school or village, we occasionally had to 
make a pit stop to buy gloves, Band-Aids, snacks or water. 
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Phlebotomist kit used during field work [left] and lab technician testing blood 
specimens at our temporary laboratory at the American Samoa Community 
College. 
As the fieldwork leader, I managed all expenditures, was in charge of paying weekly salaries for 
field and lab workers, which meant constantly being on top of all the administrative paperwork. 
American Samoa is largely a cash-based economy but every cash withdrawal machine at all the 
banks in the country were broken. In order to pay the field workers, I would do up four to five 
rounds of cash withdrawal from different ATM machines around the Island. It is these simple 
things that we often take for granted at home, and can make everyday life and field work 
logistics difficult. 
Local capacity building 
One of my other key responsibilities was to provide ongoing training and support, and 
managing the field and lab teams. Mentoring and providing knowledge and skills to the local 
staff is an important element of field epidemiology and international development. It is also 
very gratifying and one thing I absolutely love about being a field epidemiologist. At the CDC 
conference in Melbourne, I had the privilege of sharing my experiences with an inspiring field 
epidemiologist, who at the end of our conversation said “it is our life’s aim to become 
redundant”. I could not agree more!   
I learnt how to effectively lead, without being annoyed; to manage conflicts and strategic ways 
to manage time. In a resource limited setting, where both time and funding are limited, optimal 
use of of time is important as it directly impacts the operation of the project.  
With the field teams, I realised that educating them on why it was important to collect good 
quality data, and how it impacted the study and the health of those living in American Samoa, 
streamlined our data collection process. With time, the teams felt more confident at recruiting 
families, worked more efficiently subsequently improving the data quality. I used my previous 
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laboratory experience to train the lab assistants and provide them with troubleshooting tips. It 
was great to see the lab assistants become excited about the data, and taking responsibility of 
their work. I engaged in local community activities and contributed to additional capacity 
building, by presenting at seminars or judging high school science competitions.  
Building relationships and trust within the community 
Within a few days of being on the Island, it was evident that most people had a family member 
or a friend or a distant relative who had suffered with LF, and perhaps even died because of 
severe elephantiasis or hydrocoele. Therefore it was no surprise that most community members 
were very supportive of the study and were happy to be tested. Many were grateful that we were 
there to test their children and grandchildren. In some instances, such as in the more ‘urban’ 
villages, we experienced mild skepticism – however over time the teams improved at 
approaching participants and educating those who were unaware. At the schools, I found 
building a relationship with the principals and teachers, and winning their vote of confidence 
improved the recruitment process. 
In order to further engage the community and to improve our recruitment rates, I appeared on 
the radio and the local television news, where I talked about our study, its public health 
significance, confidentiality of the data and results, and about the treatment process.  In the end, 
we tested 4000 participants and treated anyone who had a positive test.  
Working in cross-cultural settings is fun but can be challenging. The communities in American 
Samoa are traditional and religious, with many traditional practices. Cultural events such as 
White Sunday, Halloween and even the presidential election slowed the recruitment process. 
Sometimes there were other competing urgencies, for example with the ongoing Zika outbreak 
and associated media scare, many people were concerned about Zika, and weren’t as concerned 
about testing for LF. Everyday island life can be slow, meetings can run late or even be 
cancelled last minute. Sundays are a religious and family day, and it is culturally inappropriate 
to work, and access to villages/ beaches is restricted. Our project time lines were strict – most of 
the work had to be completed before the onset of the wet season, which would make certain 
parts of the island inaccessible. To overcome these, one must respect the culture and engage 
with the community leaders. It was important to not get frustrated, acknowledge the limitations, 
and adopt a flexible, opportunistic and spontaneous approach to working in this setting. 
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En route to neighboring island of Aunu’u on Halloween with team members. 
Finally, I am extremely grateful for the generosity and kindness of all the Samoan people, and 
for all the experiences - the field work and super long days in the hot and humid weather, the 
amazing science, not to mention the Samoan food, Samoan dancing and fresh Pina Coladas. 
Warmest thanks to our field and lab team members, study participants and local community 
champions, particularly those from the American Samoa Department of Health who were 
instrumental to the success of the fieldwork, and is a highly respected and accomplished 
community leader. I am also thankful to all my supervisors and collaborators for their 
mentorship and guidance in undertaking this project. American Samoa is a beautiful part of the 
world, and I hope to go back someday. Fa’afetai lava! 
 
 
Dr Meru Sheel is Field Epidemiology Training Program Fellow in the Masters of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology at the Australian National University. Dr Sheel is 
supported by scholarships from the Australian Government Research Training Program 
and the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, Australia. All 
photographs were taken by the author and verbal consent for use was obtained at the 
time. 
 127 
Identifying residual transmission of lymphatic filariasis in post-
mass drug administration surveillance phase: Comparing 
school-based versus community-based surveys – American 
Samoa, 2016 
Meru Sheel
1,2
, Sarah L. Sheridan
3
, Martyn Kirk
1
, Patricia M. Graves
4
, Colleen L. Lau
3
 et al. 
(authors to be finalised) 
1
 National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, 
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia  
2
 National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance, Westmead, New South Wales, 
Australia 
3
 Department of Global Health, Research School of Population Health, Australian National 
University, Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia  
4
 College of Public Health, Medical and Veterinary Sciences, James Cook University, Cairns, 
Queensland, Australia 
  
 128 
Abstract 
Introduction: Under the Global Programme for Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis (LF), 
American Samoa conducted seven rounds of mass drug administration (MDA) from 2000-2006. 
The World Health Organization recommends systematic post-MDA surveillance using 
Transmission Assessment Surveys (TAS) for epidemiological assessment of recent LF 
transmission. We compared the effectiveness of two survey designs for post-MDA surveillance: 
a school-based survey of children aged 6-7 years, and a community-based survey targeting 
people aged ≥8 years.    
Methods: In 2016, we conducted a systematic school-based TAS in all elementary schools 
(n=29) and a cluster survey in 30 randomly selected villages on the two main islands of 
American Samoa. We collected information on school/ household locations, demographics, and 
risk factors using electronic questionnaires. Blood samples were collected to test for circulating 
filarial antigen (CFA) using the Alere
TM
 Filariasis Test Strip. For those who tested positive, we 
prepared slides for microscopic examination of microfilaria. Descriptive statistics were 
performed for questionnaire variables. Data were weighted to account for sampling design, and 
for sex and age (community survey only). CFA prevalence was estimated using the complex 
survey design in Stata13.  
Results: The school-based TAS (n=1143) identified nine antigen-positive children, and found 
an overall adjusted (survey design and sex) CFA prevalence of 0.7% (95% CI: 0.3-1.8). Of the 
nine positive children, we identified one microfilariaemic 7 year old child. 
The community-based survey (n=2507, 711 households) identified 102 antigen positive people, 
and estimated an overall adjusted (survey design, age and sex) CFA prevalence of 6.2% (95% 
CI: 4.5-8.6). Adjusted village-level prevalence ranged from 0-47.1%. CFA prevalence increased 
with age and was higher in males. In the community survey, 22 out of 86 (25.6%) antigen 
positive people were microfilaraemic.  
Conclusions: American Samoa failed school-based TAS, and the community-based survey 
identified higher than expected numbers of antigen-positive people. School-based TAS was 
logistically simpler and allowed sampling of a larger proportion of the target population, but 
results did not reflect the overall CFA prevalence in the population. The community-based 
survey, although operationally more challenging, identified CFA-positive individuals of all ages, 
and areas of high prevalence. Both surveys confirmed the presence of ongoing LF transmission.    
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Introduction  
Lymphatic filariasis (LF) is a neglected tropical disease caused by Wuchereria and Brugia 
species of helminth worms. The disease is transmitted by mosquito vectors including Aedes, 
Anopheles, Culex and Mansonia species. Globally, an estimated 68 million people are infected; 
with 36 million microfilaemic people and 36 million people who are disabled or disfigured 
because of complications including lymphoedema, elephantiasis and scrotal hydrocoeles.
1
  In 
2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched the Global Programme to Eliminate 
Lymphatic Filariasis (GPELF), which aims to eliminate LF as a public health problem by 2020. 
The GPELF uses two strategies, (i) interrupt transmission of LF by conducting mass drug 
administration (MDA) in all disease endemic regions, and (ii) morbidity management and 
disability prevention for infected people.
2
 The GPELF is estimated to have delivered 6.2 billion 
treatments to over 820 million people since its inception.
3
 Under the GPELF, the Pacific 
Programme to Eliminate LF was formed in 1999 to support 22 Pacific Island Countries in the 
Western Pacific Region.
4
 As of 2017, Cook Islands, Niue, the Marshall Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu have successfully achieved the GPELF’s elimination targets.5 
The GPELF recommends conducting Transmission Assessment Surveys (TAS) in children aged 
6-7 years for epidemiological assessment of transmission.
2
 The target population for the TAS is 
children 6-7 years because they were born during or after MDA, and any infection in this 
population would most likely be recently acquired compared to infections in older children or 
adults. Minimum of two TAS are recommended at 2-3 year intervals, until the absence of 
transmission can be verified. Transmission is considered to have ceased when mean antigen 
prevalence in an evaluation unit drops below the critical cut-off value. Critical cut-off values are 
thresholds below which transmission is considered not viable, and depend on the filarial parasite 
and vector. In regions with endemic Wuchereria bancrofti and where transmission is dominated 
by Aedes, TAS threshold is based on an antigen prevalence of 1%. Critical cut-off values are 
calculated so that the likelihood of an evaluation unit passing is at least 75% if true antigen 
prevalence is 0.5%, and no more than 5% if the true antigen prevalence is ≥1%.2 Recent studies 
have highlighted the limitations of relying solely on TAS as a post-MDA surveillance tool, 
especially as prevalence reduces to low levels, and detecting any residual transmission becomes 
increasingly challenging. For example, in Sri Lanka, TAS of children aged 6-7 years were less 
sensitive at detecting low-level transmission compared to antibody detection in school children 
aged 6-7 years, xenomonitoring and community-based surveys of people aged ≥10 years.6  
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In American Samoa, where LF is endemic, W. bancrofti is the only known species of filarial 
worm, and is transmitted by both day and night biting Aedes sp. mosquitos. Ae. polynesiensis is 
the dominant and efficient day biting vector.
7
 In 1999, the antigen prevalence using rapid 
immunochromatographic test (ICT) was estimated to be 16.5%.
8, 9
 Under the Pacific Programme, 
the American Samoa Department of Health delivered seven rounds of MDA during 2000-2006. 
In 2007, ICT prevalence reduced to 2.3% with microfilaria prevalence of 0.5%.
8, 9
 Another 
round of MDA was recommended, but was not conducted at large-scale due to logistical 
reasons.
8
  
School-based TAS are recommended in regions (e.g. American Samoa) where net-school 
enrolment is ≥75%.2 In 2011-2012, school-based TAS identified two antigen-positive children, 
and in 2015, one antigen-positive child was identified. Antigen-positive children identified 
during 2011-2012 and 2015 TAS all attended the same school. As the number of antigen-
positive children identified was below the critical cut-off of six antigen-positive children, the 
country passed TAS in 2011-2012
10
 and in 2015.
11
  
Despite passing TAS in 2011-2012 and 2015, community-based human prevalence studies and 
molecular xenomonitoring studies of infected mosquitoes in American Samoa provided 
evidence of low-level ongoing transmission.
12, 13
 In a retrospective study of serum samples 
collected in 2010, antigen (Og4C3) positive samples were identified from participants living 
across the main island of Tutuila, with higher antigen prevalence around the area (Ili’ili) where 
the antigen-positive children were identified during 2011-2012 and 2015 TAS.
12
 A 2014 study 
conducted using a convenience sample of 1078 people from different regions of American 
Samoa and aged 9 to 73 years, demonstrated antigenaemia of 2.7% (95% CI 1.8-3.8). In a sub-
group of 283 children aged <13 years who attended the same school as the antigen-positive 
children from the previous TAS, antigenaemia was 1.1% (95% CI 0.2-3.1).
11
 This study 
identified foci (hotspots) of transmission around two villages, Fagali’i and Ili’ili. 11, 12  
The sample size and threshold for TAS are designed to report numbers of positives within a 
designated evaluation unit, which in the case of American Samoa was the whole country. Thus 
TAS may not be able to detect residual clusters of transmission, particularly if there is 
significant spatial variation in prevalence within an evaluation unit. In addition, the age group 
(6-7 years) tested in TAS may have low infection rate due to slow acquisition of infection, even 
if residual endemicity exists.  
Although American Samoa had passed school-based TAS in 2011-2012 and in 2015, the 2010 
and 2014 community-based studies, both suggested ongoing transmission on LF in American 
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Samoa. This raised concerns around the suitability of TAS of young children as a tool for post-
MDA surveillance, not just in American Samoa but globally. As GPELF approaches the 
elimination target, WHO recommends developing post-MDA surveillance strategies that are 
cost-efficient and can be integrated into routine surveillance activities.
2, 11
 In 2016, we 
investigated the effectiveness of two survey designs for post-MDA surveillance: a school-based 
TAS in children aged 6-7 years and a community-based survey in individuals aged ≥8 years. 
American Samoa was an optimal study site for two reasons: (i) there have been no MDA since 
2007 and hence any infection in children aged ≤9 years is most likely to have been locally 
acquired (ii) recent evidence of ongoing LF transmission increases the likelihood of detecting 
any recent infections that were locally acquired.
11-13
 The study was designed to survey the two 
populations (school children aged 6-7 years and community members aged ≥8 years) 
independent of each other. In this paper, we report our keys findings and discuss implications 
for strengthening of TAS for post-MDA surveillance. 
Methods 
Study location  
American Samoa is a chain of seven South Pacific islands with a population of ~55,519 persons 
living in ~70 villages.
14
 Over 90% of the population resides on the main island of Tutuila, and 
the adjacent island of Aunu'u. The remote Manu'a islands were not included in this study as 
previous seroprevalence studies did not provide any evidence of residual LF transmission.
12
  
Target population and survey design 
This study had two components A) a school-based survey and B) a community-based survey. 
Each of the survey designs and sampling methods are described below. 
School-based survey 
Based on WHO TAS guidelines, a systematic school-based survey was designed for children 
aged 6-7 years.
2, 10
 All elementary schools (N=29) were included in the study.  Attendance at 
Grade 1 and 2 in primary school was used as proxy for being 6-7 years old. Assuming 1% 
antigen prevalence, the target sample size was calculated using the Survey Sample Builder,
15
 and 
was estimated to be 1,014 children. Based on this, the critical cut-off value was estimated to be 
six antigen-positive children. 
Community-based survey 
In parallel with the school-based survey, a multi-stage equal probability cluster survey based on 
WHO guidelines was conducted.
2
 Of the 70 villages/ village segments (larger villages were 
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divided into village segments of <2000 residents and very small adjacent villages were grouped), 
we randomly selected 30 villages/ village segments (referred to as villages).  
Using Survey Sample Builder, the sample size required to detect antigen prevalence of 1% was 
estimated to be 4,620 for persons aged ≥8 years. We assumed a target population of ~55,000 
persons, and accounted for an additional 1.5 times within household clustering of participants.  
The total numbers of households in the selected villages were estimated based on the census 
population size and we assumed that an average of seven persons lived in each household. 
Target number of households was estimated using the target sample size of persons required by 
the household size of 7 persons and accounted for a 15% non-response/ absentee rate. Sampling 
fraction was calculated as the proportion of households that needed to be sampled to achieve the 
target sample size. In each village, 29% households were selected (sampling fraction of 0.29).  
Within each village, households were randomly selected from a line list of geo-referenced 
buildings obtained from the American Samoa Department of Commerce.
16
 Detailed village 
maps showing locations and codes of selected households were prepared and printed prior to 
field work, and were used during village visits. Destroyed, abandoned or not currently occupied 
household were substituted with the next closest household. Within each household, all 
members aged ≥8 years were invited to participate. A household member was defined as an 
individual who considered the selected house as their principal place of residence or who slept 
in that house the previous night.  
For both school and community-based surveys, participants were eligible irrespective of 
previous participation in MDA, duration of school attendance or length of residence in the 
villages. 
Data and sample collection 
School-based survey  
At each school, we recorded the geographic positioning system (GPS) coordinates for the 
location of the school, total number of children enrolled in Grades 1 and 2, and the school 
attendance for the day. For each participant, we collected demographic information using 
electronic questionnaires based on information provided by the consenting parent/ guardian.  
Community-based survey  
Selected households were identified using fieldwork maps as described above (Figure 1A). GPS 
locations of households were recorded at the time of visit. If GPS satellite signal was not 
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available or a household was substituted, the location was marked on a map, and reconciled 
manually using the geographic information systems software (ArcGIS). On every occasion that 
we visited a village, we attempted to revisit households with previously-absent members to 
maximise participation rates. 
Electronic questionnaires were administered by bilingual field research assistants. 
Questionnaires included demographics, occupation, number of household members aged ≥8 
years, country of birth, duration lived in American Samoa, travel history and prior treatment for 
LF with albendazole and diethylcarbamazine (DEC) during MDA. Data were recorded using 
smart phones utilising the LINKS electronic database system developed by the Task Force for 
Global Health.
17
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(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 1: Sample village map used to identify selected households during 
fieldwork [A]; Blood film with medusa hair clump of filarial worms found in a 
study participant [B], American Samoa, 2016   
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Specimen collection and testing 
For each participant, we collected 200μl of finger prick blood sample into heparinised 
microtainers. The blood samples were kept cool after collection, and were tested on the same or 
following day in a controlled field laboratory environment. Blood samples were tested for 
circulating filarial antigen (CFA) using the Alere
TM
 Filariasis Test Strip (FTS).
18-20
  
All FTS-positive school children were followed-up at home, unless the child’s household was 
already selected for the community-based survey. All FTS-positive community participants 
were invited to a follow-up clinic, where they were given treatment (excluding pregnant women) 
with 400mg Albendazole and 6mg/kg DEC according to WHO guidelines.
2
 To ensure 
compliance, participants were encouraged to consume medications in the presence of a field 
team member. All minors aged <18 years were given treatment following parental/ guardian 
consent.   
During follow-up of FTS-positive people, we collected venous blood samples (~8ml) to repeat 
the FTS and prepare slides for microscopic examination of microfilaria (Mf) as described 
previously.
11
 Briefly, we prepared three sets of slides per person, by applying 3 lines of 20μl of 
blood to each slide. Once completely dried, the slides were de-haemoglobinized, fixed with 
methanol and stained with 2% Giemsa stain for 50 minutes. Each set of slides were examined 
by two or three experienced parasitologists. A slide was considered Mf positive if ≥1 
microfilaria were identified by at least one parasitologist (Figure 1B). Average of counts 
reported by all parasitologists was used to calculate the final density in Mf/ml.  
Data analyses 
The outcome measure was a positive FTS test. We undertook descriptive analyses for 
questionnaire variables and compared simple proportions using Pearson’s chi square tests or 
Fisher exact tests. We estimated crude CFA prevalence and 95% confidence intervals (CI) using 
binomial exact methods.  
We accounted for the multi-stage cluster sampling design of the survey using the ‘svyset’ 
command in Stata 13 (StataCorp, 24 College Station, TX). As American Samoa is considered a 
single evaluation unit for WHO’s LF elimination programme,10 specifying a strata level was not 
necessary. For the school-based survey, we calculated sampling weight for each participant by 
adjusting for response rates by schools, and applied post-stratification weights for sex to the 
entire sample.  
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For the community-based survey, we calculated a sampling weight for an individual as the 
inverse product of the probability of selection of the village (primary sampling unit, PSU), 
household and individual. We weighted for absentees within households and for coverage 
within each village to account for those households which could not be surveyed either due to 
logistical reasons, non-response or were vacant at the time of field teams’ visit. As 30 out of the 
70 eligible PSUs were selected, and selection was done without replacement, we applied a finite 
population correction (FPC) factor of 30/70.
21, 22
 To estimate the country- and village-level CFA 
prevalence for people aged ≥8 years, we applied post-stratification weights for age and sex 
based on American Samoa’s demographic distribution using information available from the 
2014 Statistical Yearbook.
14
  
Population estimates for American Samoa were sourced from the American Samoa Statistical 
Yearbook and were based on the 2010 census.
14
 
All analyses were performed using Stata 13 or Microsoft Excel. P values of <0.05 were 
considered statistically significant. 
Informed consent and ethics approvals 
Ethics approvals for the study were granted by American Samoa Institutional Review Board and 
the Human Research Ethics Committee at the Australian National University (protocol number 
2016/482). The study was conducted in collaboration with the American Samoa Department of 
Health and the American Samoa Community College. Official permissions for school and 
village visits were granted by the Department of Education and the Department of Samoa 
Affairs, respectively.  
For the school-based survey, along with signed consent from a parent/ guardian, assent was 
sought from all participants. For the community-based survey, signed informed consent was 
obtained from adult participants or from parents/ guardians of those aged <18 years along with 
verbal assent from minors. All field activities were carried out in a culturally appropriate and 
sensitive manner with bi-lingual local field teams, and with verbal approval sought from village 
chiefs/ mayors prior to surveying. 
Results 
We recruited 1143 and 2750 persons from the school-based and community-based surveys 
respectively (Table 1). 
  
Table 1: Summary of TAS Strengthening in American Samoa, 2016 
Survey demographics 
 
 
 
Number 
recruited 
Number of 
valid FTS
28
 
(%) 
Number 
FTS 
positive 
Crude CFA 
prevalence 
(%) 
 
Adjusted CFA 
prevalence (95% 
CI) 
Number of 
Microfilariae 
slides collected
29
 
Number of 
Microfilariae 
positive 
individuals (%) 
A. School-based survey 1143 1143 (100) 9 0.8 0.7 (0.3-1.8)
30
 9 1 (11.1) 
B. Community-based survey 
of 30 randomly selected 
villages/ village segments 
2507 2496 (99.6) 102 4.1 6.2 (4.5-8.6)
 31
 86 22 (25.6) 
All participants 3650 3639 (99.7) 111 3.1 - 95 23 (24.2) 
 
                                                          
28
 FTS were classified as invalid if the test was invalid or due to insufficient sample. 
29
 Excludes FTS-positive individuals who were lost to follow-up or did not want to be bled at time of follow-up. 
30
 Adjusted for survey design and sex using SVYSET in Stata13 
31
 Adjusted for survey design, age and sex using SVYSET in Stata13 
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School-based TAS of Grade 1 and 2 children 
We sampled all elementary schools (N=29) on the two main islands of American Samoa. All 
Grade 1 and 2 students were invited to participate (N=2180). Of these, 1143 (52.4%) students 
returned signed consent forms and all were included in the study. The average participation rate 
by school was 57% (range 18.2-91.7%). 
Table 2 summarises characteristics of participants identified though the school-based TAS. Of 
the 1143 students, we identified nine FTS-positive children with a crude CFA prevalence of 0.8% 
(95% CI: 0.4-1.5). As the critical cut-off for passing TAS was six, American Samoa failed 
school-based TAS.  
Estimated overall CFA prevalence after adjusting for participation rates by school, and sex was 
0.7% (95% CI: 0.3-1.8). The design effect for the school-based survey was 1.9. Adjusted CFA 
prevalence in males was 0.5% (95% CI: 0.1-1.9) and in females was 0.9% (95% CI: 0.4-2.4).  
Of the nine FTS-positive children, four (44.4%) attended the same school in Pago Pago, and 
two (22.2%) attended the same school in Nua. FTS-positive children from Nua lived in Fagali’i, 
a suspected hotspot for transmission. The majority (7/9, 77.8%) of FTS-positive children were 
born in American Samoa and reported to have lived there for their entire life. Two (22.2%) 
FTS-positive children were born in Western Samoa, but this difference was not statistically 
significant compared to those born in American Samoa.   
Of the nine FTS-positive children, one (11.1%) was microfilaraemic with Mf density of 1075 
Mf/mm
3
. The child was a 7 year old male who lived in Vaitogi (a village with evidence of 
ongoing transmission) and attended the school in Ili’ili.  
Community-based survey of randomly selected villages 
We visited 30 villages, and sampled 2507 persons from 711 households. The average household 
size was 6 (range 1-25) persons aged ≥8 years per household. We recruited participants from 
77.6% of the selected households, and 83.2% (range 14.3-100%) of eligible household members 
(aged ≥8 years) participated in the study. Within household non-response was mostly associated 
with household members being absent at the time of visit, rather than refusal to participate. We 
recruited 1,140 (45.5%) males and 1,367 (54.5%) females (Table 3). Of the 2507 participants 
tested, 11 (0.4%) had invalid tests and were excluded from analyses (Tables 1 & 3). Of the 2496 
participants with valid tests, 102 were FTS-positive, equivalent to an overall crude CFA 
prevalence of 4.1%. Of the 102 FTS-positive persons, 79 were male (crude CFA prevalence 
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7.0%) and 23 were female (crude CFA prevalence 1.7%). Crude CFA prevalence in males was 
significantly higher than females (p<0.001). 
The original target sample size for the community-based survey, calculated based on an 
expected CFA prevalence of 1%, was 4620. Within the first two weeks of recruitment, the 
observed CFA prevalence (4.1%) was significantly higher than anticipated, and it was agreed 
that smaller target sample size of 2981 would provide adequate statistical power (Table 4). 
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Table 2: Summary of participants in the school survey, American Samoa, 2016 
 
Questionnaire variables Number 
tested (% of 
total tested) 
Number FTS 
positive (Crude 
CFA prevalence) 
p value
32
 
 
Total 1143 (100) 9 (0.8)  
Age (years)       
5 62 (5.4) 0 (0) 0.74 
6 524 (45.8) 3 (0.6)   
7 510 (44.6) 5 (1.0)   
8 39 (3.4) 1 (2.6)   
9 6 (0.5) 0   
10 2 (0.2) 0   
Sex       
Male 550 (48.1) 3 (0.5) 0.373 
Female 593 (51.2) 6 (1.0)   
Location of school       
Nua 44 (3.9) 2 (4.5) <0.001 
Pago Pago 82 (7.2) 4 (4.9)   
Ili'ili 94 (8.2) 1 (1.1)   
Nu'uuli 93 (8.1) 1 (1.1)   
Faga'alu 44 (3.9) 1 (2.3)   
Others 786 (68.8) 0 (0)   
Place of birth       
American Samoa 1000 (87.5) 7 (0.7) 0.083 
Western Samoa 54 (4.7) 2 (3.7)   
Other 83 (7.3) 0 (0)   
Unknown 6 (0.5) 0 (0)   
Village of residence       
Faga'alu 16 (1.4) 1 (6.3) <0.001 
Fagali'i 7 (0.6) 2 (28.6)   
Fagatogo 37 (3.2) 2 (5.4)   
Pago Pago 73 (6.4) 2 (2.7)   
Tafuna 157 (13.7) 1 (0.6)   
Vaitogi 55 (4.8) 1 (1.8)   
All other villages 798 (69.8) 0 (0)   
Duration lived in the village       
Less than 1 year 61 (5.3) 1 (1.6) 0.723 
1-2 years 79 (6.9) 1 (1.3)   
3-5 years 154 (13.5) 0 (0)   
≥6 years 845 (73.9) 7 (0.8)   
Unknown 4 (0.4) 0 (0)   
 
                                                          
32
 P value estimated using Chi-square or Fisher exact for significance of difference in crude CFA 
prevalence. Statistically significant results are highlighted in bold. 
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Table 3: Summary of participants in the community survey, American Samoa, 
2016 
Questionnaire variables Number tested (%) Number FTS positive 
(Crude CFA prevalence)  
p value
33
  
 
Total 2496 (100.0) 102 (4.1)  
Age group (years) 
8 to 9 147 (5.9) 4 (2.7) <0.001 
10 to 19 732 (29.2) 6 (0.8)  
20 to 29 363 (14.5) 8 (2.2)  
30 to 39 315 (12.6) 18 (5.7)  
40 to 49 340 (13.6) 22 (6.5)  
50 to 59 309 (12.4) 25 (8.1)  
60 to 69 183 (7.3) 9 (4.9)  
≥70 107 (4.3) 10 (9.3)  
Sex 
Male 1130 (45.3) 79 (7.0) <0.001 
Female 1366 (54.7) 23 (1.7)  
Household size (≥8 years old) 
≤2  218 (8.7) 9 (4.1) 0.176 
3-6 1376 (55.1) 47 (3.4)  
7-9 551 (22.1) 31 (5.6)  
≥10 351 (14.1) 15 (4.3)  
Years lived in the village 
< 1 year 191 (7.7) 12 (6.3) <0.001 
1-2 years 123 (4.9) 10 (8.1)  
3-4 years 140 (5.6) 3 (2.1)  
5-10 years 175 (7) 7 (4.0)  
>10 years 676 (27.1) 44 (6.5)  
Whole life 1191 (47.7) 26 (2.2)  
Taken MDA in the past 
Yes 1015 (40.7) 54 (5.3) 0.029 
No  1420 (56.9) 45 (3.2)  
Unsure 61 (2.4) 3 (4.9)  
Occupation groups 
Indoor 686 (27.5) 31 (4.5) <0.001 
Outdoor 28 (1.1) 5 (17.9)  
Fish cannery worker/ Fish 
cleaner 
128 (5.1) 12 (9.4)  
Mixed indoor/outdoor 329 (13.2) 13 (4.0)  
Student 874 (35.0) 11 (1.3)  
Unemployed 318 (12.7) 20 (6.3)  
Other 133 (5.3) 10 (7.5)  
Travel outside of American Samoa in the previous 12 months 
Yes 751 (30.1) 29 (3.9) 0.71 
No 1745 (69.9) 73 (4.2)  
                                                          
33
 P value estimated using Chi-square or Fisher exact for significance of difference in crude CFA 
prevalence. Statistically significant results are highlighted in bold. 
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The age and sex distribution of the community-based survey participants and the general 
population of American Samoa is presented in Figure 2. After adjusting for the survey design, 
and age and sex distribution of American Samoa, the adjusted CFA prevalence was 6.2% (95% 
CI: 4.5-8.6). The design effect for the community-based survey was 4.2.  
 
Figure 2: Age and sex distribution of participants (bars) from community survey 
and general population (dotted lines) living in American Samoa, 2016. Population 
estimates based on American Samoa 2014 Statistical Yearbook (American 
Samoa Department of Commerce)  
After accounting for the survey design, adjusted CFA prevalence by age and sex in the 
randomly selected villages are presented in Figure 3A. In children aged 8-9 years, who were 
born after the MDA had stopped, the adjusted CFA prevalence was 2.2% (95% CI: 0.8-6.1). 
Of the 102 FTS-positive individuals, we were able to prepare slides for 86 (84.3%) participants. 
Of these, 22 (25.6%) were microfilaraemic individuals of whom 19 (86.4%) were male (Figure 
3B). The mean Mf density was 186.5 Mf/mm
3
 (range 5.6-916.7 Mf/mm
3
).  
We estimated village-level CFA prevalence by adjusting for the survey design and for age and 
sex distribution. Adjusted village-level CFA prevalence varied from 0% to 47.1% (Table 4 and 
Figure 4). Notably, only 6/30 (20%) villages had zero FTS-positive individuals. 
Microfilaraemic people were dispersed throughout the island and lived in 10 of 30 randomly 
selected villages. Six (27.3%) microfilaraemic people lived in Vaitogi, the same village as the 
Mf-positive school child.   
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 3: Adjusted* circulating filarial antigen (CFA) prevalence with 95% CIs [A] 
and microfilaraemic individuals by age and sex in community survey [B], 
American Samoa 2016. *Adjusted for survey design 
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Table 4: Summary of sampling and recruitment for community survey; and prevalence of circulating filarial antigen (CFA) for randomly 
selected villages, American Samoa 2016 
Village Total 
number of 
residents
34
 
Estimated 
number of 
total 
households 
Target 
number of 
households 
Number of 
households 
sampled (% 
of target) 
Target 
population 
aged ≥8 
years 
Number 
recruited 
(% of target) 
Number 
FTS-
positive 
Crude CFA 
prevalence 
(%) 
Adjusted CFA 
prevalence 
(95% CI)
35
 
Village 1(Afono)  524 75 22 21 (95.5) 69 71 (82.3) 3 4.2 4.0 (1.7-9.3) 
Village 2 (Alao)  495 71 20 12 (60) 65 44 (54) 0 0 - 
Village 3 (Amaua)  96 14 4 5 (125) 13 19 (120.2) 1 5.3 4.9 (1.4-16.3) 
Village 4 (Amouli)  920 131 38 33 (86.8) 121 111 (73.3) 2 1.8 2.7 (1-7) 
Village 5  (Asili)  224 32 9 9 (100) 30 28 (75.9) 4 14.3 19.6 (9.7-35.6) 
Village 6 (Auma) 254 36 10 9 (90) 33 39 (93.2) 2 5.1 8.3 (3.2-19.7) 
Village 7 (Aumi)  186 27 8 6 (75) 25 23 (75.1) 0 0 - 
Village 8 (Fagamalo)  47   7 2 3 (150) 6 13 (168) 4 30.8 47.1 (16.9-79.6) 
Village 9 (Faganeanea)  150 21 6 5 (83.3) 20 23 (93.1) 0 0 - 
Village 10 (Fagatogo)  1737 248 72 55 (76.4) 229 212 (74.1) 5 2.4 2.7 (1.4-5.2) 
Village 11 (Fatumafuti)  113 16 5 3 (60) 15 5 (26.9) 1 20.0 44.8 (10-85.5) 
Village 12 (Ili'ili)
36
  3195 456 132 87 (65.9) 421 308 (58.5) 15 4.9 4.9 (3.2-7.5) 
Village 13 (Lauli'i)  892 127 37 27 (73) 118 104 (70.8) 1 1.0 1.1 (0.3-4) 
Village 14 (Leloaloa)  448 64 18 15 (83.3) 59 40 (54.2) 7 17.9 25.8 (16.1-38.4) 
Village 15 (Malaeimi)  1182 169 49 36 (73.5) 156 120 (61.6) 5 4.2 10.9 (5-22.2) 
Village 16 (Malaeloa/Aitulagi)  698 100 29 20 (69) 92 90 (78.3) 4 4.4 8.1 (3.3-18.6) 
Village 17 (Masausi) 164 23 7 7 (100) 22 24 (88.9) 0 0 - 
Village 18 (Nua)  141 20 6 3 (50) 19 17 (73.2) 0 0 - 
Village 19 (Pago Pago)
37
 1828 261 75 62 (82.7) 241 228 (75.7) 4 1.8 2.3 (1.2-4.5) 
                                                          
34
 Population estimates based on American Samoa 2014 Statistical Yearbook (American Samoa Department of Commerce). 80% of the population is estimated to be aged ≥8 years. 
35
 Adjusted for survey design, and post-stratified for age and sex using SVYSET in Stata13. 
36
 Village 12 and 20 were split into two segments for random selection of villages. Both segments of both villages were randomly selected. Data presented here are pooled for both 
segments for each of the villages. 
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Village Total 
number of 
residents
34
 
Estimated 
number of 
total 
households 
Target 
number of 
households 
Number of 
households 
sampled (% 
of target) 
Target 
population 
aged ≥8 
years 
Number 
recruited 
(% of target) 
Number 
FTS-
positive 
Crude CFA 
prevalence 
(%) 
Adjusted CFA 
prevalence 
(95% CI)
35
 
Village 20 (Pava'ia'i) 2450 350 101 73 (72.3) 323 255 (63.2) 3 1.2 2.5 (0.8-7.5) 
Village 21 (Satala-Anua-Atuu) 674 96 28 22 (78.6) 89 81 (73) 7 8.8 9.0 (4.3-17.7) 
Village 22 (Se'etaga)  299 43 12 13 (108.3) 39 49 (99.5) 2 4.1 3.4 (1.3-8.5) 
Village 23 (Tafuna)
38
 2000 286 82 56 (68.3) 263 187 (56.8) 5 2.7 3.3 (1.4-7.6) 
Village 24 (Taputimu)  841 120 35 29 (82.9) 111 88 (63.5) 0 0.0 - 
Village 25 (Tula)  405 58 17 14 (82.4) 53 52 (78) 4 7.7 14.5 (5.9-31.5) 
Village 26 (Utumea West)  53 8 2 3 (150) 7 12 (137.5) 1 8.3 12.7 (3.2-39.4) 
Village 27 (Vaitogi) 1959 280 81 64 (79) 258 212 (65.7) 18 8.5 11.8 (7.9-17.4) 
Village 28 (Vatia) 640 91 26 19 (73.1) 84 52 (49.3) 4 7.8 21.8 (9.8-41.6) 
Total 22601 3230 933 711 (76.2) 2981 2507 (84.1) 102 4.1 6.2 (4.5-8.6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
37
 One of two segments of Pago Pago was randomly selected; number of residents shown here is half of the total population of Pago Pago. 
38
 One of four segments of Village 23 was randomly selected; number of residents shown here is quarter of the total population of Tafuna. 
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Figure 4: Location of villages (N=30) and adjusted* circulating filarial antigen 
(CFA) prevalence, American Samoa, 2016. *Adjusted for survey design, age and 
sex distribution of American Samoa. 
Discussion 
Our study confirmed ongoing transmission of LF in American Samoa. We identified 111 
antigen-positive persons with an overall crude CFA prevalence of 3.1%. Of the 95 antigen-
positive persons for whom slides were available, 23 (24.2%) were microfilaraemic including a 7 
year old child. American Samoa failed school-based TAS in 2016, and the community-based 
survey identified higher than expected numbers of antigen-positive people. The school-based 
survey was logistically easier, cheaper and less time consuming, but the community-based 
survey provided detailed information on estimates of community-level CFA prevalence, areas 
of high prevalence and helped identify antigen and microfilariae positive people who are 
capable of perpetuating transmission.  
The adjusted CFA prevalence in the school-based survey of children aged 6-7 years (0.7%) was 
significantly lower than the community-based survey of people aged ≥8 years (6.2%). Although 
antigen-positive people aged ≥8 years may not have been as recently infected as the 6-7 year old 
children, it is important to identify them in the post-MDA setting as they may serve as a 
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reservoir of parasites and maintain residual transmission.
23
 The capacity of the community 
survey to detect residual transmission is also evident from its ability to identify antigen positive 
children aged 8-9 years (adjusted CFA prevalence of 2.2%, 95% CI 0.8-6.1), who were either 
born after the MDA or were too young to receive treatment, and would not have been otherwise 
identified through school-based TAS. Our findings indicate that prevalence estimated by TAS 
of young children may not be sufficiently sensitive to identify areas where antigen positive 
people aged ≥8 years live (i.e. areas of residual transmission).  
The school-based TAS and the community-based survey had several advantages and limitations. 
The key comparisons between the two survey designs are summarised below. In our study, the 
school-based TAS was highly representative of the target population (6-7 years) and included 
52.4% of Grade 1 and 2 children from all elementary schools. The school-based survey in 2016 
identified two FTS-positive children living in Fagali’i, an area of known high LF transmission.11 
It also identified four FTS-positive children from another school, who lived in Fagatogo and 
Pago Pago. Both of these villages had estimated CFA prevalence of 2.7% and 2.3%, 
respectively, below the overall estimated CFA prevalence of 6.2%. Significantly higher CFA 
prevalence in children attending certain schools indicates that transmission might be occurring 
in and around schools. A study conducted in Samoa, where Ae. polynesiensis is an efficient day 
biting mosquito, observed spatial clustering of infected children aged ≤10 years in a few 
selected schools and provided suggestive evidence of transmission at the school-level.
24
 
The school-based TAS provided limited information on risk factors including age and sex. No 
differences were observed in CFA prevalence between male and female children, most likely 
due to similar duration of time spent outdoors by children of both sexes. In contrast, the 
community-based survey indicated that males (particularly in persons aged ≥20 years) had 
higher CFA prevalence and greater proportion had detectable microfilaria. Adult males are most 
likely at higher risk due to the longer periods of time spent outdoors, increasing the likelihood 
of mosquito bites.
12, 25
 Hormonal and pregnancy-mediated regulation of the immune system may 
also contribute to lower infection rates in female, particularly during the reproductive years.
26
 
The age differential between children and adults also supports modelling studies which 
suggested that testing of adults were more efficient at detecting transmission in low prevalence 
settings compared to testing children aged 6-7 years.
23
 
The school-based survey was a systematic survey where all elementary schools on the two main 
islands were surveyed. The community-based survey was a modified WHO cluster survey, 
which is recommended for surveying large populations in resource-limited settings. By 
correcting for clustering during analyses,
22, 27
 we believe our results are an accurate estimate of 
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the country-wide CFA prevalence. As only 30 of the 70 villages were sampled, the school and 
community-based surveys were not geographically aligned. Consequently, some children tested 
in the school-based survey lived in villages that were not selected for the community-based 
survey. However, as we surveyed a large proportion of the selected villages, and that many 
villages are contiguous along the limited number of roads in American Samoa, geographical 
concordance is unlikely to be as issue.  
The reasons for persistence of high LF prevalence in American Samoa remain unclear, and 
could be associated with a multitude of factors including poor-coverage or systematic non-
compliance during MDAs,
28, 29
 migration and travel of people from other regions in the Pacific 
where LF transmission is ongoing
12, 25, 29
 and the presence of efficient day and night biting 
mosquitoes.
13
 However, as American Samoa failed TAS in 2016, one year after passing TAS in 
2015; it raises several questions about the utility of TAS of young children for conducting post-
MDA surveillance. It is unclear if there has been a resurgence of LF within one year or whether 
the 2015 TAS may have missed antigen-positive children, even though >90% schools were 
surveyed. As LF has a long incubation period, and microfilaremia and antigenemia develop over 
months to years after exposure,
30
 it is unlikely that all the antigen-positive people of all ages 
identified in our study acquired infection during the period between 2015 TAS and 2016 TAS. 
Likely persistence of transmission was evident from the community-based human research 
studies conducted in 2010 and in 2014, which identified foci of residual transmission in certain 
parts of American Samoa and high antigen prevalence amongst migrant workers.
11, 12
 As the 
previous TAS failed to detect these hotspots, it is possible that people living in high prevalence 
areas may have served as reservoirs and perpetuated LF transmission. Hypothetically, if at the 
time of 2011-2012 and 2015 TAS, post-MDA surveillance extended to testing of older persons, 
programme implementers may have identified infected individuals. This most likely would have 
provided evidence ongoing transmission and identified foci of residual transmission.  
Subsequently, disease resurgence could have been avoided or control measures such as 
territory-wide or targeted MDA could have been implemented earlier.   
While further studies to understand the transmission dynamics and risk-factors influencing LF 
resurgence are underway, our data strongly suggests that current design of school-based TAS of 
children aged 6-7 years is not sufficiently sensitive for post-MDA surveillance . Considering the 
wide-spread transmission across American Samoa and the unexpectedly higher CFA prevalence, 
further MDA or other intervention such as test and treat will be required. Post-MDA 
surveillance strategies should be enhanced and focus on identification of infected persons.
2
 
Although community-based surveys are operationally challenging, surveillance activities should 
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focus on opportunistic and cost-effective methodologies targeting community members.
11, 23
 For 
example, testing high-risk occupation groups at workplace clinics, pregnant women while 
attending routine antenatal appointments, community members at the time of routine health 
check-ups for chronic illnesses, high-school students at the time of vaccination campaigns and 
household members of antigen-positive people. Collectively, our findings call for careful 
planning and implementation of MDAs, and sensitive and sustainable post-MDA surveillance in 
order to achieve elimination goals of the global programme by 2020. 
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Appendix 2A: Short report on herpes zoster in Indigenous 
Australians 
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Appendix 3A: LGV questionnaire  
Created in and extracted from the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information Management 
System (NCIMS) 
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Appendix 4A: Evaluation of Post-Cyclone Winston Early 
Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS in a Box), Fiji 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A joint collaboration between the Fiji Centre for Communicable Diseases Control, Ministry of 
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Executive Summary 
Fiji established the Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS in a Box) in March 
2016 in order to monitor communicable disease trends and detect early warning signals for 
potential outbreaks following the devastation caused by Tropical Cyclone Winston. Eight 
syndromes of epidemic concern were identified by the Ministry of Health and Medical Services 
and incorporated into the mobile-phone based syndromic surveillance system. An additional 
syndrome (Zika-like illness) was added two weeks after the system’s implementation. EWARS 
enables front line health care workers to report data via a mobile phone application, which then 
transmits the data to a ‘cloud-based’ EWARS database. The system utilises two types of 
reporting systems- Indicator Based Surveillance (IBS) and Event Based Surveillance (EBS), 
both of which are integrated into a single web-based platform. 
The purpose of this evaluation was to report on the performance of EWARS in a Box (EWARS) 
over the first three months of implementation in Fiji (Epidemiological weeks 10 to 21, 2016) 
and provide recommendations for future use in post-disaster settings, as well as for possible 
integration into Fiji’s routine public health surveillance system. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilised to evaluate the system attributes of 
EWARS. Reporting performance was assessed through a quantitative analysis of reported data, 
whilst the experience of using the system was explored through an online cross-sectional survey 
of EWARS users, along with site visits to reporting health facilities. EWARS actors 
(stakeholders) were consulted at multiple levels using semi-structured interviews.  
The system recorded a total of 34,113 cases for the nine syndromes between 7 March 2016 and 
29 May 2016. A total of 325 alerts were generated through IBS and 10 through EBS. No major 
public health events were detected during the post-disaster phase, however a number of small 
investigations were initiated based on surveillance data generated through EWARS.  
The evaluation found that EWARS was generally well accepted by users and that there was a 
high level of confidence in the system’s ability to monitor communicable disease trends and 
detect early warnings for potential disease outbreaks. Information provided via weekly 
epidemiological bulletins was considered useful by both system users and stakeholders, 
however recommendations were made for further utilisation. Completeness of reporting to 
EWARS was high throughout the period under evaluation, yet a number of barriers to timeliness 
were identified, particularly in relation to the workload burden on focal points. The system was 
found to be highly stable, flexible and portable, demonstrating its suitability for post-disaster 
settings.  
Key recommendations include: 
 Increasing engagement with EWARS reporting sites through regular site visits by 
surveillance officers; 
 Strengthening Event Based Surveillance (EBS) reporting by increasing awareness 
among health care workers and outbreak response teams; 
 Enhancing the usefulness of the EWARS weekly bulletin by improving the layout and 
including further interpretation; 
 Developing standard operating procedures to assist surveillance officers in the 
verification of alerts and for guidance with specimen collection for laboratory 
confirmation of suspected cases; 
 Providing epidemiological training for surveillance officers in outbreak identification, 
investigation and response. In addition, the inclusion of a ‘train-the-trainer’ format 
would enable knowledge transfer to focal points; 
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 Streamlining data collection and reporting processes at health facilities to improve 
timeliness and data quality; and 
 Integration of the system into Fiji’s routine syndromic surveillance would require 
further consideration around maintenance and storage of the data, infrastructure, cost 
and the representativeness of sites. 
Based on EWARS’ strong performance in Fiji, transitioning elements into Fiji’s routine 
surveillance system may help to strengthen surveillance and public health in Fiji overall.  
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Introduction 
Tropical Cyclone Winston made landfall in Fiji on February 20, 2016 causing widespread 
damage, destroying homes and schools, bringing down trees and powerlines, and flooding rivers. 
This category 5 tropical cyclone was the strongest in recorded history to hit Fiji. A National 
State of Emergency was declared on 21 February 2016 and remained in place for 60 days. The 
cyclone caused severe damage to infrastructure and crops in all four health divisions of Fiji. 
Areas most affected included:  
- Savusavu, Nabouwalu, Taveuni (Northern Division);  
- Lomaiviti group including Levuka, Koro Island, and Batiki Island (Eastern Division);  
- Tailevu North, Rakiraki (Central Division); and 
- Ba and other areas (Western Division). 
 
As of 24 February 2016, 43 fatalities were confirmed by the Fiji government and an estimated 
54,615 persons were residing in 899 evacuation centres (109 were schools) [report 29/02/16 
from NDMO (http://www.newswire.com.fj)]. A rapid public health risk assessment conducted 
by the Fiji MOHMS and WHO identified a number of water-borne and vector-borne diseases 
that posed a medium to high risk for substantial outbreaks. Of particular concern were 
leptospirosis, diarrhoea (including dysentery), typhoid, and mosquito borne disease outbreaks 
including dengue, chikungunya and Zika virus 
99
. An increased risk of respiratory infections due 
to overcrowding and decreased hand hygiene was also identified. Based on the findings from 
the public health risk assessment, the establishment of a post-disaster Early Warning and Alert 
Response Network (EWARN) was recommended. Under the WHO’s core commitments and 
IHR obligations, an EWARN was established within 14 days of the disaster 
90
.  
 
Different types of EWARN systems have been implemented previously following disasters such 
as the Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) in Pakistan, Surveillance in Post Extreme 
Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) in the Philippines 
91
 and Solomon Islands 
92
. More recently, 
the WHO Intelligence, Information and Monitoring unit (IIM) developed a web-based EWARN 
system using smartphones to capture and transmit surveillance data. This system, known as 
‘EWARS in a Box’, was first implemented in South Sudan in 2015 98. EWARS in a Box was 
adapted and implemented in Fiji post-cyclone Winston.  
 
The following syndromes were reported through EWARS in a Box (Fiji):  
 
Weekly reporting (Indicator Based Surveillance or IBS) 
 
1. Acute fever and rash 
2. Prolonged fever 
3. Influenza-like illness 
4. Watery diarrhoea  
5. Bloody diarrhoea 
6. Acute jaundice syndrome 
7. Suspected dengue 
8. Suspected meningitis 
9. Zika-like illness 
 
Immediate reporting (Event Based Surveillance or EBS) 
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- Any unexpected deaths or public health events that were potentially related to 
infectious, chemical or environmental causes. 
Prior to Tropical Cyclone Winston, the Fiji Syndromic Surveillance System (FSSS) reported 
weekly on 5 syndromes (acute fever and rash, influenza-like illness, diarrhoea, prolonged fever 
and dengue-like illness) from 12 sentinel health facilities (hospitals and clinics) located across 
all four divisions of Fiji. EWARS in a Box was implemented in 34 health facilities across the 
four divisions (Central, Eastern, Western and Northern). EWARS in a Box is scaled-up version 
of the FSSS. Eleven of the 34 EWARS sites previously reported syndromic surveillance data 
through FSSS. The additional sites were selected based on their likelihood of experiencing an 
epidemic, population density, proximity to areas worst affected by the cyclone and location of 
internally displaced persons. In addition, telecommunication access was taken into account in 
site selection due to the reliance of EWARS in a Box on phone and internet access.  
Rationale for EWARS in a Box  
The objectives of EWARS in a Box (Fiji) align with that of other EWARN systems and centre 
on having an effective surveillance system that will allow monitoring of communicable diseases 
during the post-disaster phase. Humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters are often 
accompanied by communicable disease outbreaks leading to severe mortality and morbidity, 
which can largely be reduced by implementing timely and effective surveillance 
88
. In the 
absence or breakdown of pre-existing surveillance systems, EWARS can monitor changing 
disease dynamics and generate early signals of potential communicable disease outbreaks.  
The implementation of EWARS post-Cyclone Winston was necessary to supplement existing 
systems to ensure that MOHMS was able to adequately monitor burden of communicable 
diseases and detect potential disease outbreaks in a timely fashion.  
In addition, EWARS was preferred as it is an automated EWARN system (detailed later), and 
hence served as a suitable surveillance system compared with previously implemented 
EWARNs reducing the time and human resources required for everyday surveillance including 
data collection, analysis and dissemination. 
System description 
‘EWARS in a Box’ (http://ewars-project.org/) is an EWARN, specifically designed for post-
disaster emergencies in difficult-to-access locations 
91, 101
. For the purposes of this report, 
‘EWARS in a Box’ will be referred to as EWARS. EWARS comes as a field-ready box 
containing smartphones for data collection and reporting that only requires mobile coverage (no 
internet or electricity needed). This makes it a particularly useful surveillance system for post-
disaster settings. One standard ‘Box’ contains 50 mobile phones that can support up to 50 health 
facilities covering up to 500,000 people. The kit also consists of a local server for data hosting 
and a solar power generators and chargers. 
EWARS was implemented within two weeks of Cyclone Winston (by the end of 
epidemiological week 9) at 34 sites including health centres, sub-divisional and divisional 
hospitals across the four divisions (Annex A). EWARS enables front line health care workers to 
report data via a mobile phone application, which then transmits the data to a ‘cloud-based’ 
EWARS database. The EWARS database is hosted by the Amazon Web Services and is 
currently maintained by the WHO headquarters in Geneva. Figure 1 describes the operational 
process flow for EWARS for both IBS and EBS. 
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IBS predominantly relies on patients presenting to a health facility with one of the nine 
syndromes monitored by EWARS. Standard case definitions for each syndrome are used 
(Annex B) and numbers are recorded using a paper-based tally sheet (Annex C). At the end of 
an epidemiological week (Monday to Sunday), each site uses the EWARS mobile phone 
application to report the total number of cases per syndrome and total consultations for persons 
aged under 5 years and 5 years and over. In total, each site is expected to report 36 values 
including zero reporting.
39
  
Like other syndromic surveillance systems, EWARS relies on pre-set thresholds for epidemic 
detection (Annex B). Once the data are entered via the mobile phones, an online system 
analyses the data and generates an ‘alert’ if the threshold is exceeded. Each alert triggers a chain 
of public health responses (as detailed in Figure 1). An alert is investigated by the relevant 
divisional surveillance officer, who conducts a rapid risk assessment to verify the alert (e.g. 
ruling out surveillance artefacts) and determine the reasons for the increase in the number of 
cases. The rapid risk assessment usually involves a telephone conversation with the EWARS 
focal point at the concerned health facility. The final decision on whether an alert is a ‘false’ or 
‘true’ event is then decided by the divisional medical officer (DMOs) or consulting 
epidemiologist.  
In contrast, EBS relies on health care workers reporting any unexpected or unusual public health 
event of an infectious, chemical or environmental nature, using the EWARS website or by 
calling the toll-free number listed on the EWARS posters and tally sheets that were provided to 
each site during the implementation of the system. In contrast to IBS, every submitted report 
generates an alert which then undergoes a risk-assessment by the national EBS surveillance 
officer. All verification and public health actions are recorded in EWARS in the same way as 
IBS reports. EWARS is the first ever early warning system to integrate IBS and EBS using a 
common platform for reporting and verification. Although IBS and EBS were traditionally 
considered independent surveillance systems, they have complimentary roles to play in 
communicable disease surveillance following a disaster and should be aligned to ensure 
comprehensive surveillance of public health events 
101
. 
The surveillance data are automatically compiled at the end of each epidemiological week (epi 
week) into an epidemiological bulletin (Annex D). The system is automated with in-built 
algorithms so it can estimate the number of cases, proportional morbidity, performance 
indicators such as timeliness and completeness, numbers of alerts verified at divisional and 
national level. The weekly bulletin reports on both IBS and EBS, and contains information on 
trends on all 9 syndromes. The EWARS Weekly Bulletin is used to monitor disease trends by 
public health staff as well as divisional and national coordinators at FCCDC and MOHMS. 
                                                          
39
 Zero reporting requires health facilities to include a zero when there have been no cases of a 
particular syndrome, rather than leaving that field blank. 
  
 
Figure 1: Operational flow of data for Early Warning and Response System in a Box, Fiji 2016. 
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EWARS (System) actors 
The EWARS actors in Fiji following cyclone Winston are depicted in Figure 2.  For the 
purposes of the evaluation, the following definitions were applied: 
- EWARS developers are those who were involved in the development and 
implementation of the system.  
- EWARS stakeholders are those who had an overarching role in the performance of 
EWARS and its impact on public health in Fiji, and have some vested financial interest 
in the system. 
- EWARS owners are those who own the system and the data stored within the system. 
- EWARS users are those who were involved in collection, analysis, dissemination of 
information and were ultimately responsible for implementing public health response. 
- EWARS partners are those who were not directly associated with EWARS but may 
have utilised the information generated via EWARS for other health related responses. 
 
 
Figure 2: EWARS actors associated with EWARS in Fiji post cyclone Winston, 2016.
40
  
 
 
                                                          
40
 Roles and responsibilities of EWARS users are detailed in Annex G 
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Evaluation of EWARS in a Box (Fiji) 
This evaluation of EWARS was a joint collaboration between the Fiji Centre for Communicable 
Diseases Control (FCCDC), Ministry of Health and Medical Services (MOHMS) and the WHO 
Division of Pacific Technical Services, Fiji. The evaluation involved a detailed review of 
EWARS in order to understand its performance after Cyclone Winston and endeavours to 
strengthen communicable diseases surveillance in Fiji. The evaluation was undertaken over a 
period of 6 weeks from May- June 2016. 
The objectives of the evaluation were as follows: 
Primary objective 
- To assess the overall performance of EWARS during the post-cyclone Winston 
emergency phase. 
- To evaluate the ability of EWARS to monitor communicable diseases trends and signal 
early warnings for suspected outbreaks and clusters of epidemic-prone diseases for 
timely public health action. 
Secondary objectives 
- To identify the current gaps in disease surveillance under EWARS 
- To assess the impact of EWARS on strengthening the public health surveillance system 
in Fiji 
- To assess the utility of data in influencing public health actions undertaken by EWARS 
partners  
- To make practical recommendations to improve EWARS’ performance for future use in 
other post-disaster settings 
- To make recommendations for the incorporation of EWARS reporting into Fiji’s 
routine communicable diseases surveillance system  
Methods 
The evaluation framework (Table 1) was structured based on recommendations from previously 
published evaluation methodologies 
102-106
 and evaluations of the Pacific Syndromic 
Surveillance System (PSSS) 
100, 107-109
 and the Fiji Syndromic Surveillance System (FSSS) 
(report under review).  
Attributes were assessed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. All data analysis was 
conducted using Microsoft Excel 2010, unless otherwise specified. Key activities undertaken for 
the evaluation are outlined below: 
 Interviewing of key informants including EWARS developers, stakeholders and 
partners to gain an understanding of the significance, strength and weaknesses of 
EWARS post-cyclone Winston. The same questionnaire was used regardless of the 
mechanism of delivery. 
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 Quantitative analysis of data was conducted using data stored within the EWARS 
database from epidemiological weeks 10 (week beginning 7 March 2016) up to 21 
(week ending 29 May 2016)
41
.   
 The system was evaluated using attributes listed in table 1. 
 Timeliness and completeness of reporting using IBS- EWARS over the 12 week period 
was assessed. 
 Timeliness and impact of event based surveillance was assessed using the EWARS 
database. The assessment was restricted due to the availability of limited data since the 
implementation of EWARS. 
 Visits to health facilities were undertaken to understand the process of data reporting 
and collection, and validate the quality of data reported. 
 A cross sectional survey of EWARS users was conducted to assess the experience of the 
system. Users were identified at two levels: those who report to the system (focal 
points) and those who monitor the reporting (surveillance officers). Two self-
administered online surveys were designed in SurveyMonkey® and distributed via 
email. Responses were collected through SurveyMonkey® and analysed in Microsoft 
Excel 2010 and Nvivo 11. A mixed-methods approach to data analysis was employed in 
order to analyse both quantitative and qualitative data provided through the survey. 
Response rates were high with 79% (27/34) of focal points and 100% (5/5) of 
surveillance officers completing the survey (detailed results in Annex E and F). 
Table 1: Attributes used to evaluate EWARS 
EWARS evaluation components 
System attributes Data sources 
Surveillance outputs 
 
EWARS database 
 
Timeliness and completeness (IBS only) 
 
EWARS database; Survey 
Data Validity (IBS only) 
 
EWARS database; Site visits to understand data 
collection practices and retrospective review of 
clinical records  
Usefulness Survey 
Flexibility 
 
Survey; Interviews 
Acceptability  Survey 
Simplicity Survey 
Stability EWARS database; Survey 
Representativeness 
 
EWARS database, MOHMS population data, 
Interviews 
Costs System owners and review of budgets 
Portability 
 
Interviews 
Impact of Event Based Surveillance EWARS database; Survey; Interviews 
  
                                                          
41
 Data extracted on 31/05/2016  
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Results 
Surveillance outputs 
A total of 34,113 cases were recorded from 326, 861 consultations between 7
th
 March 2016 and 
29
th
 May 2016. Influenza-like illness had the highest incidence (16426 cases, 48.2%), followed 
by watery diarrhoea (10,054 cases, 29.8%), dengue-like illness (4,520, 13.3%), prolonged fever 
(1461 cases, 4.3%), acute fever and rash (672 cases, 2%), zika-like illness (583 cases, 1.7%), 
bloody diarrhoea (293 cases, 0.9%), acute jaundice syndrome (71 cases, 0.2%) and suspected 
meningitis (33 cases, 0.1%).  
Figures 3 and 4 represent trends in syndromes, and figures 3A and 4A represent proportional 
morbidity for syndromes under surveillance through EWARS over the 12 week period. 
Proportional morbidity is expressed as a percentage of total weekly consultations. For simplicity 
reasons, only national level analysis is presented here. In conjunction with ILI- being the most 
commonly reported syndrome, increasing trends in ILI were observed from epi-week 14 
onwards. The increase in ILI could be associated with overcrowding and displacement of people 
during Cyclone Winston (epi-week 8) and Cyclone Zena (epi-week 14). A retrospective analysis 
of laboratory data conducted by the FCCDC indicated that these early signals in trends of ILI 
corresponded with an increase in the number of laboratory confirmed cases of influenza. The 
increase in ILI was also accompanied by an increase in ICU admissions of patients with 
influenza-associated Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI). However, in this circumstance, 
public health action was prompted by concerned hospital staff rather than through EWARS. The 
evaluation demonstrated that EWARS data were not always well understood and utilised to 
estimate the burden of disease and predict transmission, and hence generate a public health 
response.  
Figure 3: National trends for influenza-like illness (ILI), acute watery diarrhoea (AWD), 
prolonged fever (PF) and dengue-like illness (DLI) as reported through EWARS, Fiji, 
Epidemiological weeks 10 – 21, 2016 
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Figure 3A: Proportional morbidity
42
 for influenza-like illness (ILI), acute watery 
diarrhoea (AWD), prolonged fever (PF) and dengue-like illness (DLI) as reported through 
EWARS, Fiji, Epidemiological weeks 10 – 21, 2016 
 
 
Figure 4: National trends for acute jaundice syndrome (AJS), acute bloody diarrhoea 
(ABD), suspected meningitis (Men), acute fever and rash (AFR) and Zika-like illness 
(ZLI)
43
 as reported through EWARS, Fiji, Epidemiological weeks 10 – 21, 2016 
 
                                                          
42
 Morbidity = number of cases / total number of weekly consultations 
43
 Zika-like illness was added during epi-week 13. 
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Figure 4A: Proportional morbidity
44
 for acute jaundice syndrome (AJS), acute bloody 
diarrhoea (ABD), suspected meningitis (Men) and Zika-like illness (ZLI)
45
 as reported 
through EWARS, Fiji, Epidemiological weeks 10 – 21, 2016 
 
The system utilised sensitive case definitions and low thresholds to ensure that no potential 
disease outbreak signals were missed. Every time a reported event (# of cases) exceeded the 
threshold, an alert was automatically generated within EWARS. The alert log in figure 5 shows 
trends at an EWARS site for prolonged fever over time, along with the corresponding moving 
threshold in blue.   
Figure 5: Snapshot of an alert log for prolonged fever from EWARS dashboard 
 
Table 2 summarises the number of alerts generated nationally over the 12 week period and the 
number of alerts verified. A total of 325 alerts were generated through IBS and 10 through EBS.  
                                                          
44
 Morbidity = number of cases / total number of weekly consultations 
45
 Zike-like illness was added during epi-week 13. 
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Although a large number of IBS alerts were verified (suppressed or actioned), the evaluation 
highlighted that responses to alerts were often focussed on verifying the alert quickly and did 
not always include a rapid risk assessment. Consulting EWARS epidemiologists undertook in-
country assessments of EWARS and, in conjunction with EWARS surveillance officers, 
established risk assessment protocols for alert verification.  
Table 2: Number of alerts generated through EWARS, Fiji 2016.  
Epi-week # alerts 
generated 
# (%) alerts 
verified 
# alerts 
generated 
# (%) alerts 
verified 
 IBS EBS 
10 9 9 (100) 0 0 
11 14 14 (100) 3 1 (33) 
12 16 16 (100) 3 1 (33) 
13 31 31 (100) 1 1 (100) 
14 43 42 (98) 1 0 
15 32 31 (97) 0 0 
16 41 41 (100) 1 0 
17 34 30 (91) 0 0 
18 15 14 (93) 0 0 
19 30 18 (60) 0 0 
20 39 20 (67) 0 0 
21 21 11 (52) 1 1 (100) 
 
Although no major outbreaks were detected through IBS during the post-disaster phase, the 
system triggered several investigations of small outbreaks of watery diarrhoea and measles
46
. 
EWARS actors felt that the automated alert system was more effective at mobilising the 
divisional outbreak response teams (DORT) and sub-divisional outbreak response teams (SORT) 
during post-Cyclone Winston disaster phase compared with previous national emergencies. 
However, further guidelines and training modules should be developed to better align the rapid 
response process with EWARS. For instance consultations with focal points and surveillance 
officers found that EWARS users lacked clarity on when specimens should be collected. Often 
focal points collected and shipped specimens from all cases, which significantly increased the 
volume and costs for laboratory testing during the post-cyclone response. Developing standard 
operating protocols recommending a minimum number and type of specimens for each 
syndrome are recommended. This will guide the EWARS sites and streamline the process of 
laboratory testing to confirm diagnosis of suspected cases. 
Timeliness and completeness (Indicator Based Surveillance) 
Timeliness refers to whether data are submitted on time to for any public health response and 
completeness refers to whether data are submitted independent of the time 
106
. In order to 
                                                          
46
 personal communication with Suva SDMO 
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generate a timely public health response, it is of paramount importance for data to be submitted 
on time 
106
. Although real time monitoring of syndromic surveillance is ideal, it is often difficult 
in the context of post-disaster emergencies and Pacific Island Countries.  
In relation to EWARS, timeliness of reporting was defined as the number of reports that were 
received by 6pm on the Monday (day 1) of the following epi-week. Table 3 represents the 
matrix used for calculating timeliness and completeness. Figure 6 shows national and divisional 
trends in reporting of data over the 12 week period. The national average for timeliness was 
64%. Timeliness steadily improved over time, possibly due to a combination of factors 
including improved understanding of EWARS, enhanced data collection practices and 
relationship building between the surveillance officers and the focal points. In this context, it is 
important to note that divisional surveillance officers were actively involved and spent a 
significant amount of their time following up on report submissions to ensure timeliness of 
reporting. 
 
 
 
 
Another measure of timeliness is the time taken to respond to an alert and initiate public health 
action. Quantitative analysis of the time taken to respond to an alert was not possible during the 
course of the evaluation. The majority of alerts were verified (Table 2), and most delays in the 
verification process appeared to be due to surveillance officers’ being unable to access the focal 
points to review the cases
47
.  
  
                                                          
47
 Survey and personal communication with EWARS surveillance officers 
“Reporting on disease risk has been timely and consistent throughout the response. Health 
has been among the most active clusters in formulating public information campaigns about 
risks identified.” 
- EWARS partner 
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Figure 6: Timeliness of IBS reporting at National and Divisional level through EWARS, 
Fiji, epidemiological weeks 10-21. Expected number of reporting sites (National= 34, 
Central = 12, Eastern = 2, Western = 12, Northern = 10) 
 
Completeness of reporting refers to the proportion of sites that submitted the data independent 
of the time of submission 
106
. In this context, completeness is reported as the percentage of 
reports received by Sunday of the following epi-week (i.e. a report was considered incomplete if 
it was delayed by more than 7 days). Figure 7 shows national and divisional trends in the 
percentage of reports received by the end of each epi-week. The national average for 
completeness of reporting was 90%.  
Both timeliness and completeness are indicators of the quality of surveillance data. Figures 5 
and 6 showed most EWARS sites were in general reporting well although not always on time 
(by 6pm Monday). A timeliness and completeness target of 80% is recommended to ensure 
timely public health action is able to be taken. However, in order to improve the quality of data 
reporting, it is important to understand the barriers to reporting to improve system performance.  
Important to note the timeliness and completeness of reporting appeared to be on downward 
trend after epidemiological week 20 (Figures 6 and 7). The percentage of IBS alerts verified 
dropped from 93% in week 18 to 50% in week 21 (Table 2). This could be indicative of fatigue 
in the surveillance system. Fiji has reported data on syndromic surveillance for several years 
where in frequency of reporting and data were found to be incomplete and not always on time 
108
. 
 
  
 185 
Figure 7: Completeness of IBS reporting at National and Divisional level through EWARS, 
Fiji, epidemiological weeks 10-21. Expected number of reporting sites (National= 34, 
Central = 12, Eastern = 2, Western = 10, Northern = 10)
48
 
 
Survey results showed the majority of focal points (21/24, 88%)
49
 experienced situations where 
they were unable to report on time. The main challenge for timely reporting was the workload 
on focal points (14/24, 56%). Delays in some situations were attributed to other staff members 
not completing and handing in their tally sheets on time (11/24, 46%). Since EWARS sites may 
have several clinicians, focal points are often required to follow up multiple staff members in 
order to collate and submit the weekly reports. This was highlighted as an issue during site visit 
discussions, particularly in larger hospitals with a high number of reporting officers. The 
challenges for timely reporting highlight the need to streamline EWARS reporting processes 
within health facilities and to the need to align them with other already established surveillance 
systems.  
Lack of internet signal was also highlighted as a challenge for timely reporting (11/24, 46%), 
and in some cases focal points were unable to report due to a lack of mobile phone credit (4/24, 
17%). Albeit rare, the use of EWARS mobile phone credit for personal or other use by focal 
points has been highlighted as a concern by surveillance officers.
50
 Systems to limit or monitor 
personal mobile phone use may be helpful to reduce this occurrence.  
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 3 respondents did not answer this question. 
50
 Consultation with surveillance officers. 
  
 
Table 3: Timeliness and completeness of IBS reporting through EWARS in Fiji, epidemiological week 10- 21. 
Information item Epidemiological weeks Total 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Number of EWARS sentinel 
sites 
34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Number of reports expected 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 306 
Total number of reports 
received  
23 33 33 33 32 33 33 28 29 29 33 22 277 
Total number of reports 
received by Day 1 of Epi 
week (Monday) 
14 26 12 28 26 22 23 25 20 20 20 18 196 
Timeliness of reporting 
% reports received by 
Monday 
41.2 76.5 35.3 82.4 76.5 64.7 67.6 73.5 58.8 58.8 58.8 52.9 64.1 
Completeness of reporting 
% reports received by end 
of epi week 
67.6 97.1 97.1 97.1 94.1 97.1 97.1 82.4 85.3 85.3 97.1 64.7 90.5 
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Data validity (Indicator Based Surveillance) 
Data validity refers to the accuracy of information that is captured by the surveillance system 
103, 
106
. Teams consisting of EWARS epidemiologists and divisional surveillance officers visited a 
total of 11 EWARS sites across the Central, Northern and Western divisions in order to assess 
data validity. A retrospective review of clinic registers was undertaken by the surveying teams. 
Epidemiological weeks 13 and 17 were selected to assess quality of reporting in the earlier and 
later weeks of surveillance through EWARS. Ideally, the number of cases identified through the 
review would be comparable to the number of cases reported to EWARS.  
There were a number of limitations in the assessment of data validity. Access to clinic registers 
was not always possible as they were often being used by medical practitioners. Therefore, 
complete case counts for both epidemiological weeks were obtained from 3 sites only. The total 
numbers of outpatient consultations for each epidemiological week were not available for two 
of the three sites, restricting the comparison to case counts.  
The comparison of case counts captured by EWARS with the retrospective review data 
demonstrated a certain level of discrepancy (Annex H). The reported discrepancies were not 
necessarily indicative of data inaccuracy, but highlighted variability in reporting practices and 
the difficulty in replicating data collection processes at sentinel sites. In another instance, site 3 
reported 29 cases of bloody diarrhoea to EWARS in epidemiological week 17, whilst the 
register review identified 23 cases of watery diarrhoea (Annex H). The error was clarified and 
amended by surveillance officers after an alert was generated, demonstrating the strength of 
EWARS’ verification process and its contribution to data validity. Heterogeneity and 
complexity in data collection processes should be minimised to enhance data validity for 
improved outbreak detection. 
In addition to reviewing the clinical records, the teams met with EWARS focal points and 
discussed site specific data collection practices. A number of challenges in applying case 
definitions were identified during the site visits and though the cross-sectional survey, including 
overlap between syndromes, patients meeting more than once case definition, and a lack of 
clarity and specificity surrounding case definitions. Discussions with focal points suggested that 
clinical history was sometimes applied to the identification of cases by clinical staff, regardless 
of symptoms recorded in the patient register. This may lead to misclassification when other 
health facility staff are involved in tallying cases. Ideally, patient registers should reflect the 
information being provided to EWARS. 
Timely detection of an outbreak relies on data validity, however the accuracy of case counts is 
less critical during post-disaster settings where identifying ‘hot-spots’ rapidly is crucial. In these 
situations, data validity can be supported through strong verification processes as has been 
demonstrated by EWARS. 
Usefulness 
Usefulness refers to the system’s contribution in monitoring diseases trends and early detection 
of signals that might lead to potential disease clusters or outbreaks 
102
. Surveyed users were 
confident in the ability of EWARS to detect early warnings for potential disease outbreaks (its 
primary purpose). Sixty-nine percent of respondents (n=32) thought the system could detect 
early warnings very well and a further 25% thought that it could detect early warnings 
somewhat well.  
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The information provided by EWARS in the weekly bulletin was considered very useful (11/24, 
46%) and somewhat useful (13/24, 54%) by users. Table 4 outlines the main uses of information 
among focal points who received the bulletin.  
Table 4: Use of information in the EWARS Weekly Bulletin by focal points, cross-
sectional survey, (n=19)
51
 
Use of information  Focal points (%) 
Information sharing amongst colleagues at the health facility and 
within the community 
32% 
Compare data trends of different reporting areas 26% 
Initiate preventive or responsive health action  26% 
 
Recommended improvements to the bulletin included more detail to support interpretation. For 
example, the inclusion of thresholds on graphs would support surveillance officers in 
monitoring trends and provide visual support for response activities. In addition, showing cases 
aged under 5yrs and over 5yrs (rather than combining these groups) would provide greater 
demographic detail to support targeted public health action. Discussions with focal points and 
surveillance officers during site visits indicated that health facility specific summaries would 
benefit disease monitoring at the local level, and details on the outcome of previous weeks’ case 
investigations would assist medical officers in tracking cases. 
Along with increased awareness and understanding of surveillance among health care workers, 
the cross-sectional survey revealed some improvements in clinical management as a result of 
EWARS. 
 
EWARS actors felt that EWARS had strengthened the communicable diseases surveillance in 
Fiji and, if re-activated during another disaster or integrated long term, it would be highly 
beneficial in improving Fiji’s public health system. 
 
 
Flexibility 
A flexible surveillance system is able to adapt to changing information needs or operating 
conditions without significant time, staff contribution or funding 
102
. In the context of this 
evaluation, flexibility refers to the adaptability of syndromes reported and modifications in the 
reporting process. Zika-like illness was included as a ninth syndrome three weeks after 
implementation. In order to assess the system’s flexibility, EWARS users (focal points and 
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 8 focal points indicated that they did not receive the EWARS Weekly Bulletin 
“Best ever public health action in Fiji” 
- EWARS implementer 
EWARS was very helpful in making us vigilant with variety of cases that were flocking in 
after the cyclone. It enabled us to label cases appropriately and treat them 
appropriately as well.” 
“[EWARS] made me understand each and every case definition their managements and 
proper investigations.” 
-EWARS Focal points 
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surveillance officers) were asked how easy it was to amend their reporting and surveillance 
processes after Zika-like illness was added. Forty-four percent of focal points (n=27) indicated 
that it was very easy to amend the reporting process when an additional syndrome was 
introduced, and 48% indicated that it was somewhat easy. All surveillance officers indicated 
that it was very easy to amend the surveillance process when Zika-like illness was introduced.  
Furthermore, discussions with EWARS developers revealed that modifying the online system 
was a relatively simple process. This was also true for ongoing changes made to the EWARS 
website and dashboard, and the alert management process. Adding an additional reporting site 
was also considered to be relatively simple. Koro Island health centre, which was in one of the 
worst affected regions, was included as an EWARS sentinel site in epi-week 13. The delay in 
implementation was associated with access to the island. EWARS was implemented with 
relative ease once infrastructure had been sufficiently restored, and the site could be accessed.  
The flexibility of EWARS is an important attribute in the context of Fiji and for the 
implementation of EWARS in other post-disaster settings. As is expected from an early warning 
system, EWARS was found to require minimal resources and change in practices to scale-up or 
scale-down the number of syndromes or sites. 
Acceptability  
Acceptability refers to the willingness of users to participate in the surveillance process 
including data collection and analysis 
102
. Accurate, timely and complete information for public 
health action relies on significant support for the system at the user level. Acceptability can be 
influenced by a number of factors such as the ease of reporting, the burden on time, feedback 
received on the information reported, and the level of training and support provided. 
Although mobile phone reporting of surveillance data has been previously utilised in Fiji, 
reporting via smartphones using a web based application was a novel approach introduced in 
Fiji post-cyclone Winston. The cross-sectional survey revealed there was high acceptability 
among focal points in relation to using the EWARS application (Table 5). Similarly, most 
surveillance officers (4/5, 80%) indicated that it was very easy to use the EWARS website.  
Table 5: Attitudes of EWARS focal points toward using mobile phones for EWARS 
reporting, cross-sectional survey (n=27) 
Smart phone use for EWARS reporting  Focal points (%) 
Using the EWARS mobile phone to transmit weekly reports 93% 
Found mobile phones very easy to use for reporting 89% 
Preferred method of reporting is through EWARS mobile phones 89% 
 
A common theme identified through discussions at site visits was that reporting introduced a 
significant time burden on focal points. High workload was also recognised as a contributor to 
delayed reporting in the cross-sectional survey (14/27, 52%).  
Focal points were generally positive about the feedback received both from surveillance officers 
and through the EWARS weekly bulletin. However, 26% of respondents (7/27) indicated that 
they had not received the bulletin and were not receiving feedback on the information reported 
to the system. In order to maintain acceptability of the system, it is important that focal points 
receive timely and useful feedback.  
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The majority of EWARS users were satisfied with the training and support they received during 
the implementation phase, and were satisfied with the system overall (Table 6).  
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Table 6: EWARS user satisfaction, cross-sectional survey, Fiji, 2016 (n=32) 
EWARS user satisfaction  Very satisfied or somewhat satisfied (%) 
Initial training for EWARS 88% 
Ongoing support to conduct EWARS activities 100% 
Overall satisfaction with the system 97% 
 
Simplicity 
Simplicity refers to the ease of operation of the system and is highly related to acceptability and 
timeliness. EWARS introduced nine syndromes for weekly reporting, which is higher than that 
of previous syndromic surveillance systems in Fiji.
52
 However, users did not indicate that the 
number of syndromes adversely affected the operation of the system (90% of users felt that the 
number of syndromes were appropriate).  
 
 
 
Stability  
Stability refers to the reliability of the system and its resilience to change 
103
. EWARS in a Box 
is highly technologically dependent and therefore it is critical that the system does not 
experience outages or require frequent upgrades. In order to assess the stability of the system, 
server logs were extracted from the host server at Amazon Web Services (AWS) (Figure 8). The 
graph shows a constant stream of activity with regular positive spikes (indicative of peaks in 
activity) from February to May 2016. An activity level of zero would suggest that the 
application was not functional. Based on this indicator, EWARS application had a very high 
level of stability. 
Figure 8: EWARS server log from February – May 201653 
 
To further assess the stability of the system from users’ perspective, focal points and 
surveillance officers were asked if they had ever experienced difficulty accessing the EWARS 
application or website. Of focal points who responded, 55% (15/27) indicated that they had 
some difficulty accessing the EWARS application on the mobile phone. The frequency with 
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 Five syndromes reported under the FSSS. 
53
 Graph shows activity until 15/05/2016. 
“Mobile phones make it exciting to report data” 
“More time for training of focal points. Too much information and not enough time” 
- System implementer 
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which focal points had difficulty accessing the application varied among respondents and 
between divisions. While the response was variable, 30% (8/27) of users reported they had 
difficulty more than once a month. The stability and accessibility of the system could further 
influence timely reporting of data. The EWARS website (www.ewars.ws) is currently 
undergoing a platform upgrade to improve its accessibility and support the increasing number of 
users globally, as well as users in remote locations where mobile connectivity and internet 
access can be limited. 
Representativeness 
Representativeness in this context refers to the geographical appropriateness of the EWARS 
sites during the post-cyclone Winston emergency phase 
103
. EWARN site selection after a 
natural disaster is often difficult due to the logistical challenges associated with collapsed 
infrastructure and access to health care facilities 
92
. Sites were selected based on the following 
factors
54
: 
- 11/12 sites already reporting to FSSS were captured 
- Sites where both road and telecommunication infrastructure were somewhat intact 
- Sites that were severely affected by Cyclone Winston and hence were at greater risk of 
experiencing a communicable disease outbreak (based on the rapid public health risk 
assessment) 
99
. 
- Based on the population density in Fiji 
The map in Figure 8 shows an overlay of the path of the cyclone and EWARS sites. Most 
EWARS sites were those lying within 100kms from the path of the cyclone. EWARS sites 
within the 50km band were most severely affected sites. Although most EWARS sites were 
fairly representative of the post-disaster phase, some areas were not captured due to limitations 
in access and damage to infrastructure (parts of Eastern division). This might have led to some 
localised outbreaks being missed by the surveillance system.    
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 Personal communication with EWARS developers 
  
 
Figure 8: Map representing path of tropical cyclone Winston, EWARS surveillance sites, total population and population density for each 
province in Fiji, 2016. 
55
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 Based on projected population estimates for 2016 as provided by Fiji MOHMS and are calculated based upon 2007 census conducted by Fiji Bureau 
of Statistics and using MOHMS divisional boundaries. Image courtesy of Paul Jaskierniak, WHO DPS 
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Table 7 lists the number of EWARS sites per division and the percentage of all health centres 
represented by EWARS sites. If EWARS (or a modification of it) was integrated into ongoing 
surveillance, site selection should be reviewed to assess coverage across all divisions.  
Table 7: Population size and EWARS surveillance site coverage by Division, Fiji, 2016 
 Population
56
 % of total 
population 
# EWARS 
sites 
# health 
facilities 
% of total 
EWARS sites 
% of health 
facilities 
captured by 
EWARS 
Central 361894.6 41.6 12 52 35.3 23.1 
Eastern 36869.9 4.2 2 52 5.9 3.8 
Western 344663.3 39.6 10 61 29.4 16.4 
Northern 127556.1 14.6 10 45 29.4 22.2 
TOTAL 870983.9 100.0 34 210   
 
Cost 
Cost of the surveillance system is an important factor in assessing the public health importance 
of the system itself 
103
. Conducting a detailed cost-effectiveness analysis was beyond the scope 
of this evaluation, however, direct costs associated with EWARS were estimated (Table 8). 
Costing data was provided by the Fiji MOHMS, Fiji Health Sector Support Program (FHSSP) 
and WHO DPS in Fiji.  
 
 
 
The total cost of implementing and running EWARS in a Box for three months was 
approximately US$190,000. The costing does not include in-direct costs of MOHMS and WHO 
staff who contributed their time during this period, along with staffing costs of WHO consulting 
epidemiologists. The largest expenditure (~US$135, 000) was associated with supporting 
consultant EWARS epidemiologists in Fiji for the implementation and ongoing support of 
EWARS related activities. If EWARS was to be re-activated during another humanitarian 
disaster in Fiji, or was integrated into Fiji’s existing syndromic surveillance, retention and 
continued up-skilling of trained surveillance officers, medical officers and focal points is highly 
recommended. Increased capacity building within the MOHMS staff will not only reduce the 
associated costs but also lead to long term development of a strong public health system in Fiji.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Direct costs associated with EWARS in a Box; February – May 201657 
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 Projected population estimates for 2016. Figures provided by Fiji MOHMS and are calculated 
based upon 2007 census conducted by Fiji Bureau of Statistics and MOHMS divisional 
boundaries. 
“Good investment for the MOHMS”  
- EWARS stakeholder 
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Funding body Item Cost in 
USD 
Fiji Ministry of Health and Medical 
Services (MOHMS) 
Travel costs during implementation of 
EWARS in a Box 
6, 578 
Fiji Health Sector Support 
Program (FHSSP) 
Salary support for surveillance officers 13, 882 
World Health Organization 
(WHO) 
EWARS in a Box (mobile handsets) 7, 477 
Mobile phone credit and data (Digicel) 1, 925 
Laptops for surveillance officers 13, 450 
Contractual services general 42, 405 
Consultant travel costs 92, 550 
Car rentals 5, 606 
Total  183, 873 
 
A complete cost-effectiveness analysis is recommended to assess the economic burden of 
responding to a large scale outbreak which could be averted, or the overall impact reduced, by 
using a functional early warning surveillance system. 
Portability 
Portability of the system refers to the possible use or duplication of the system in another 
circumstance or location 
103
. EWARS in a Box is essentially a kit containing 50 mobile phones 
along with a two laptops that can be deployed within 48 hours of an humanitarian emergency 
98
. 
Like any other surveillance system, the system is limited by its dependence on communication 
(road and telecommunication) being intact during the disaster phase. In Fiji, implementation of 
EWARS in a Box was undertaken within 14 days post-cyclone, soon after infrastructure had 
been restored and other key necessities such as shelter, food, safe drinking water and sanitation 
had been provided to those severely affected 
99
. All stakeholders and developers felt that the 
implementation of EWARS in a Box was timely and relatively simple post-cyclone Winston. 
However, establishing guidelines and standard operating procedures, and documenting ‘lessons 
learnt’ for implementation and for future use of EWARS in a Box is recommended to facilitate 
the deployment of the system in future disaster settings.   
Event based surveillance 
Event Based Surveillance or EBS through EWARS is reliant on health care workers reporting 
any unusual public health events or unexpected deaths (Figure 1). As EBS is an immediate 
reporting system, it is difficult to assess the timeliness of EBS in a similar manner to IBS. For 
these reasons, its impact and effectiveness was measured by the time taken to respond to an alert 
(verification) and by the number of cases that were impacted by each investigation. Table 9 
shows the time taken to respond to and verify alerts indicating potential outbreaks under EBS. 
The alerts were investigated by outbreak response teams. Of the 4 confirmed outbreaks, 2 were 
associated with conjunctivitis, 1 was associated with typhoid and the cause of 1 remained 
unknown. These data suggest that EBS was useful for outbreak detection during the post-
cyclone response, and the impact of timely public health response can be broad. Table 2 also 
shows the number of EBS alerts that were verified. 
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Table 9: Time taken to verify and confirm potential outbreaks when reported through 
EBS between epidemiological weeks 10-21, 2016 
 Number of 
outbreaks 
Time taken to 
generate a 
public health 
response (in 
days)
58
 
Impact of outbreak 
      # of cases # of deaths 
Confirmed 
outbreaks 
1 0 830 0 
1 1 50 0 
1 2 4 0 
1 4 12 1 
    
Non-confirmed 
outbreaks 
1 Unknown 13 0 
1 Unknown 1 0 
1 3 5 3 
1 6 31 0 
1 8 0 0 
1 21 4 3 
 
Both surveys and stakeholder interviews suggested that EBS was not well adopted and required 
work to strengthen implementation. When focal points were asked “What would you do if you 
saw an unusual public health event?” the majority of respondents (16/27, 59%) indicated that 
they would directly contact and seek guidance from their SDMO or DMOs. Only 7/27 indicated 
that they would contact the FCCDC and 3/27 indicated they would use the toll free number to 
report the event. Importantly, the national coordinator for EBS felt that the reason the system 
was not performing well (personal communication) was due to the lack of training and 
awareness among health care workers. 
All stakeholders felt that EBS had not performed well during the post-cyclone Winston phase, 
and believed EBS was important and should be strengthened.  
 
 
Several clusters or outbreaks were recently detected in Fiji, most of which were identified 
through non-IBS reporting, signifying the role of EBS during post-disaster emergencies. Further 
training to improve EBS reporting, risk assessment and verification process is recommended. 
Conclusions 
EWARS in a Box was implemented in Fiji after large-scale damage was caused by Tropical 
Cyclone Winston. WHO recommends a formal evaluation of an EWARN 3-6 months after its 
implementation 
91
. This rapid evaluation assessed the performance of EWARS during the first 
three months of implementation in Fiji. 
EWARS in a Box is a field-ready surveillance system that utilises smartphones and a web based 
application to collect and transmit surveillance data on nine syndromes. Although the system is 
specifically designed for post-disaster emergencies, the role of early warning systems for 
outbreak detection extends beyond the disaster phase and should be highlighted.  
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 Calculated as final date of verification minus the date of report 
“Don’t think it has worked well at all; needs more awareness and training”. 
-System implementer 
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The evaluation demonstrated that EWARS had satisfied its primary purpose of monitoring 
communicable disease trends over time. In the absence of a large-scale outbreak, it was difficult 
to assess the system’s sensitivity to detect outbreaks for reasons highlighted previously 100, 104.  
Reporting through EWARS was complete and relatively timely. EWARS in a Box was 
considered simple, acceptable and generally useful by all those involved in the surveillance. The 
system was found to be portable and stable, making it ideal for use in low-resource and remote 
post-disaster settings. Importantly, EWARS in a Box was successful in overcoming several 
issues highlighted during a recent evaluation of the Fiji Syndromic Surveillance System (FSSS). 
Key factors contributing to the success of EWARS in Fiji after cyclone Winston are listed 
below: 
 The system was easy to implement. 
 Automated reporting, analysis and dissemination of surveillance data provided 
near- real time monitoring of communicable disease trends. 
 In contrast to the FSSS where all activities were coordinated by a national 
surveillance officer, the divisional surveillance officers recruited specifically for 
EWARS were instrumental in ensuring that all reports were received on time and 
alerts were verified as quickly as possible. The role of the surveillance officers 
should be acknowledged and highlighted during future implementation of EWARS 
in other settings. 
Like many other surveillance systems EWARS in a Box is limited by its reliance on access to 
telecommunication (mobile coverage) and access to sites. Another limitation was the lack of 
baseline data and hence the use of generalised thresholds for detecting outbreaks. Although the 
system was fairly representative of Fiji, some areas might have been missed due to limited 
access immediately after the cyclone. 
Some issues pertaining to the quality of data and application of case definitions continue to exist, 
and improvement of these aspects should be considered. Some divisions performed better than 
others in relation to timeliness of reporting. This could be associated the with varying burden of 
disease and population density between the different divisions, however continued 
troubleshooting and engagement is recommended to ensure that reports are received on time. 
Increased dissemination and discussion of surveillance data should be undertaken in conjunction 
with subdivisional and divisional outbreak response teams in order to achieve effective and 
well-coordinated public health responses.  
Substantial infrastructure, human resources and financial resources were used in the 
implementation of EWARS in a Box in Fiji. Based on EWARS’ performance in Fiji, 
transitioning elements of EWARS into Fiji’s routine surveillance system can provide as an 
opportunity to strengthen the surveillance system and the public health system in Fiji overall.  
Recommendations to improve and strengthen EWARS in a Box 
EWARS epidemiological bulletin 
One of the key strengths of EWARS in a Box is its ability to automatically generate a bulletin at 
the end of each epidemiological week. The automated bulletins are highly beneficial during 
acute emergencies and minimise manual data recording, analysing, collating and dissemination 
of information. Automation of the bulletins reduces human error in reporting and significantly 
reduces the burden on human resources. In addition, the surveillance outputs and EWARS 
bulletin are flexible and should be adapted for each disaster setting. Key recommendations to 
improve the utility of the EWARS bulletin are below: 
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 Improving the layout and design of EWARS bulletin has been discussed with EWARS 
developers and is currently being reviewed by a consultant EWARS epidemiologist.  
-Consideration should be given to including further interpretation within each 
bulletin, inclusion of alert thresholds on graphs for further clarity and site-
specific feedback. Although this might not be critical during an emergency 
phase as most responses are required to be coordinated at a national level. 
 Ensure all EWARS actors receive the weekly bulletin. One of the keys to improving 
surveillance over time is to provide feedback to those who are responsible for collecting 
data. Empowering focal points with this information will improve long term 
engagement with the system. 
Strengthen Event Based Surveillance reporting through EWARS  
Increasing awareness on the public health importance of EBS and providing training to health 
care workers and outbreak response teams is recommended. Based on the findings from the 
survey, review of the current EBS reporting should be undertaken, where in all health care 
workers, SDMOs and DMOs should be encouraged to report any unusual public health events 
through EWARS. Timely EBS reporting and risk assessments can prevent or reduce the impact 
of large-scale outbreaks compared with indicator based surveillance. 
Greater engagement with EWARS sites 
Site visits conducted with the surveillance officers as part of the EWARS evaluation proved to 
be extremely useful in strengthening relationships with data providers, providing ad-hoc 
training, identifying issues and troubleshooting. If EWARS (or a modification of it) is continued 
in Fiji, regular visits to the surveillance sites by the Surveillance Officers would be very 
beneficial. A structured checklist could be developed to allow the Surveillance Officers to 
systematically review, assess, validate and strengthen surveillance.  
Develop standard guidelines and training modules 
 This is the first time EWARS in a Box has been implemented in a Pacific Island 
Country. Protocols detailing the operation of the system and the verification process 
should be documented for future deployment of EWARS.  
 Rapid risk assessment guidelines should be implemented and training provided to assist 
with alert response. The evaluation found that the surveillance officers were clear on 
alert thresholds but were less confident around when an outbreak response should be 
initiated (response thresholds).  
 Laboratory and other surveillance systems should be better aligned with EWARS. 
Standard protocols recommending a minimum number and type of specimens for each 
syndrome are suggested. This will guide the EWARS sites and streamline the process of 
laboratory testing to confirm diagnosis of suspected cases. In addition, the use of rapid 
diagnostics tests and/ or point of care testing should be explored to improve the data 
quality, improve the positive predictive value of the surveillance system and reduce the 
burden of laboratory surveillance. 
 Lessons learnt from the Fiji experience of EWARS should be documented for use in 
other Pacific Island Countries and countries experiencing humanitarian disasters. 
Recommendations for integration of EWARS into Fiji’s existing 
surveillance system 
Human capacity building at Divisional and National levels 
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Building human capacity is paramount for sustaining good public health surveillance. Building 
national capacity will also reduce costs associated re-activation of EWARS during another post- 
disaster emergency. 
 Basic epidemiological training should be considered for all public health staff 
undertaking surveillance activities. Epidemiological training focused on outbreak 
identification, investigation and response is recommended for surveillance officers.  
 Weekly meetings with the EWARS surveillance team (surveillance officers, 
SDMOs and DMOs) are recommended wherein bulletins (and other EWARS 
related issues) are reviewed in depth. This will ensure timely and effective public 
health response. 
 Regular ‘on-the-job’ training for EWARS focal points should be considered. This 
training could be conducted in a ‘train-the-trainer’ format to allow focal point to 
readily transfer knowledge and skills to others involved in surveillance within their 
respective facilities. Retention of all trained staff involved in EWARS should be 
prioritised.  
Case classification 
The evaluation identified a number of issues around case classification, which affects the quality 
of data reported to the system. In order for effective identification and response to potential 
outbreaks, quality of data should be considered a priority. However, this needs to be weighed 
against the burden of reporting. The evaluation identified the following areas where case 
classification could be improved: 
 Recording and monitoring of case classification issues by surveillance officers is 
recommended. These issues can be discussed and solutions sought during weekly 
surveillance meetings.  
In particular, a clarification on how ‘fever’ is defined in all case definitions is 
recommended (e.g. fever >38◦C or self-reported fever without a measured fever). 
Inclusion of self-reported fever greater 2 days, regardless of measured temperature 
on day of presentation, might also be considered. 
 Encouraging the recording of syndromes directly into the clinic registers is highly 
recommended. To facilitate this process, case definitions could be provided in a 
laminated A5 format that can be kept in each clinic register for easy reference; inclusion 
of standard abbreviations for each syndrome (e.g. AFR, PF, ILI, WD, etc) would make 
recording in registers consistent. A longer term option would be to include an extra 
column in the clinic register for “Syndrome.” Additionally, consideration could be 
given to adding “fever y/n”, “length of fever (days)” and “recorded temp” columns into 
the register. 
 
Representativeness of EWARS 
The number of syndromes and sites represented by EWARS should be re-assessed prior to 
transitioning EWARS to Fiji’s routine syndromic surveillance system. Current EWARS sites 
target areas that were severely affected by cyclone Winston. Similarly, the syndromes were 
chosen based on post-disaster epidemic risk assessment. Once the disaster phase is over, site 
selection should be reviewed. A communicable diseases risk assessment should be undertaken 
to determine the appropriateness of syndromes moving forward.  
 
Data management  
All syndromic surveillance data is currently stored in a cloud based EWARS server. All 
stakeholders should be consulted to discuss the migration and long term maintenance of the 
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database and the online system. It is recommended that the MOHMS seek WHO’s guidance on 
this issue based on previous models where EWARS has been absorbed into countries’ existing 
surveillance systems. Consideration should be given to a ‘full cloud’ and/ or ‘hybrid cloud’ 
model which allows automated updates to the software (maintained by WHO) while ensuring 
data security and encryption as per the MOHMS requirements.   
 
Telecommunication 
EWARS reporting is dependent of use of mobile data. The system has performed well overall, 
with some issues around access to mobile data and network coverage. MOHMS should seek 
guidance from both the Fiji Ministry of Information and WHO on improving mobile phone 
coverage and access to internet in remote settings.   
 
Strengthening communication at all levels 
Based consultations with EWARS actors, enhanced communication and dissemination of 
surveillance data between all those involved in post-disaster response is recommended during 
future emergencies. 
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Annexes 
Annex A: List of EWARS reporting sites by Division and Sub-division 
# Division Sub-division Health facility Name 
1 Central 
Division 
Tailevu Subdivision Nayavu Nayavu 
2 Central 
Division 
Suva Subdivision Lami HC    Lami 
3 Central 
Division 
Suva Subdivision Valelevu HC Valelevu 
4 Central 
Division 
Suva Subdivision Makoi HC Makoi 
5 Central 
Division 
Suva Subdivision Samabula HC Samabula 
6 Central 
Division 
Suva Subdivision Nuffield HC Nuffield 
7 Central 
Division 
Serua/Namosi Subdivision Navua Subdivisional Hospital Navua 
8 Central 
Division 
Rewa Subdivision Nausori Subdivisional Hospital Nausori 
9 Central 
Division 
Tailevu Subdivision Korovou Subdivisional Hospital Korovou 
10 Central 
Division 
Tailevu Subdivision Lodoni HC Lodoni 
11 Central 
Division 
Naitasiri Subdivision Vunidawa Subdivisional Hospital Vunidawa 
12 Central 
Division 
Naitasiri Subdivision Naqali HC Naqali 
13 Western 
Division 
Nadroga/Navosa Subdivision Sigatoka Subdivisional Hospital Sigatoka 
14 Western 
Division 
Nadroga/Navosa Subdivision Keiyasi Keiyasi 
15 Western 
Division 
Nadi Subdivision Nadi Subdivisional Hospital Nadi 
16 Western 
Division 
Nadi Subdivision Namaka HC Namaka 
17 Western 
Division 
Lautoka Subdivision Lautoka Subdivision Hospital Lautoka 
18 Western 
Division 
Lautoka Subdivision Kamikamica HC Kamikamica 
19 Western 
Division 
Lautoka Subdivision Natabua HC Natabua 
20 Western 
Division 
Ba Subdivision Ba Subdivisional Hospital Ba 
21 Western 
Division 
Tavua Subdivision Tavua Subdivisional Hospital Tavua 
22 Western 
Division 
Ra Subdivision Rakiraki Subdivisional Hospital Rakiraki 
23 Northern 
Division 
Cakaudrove Subdivision Savusavu Subdivisional Hospital Savusavu 
24 Northern 
Division 
Cakaudrove Subdivision Tukavesi HC Tukavesi 
25 Northern 
Division 
Cakaudrove Subdivision Nakorovatu HC Nakorovatu 
26 Northern 
Division 
Bua Subdivision Nabouwalu Subdivisional 
Hospital 
Nabouwalu 
27 Northern 
Division 
Bua Subdivision Wainunu HC Wainunu 
28 Northern 
Division 
Macuata Subdivision Labasa Divisional Hospital Labasa 
29 Northern 
Division 
Macuata Subdivision Dreketi HC Dreketi 
30 Northern 
Division 
Macuata Subdivision Seaqaqa HC Seaqaqa 
31 Northern 
Division 
Taveuni Subdivision Waiyevo Subdivisional Hospital Waiyevo 
32 Northern 
Division 
Taveuni Subdivision Waimaqera HC Waimaqera 
33 Eastern 
Division 
Lomaiviti Subdivision Levuka Subdivisional Hospital Levuka 
34 Eastern 
Division 
Lomaiviti Subdivision Koro HC Koro 
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Annex B: List of EWARS syndromes, case definitions and thresholds 
Syndrome Case definition Thresholds 
Acute fever and rash Fever either reported or measured (>38°C) 
PLUS non-blistering rash 
1 case 
Prolonged fever Any fever either reported or measured 
(>38°C) lasting three or more days 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
Influenza-like illness Fever either reported or measured (>38°C) 
PLUS cough and/or sore throat. 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
Acute watery diarrhoea Three or more loose or watery stools in 
24hrs (non-bloody). 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
Acute bloody diarrhoea Any episode of acute bloody diarrhoea 3 cases in one location 
in 1 week or 
twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 2 weeks 
Acute jaundice syndrome Jaundice (yellow eyes or dark urine) AND 
severe illness with or without fever. 
3 cases 
Suspected dengue Fever for at least 2 days PLUS at least two 
of the following:- nausea or vomiting; - 
muscle or joint pain; - severe headache or 
pain behind the eyes; - rash; - bleeding. 
Twice the average 
number of cases seen 
in the previous 3 weeks 
Suspected meningitis Sudden onset of fever, PLUS one or more 
of the following:- severe headache;- neck 
stiffness;- altered consciousness; - 
petechial/puerperal rash. 
1 case 
Zika-like illness Generalized maculopapular rash plus two 
or more of the following: Arthralgia or 
myalgia; Red eyes or non-purulent 
conjunctivitis; Oedema of hands or feet; 
Low grade fever (< 38℃), Pain behind the 
eyes 
3 cases 
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Annex C: Tally sheet for EWARS reporting 
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Annex D: Snapshot of EWARS bulletin for epidemiological week 10 
 206 
Annex E: EWARS Cross-Sectional Survey (Focal Points) Summary59 
1 Division Number  (% response rate) 
 
Central 12/12 100% 
 
Eastern 2/2 100% 
 
Northern 5/10 50% 
 
Western 8/10 80% 
 
Total 27/34  79% 
2 Position Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Subdivisional medical officer 5 19% 
 
Medical officer 15 56% 
 
Nurse* 6 22% 
 
Other 1 4% 
3 What do you think is the purpose of EWARS? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: outbreak detection 18 67% 
 
Theme: outbreak response 9 33% 
 
Theme: general disease surveillance or monitoring 12 44% 
4 Do you think EWARS has had any impact on public health in Fiji? Number (n=26) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 20 77% 
 
No 0 0% 
 
Unsure 6 23% 
5 In your opinion, how easy is it to use EWARS on the mobile phone? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very easy 24 89% 
 
Somewhat easy 3 11% 
 
Not very easy 0 - 
 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 0 0% 
6.1 
Have you ever had difficulty accessing EWARS on the mobile phone? 
Application not working 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 15 56% 
 
No 12 44% 
 
Unsure 0 - 
6.2 How often has this occurred? Number (n=15) (% total respondents) 
 
Very often (most weeks) 2 13% 
 
Somewhat often (more than once a month) 6 40% 
 
Not very often (once or less than once a month) 3 20% 
 
Not at all often (twice or less) 4 27% 
7.1 Are you aware of the EWARS case definitions? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 27 100% 
 
No 0 - 
 
Unsure 0 - 
7.2 How easy is it to classify cases into the syndrome categories? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very easy 11 41% 
 
Somewhat easy 16 59% 
 
Not very easy 0 - 
 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 0 - 
8 
At your health facility, what is the process used to record patients who 
meet the case definitions? 
Number (n=20) (% total respondents) 
 
Medical officers record cases directly on the EWARS tally sheet at the 
time a patient is seen 
4 20% 
 
Medical officers record cases on an EWARS line list 1 5% 
 
Weekly review of register or logbook by Medical Officer or Nurse 13 65% 
 
Not known 0 - 
 
Other 2 10% 
9 
How do you send / transmit the EWARS weekly reports?  
Tick all that apply 
Number (n=20) (% total respondents) 
 
EWARS mobile phone application 25 93% 
 
EWARS website (using computer) 1 4% 
 
Email 4 15% 
 
Telephone call 8 30% 
 
SMS 6 22% 
 
Other 3 11% 
10 
What is your preferred reporting method?  
Ranked as first preference 
Number (n=26) (% total respondents) 
 
EWARS mobile phone application 24 92% 
 
EWARS website (using computer) 0 - 
 
Email 0 - 
 
Telephone call 2 8% 
 
SMS 0 - 
                                                          
59
 For privacy reasons, qualitative data has not been included in the summary. 
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11.1 
Have there been situations where you could not submit the EWARS 
weekly report on time (before Monday 6pm)? 
Number (n=24) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 21 88% 
 
No 3 13% 
 
Unsure 0 - 
11.2 
What are the most common challenges for timely reporting?  
Tick all that apply 
Number (n=24) (% total respondents) 
 
Tally sheet not received on time from other staff 11 46% 
 
No access to internet (no credit) 4 17% 
 
No access to internet (no signal) 11 46% 
 
No access to phone 2 8% 
 
Not enough time / workload too busy 14 58% 
 
Unsure 0 - 
 
Other 4 17% 
12 
What would you do if you identified an unusual public health event?  
Unexpected deaths, cluster of illness, animal die off, environmental hazard etc. 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: contact SDMO / DMO  16 59% 
 
Theme: contact EWARS surveillance officer 7 26% 
 
Theme: contact FCCDC (Mataika House) 7 26% 
 
Theme: use toll-free number to report event 3 11% 
13 
Do you think the number of syndromes reported to EWARS is 
appropriate? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 24 89% 
 
No - too many syndromes 1 4% 
 
No - too few syndromes 1 4% 
 
Unsure 1 4% 
14.1 
How easy was it to amend the reporting process when an additional 
syndrome (Zika-like illness) was added to EWARS? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very easy 12 44% 
 
Somewhat easy 13 48% 
 
Not very easy 2 7% 
 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 0 - 
14.2 Why was it difficult to amend the reporting process? Number (n=2) 
 
 
Theme: similar case definitions and patient presentation 2 - 
15 
How well do you think EWARS is able to signal an early warning for 
potential disease outbreaks? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very well 18 67% 
 
Somewhat well 7 26% 
 
Not very well 2 7% 
 
Not at all well 0 - 
16 
Have you received any feedback when an EWARS alert has been 
generated for your health facility? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 22 81% 
 
No 3 11% 
 
Unsure 1 4% 
 
N/A 1 4% 
17.1 Do you receive the EWARS weekly bulletin? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 19 70% 
 
No 7 26% 
 
Unsure 1 4% 
17.2 
How useful is the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin for your 
health facility? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very useful 9 33% 
 
Somewhat useful 12 44% 
 
Not very useful 3 11% 
 
Not at all useful 3 11% 
17.3 How have you used the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin? Number (n=19) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: information sharing 6 32% 
 
Theme: to compare with other reporting areas 5 26% 
 
Theme: to initiate preventive or responsive public health actions 5 26% 
17.4 How could the EWARS weekly bulletin be improved? Number (n=19) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: include health facility specific surveillance data 3 16% 
 
Theme: include outcome of previous week's case investigations 1 5% 
 
Theme: increase access to other staff members at health facility 2 11% 
17.5 
Do you ever distribute the information in the weekly bulletin to other 
persons or organisations? 
Number (n=26) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 9 35% 
 
No 16 62% 
 
Unsure 1 4% 
17.6 Who do you distribute the information to? Number (n=9) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: health facility colleagues 8 89% 
 
Theme: community health care workers 3 33% 
 
Theme: regional public health staff 1 11% 
18 How satisfied do you feel with the training that you received when Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
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EWARS was implemented? 
 
Very satisfied 11 41% 
 
Somewhat satisfied 12 44% 
 
Not very satisfied 3 11% 
 
Not at all satisfied 1 4% 
19 
How supported do you feel to be able to carry out your EWARS 
responsibilities? 
Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very supported 13 48% 
 
Somewhat supported 14 52% 
 
Not very supported 0 - 
 
Not at all supported 0 - 
20 Overall, how satisfied are you with EWARS? Number (n=27) (% total respondents) 
 
Very satisfied 16 59% 
 
Somewhat satisfied 11 41% 
 
Not very satisfied 0 - 
 
Not at all satisfied 0 - 
* Including the titles of Nurse Practitioner and Sister. 
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Annex F: EWARS Cross-Sectional Survey (Surveillance Officers) 
Summary60 
1 What do you think is the purpose of EWARS? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: outbreak detection 3 60% 
 
Theme: outbreak response 3 60% 
2 Do you think EWARS has had any impact on public health in Fiji? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 5 100% 
 
No 0 - 
 
Unsure 0 - 
3 In your opinion, how easy is it to use EWARS? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very easy 4 80% 
 
Somewhat easy 0 - 
 
Not very easy 1 20% 
 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 0 - 
4.1 Have you ever had difficulty accessing the EWARS website? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 1 20% 
 
No 4 80% 
 
Unsure 0 - 
4.2 How often has this occurred? Number (n=1) (% total respondents) 
 
Very often (most weeks) 0 - 
 
Somewhat often (more than once a month) 0 - 
 
Not very often (once or less than once a month) 0 - 
 
Not at all often (twice or less) 1 - 
5 
In your opinion, how timely are the reports submitted from health 
facilities in your division/s? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very timely  0 - 
 
Somewhat timely 5 100% 
 
Not very timely 0 - 
 
Not at all timely 0 - 
6 
How often do you correct errors in the reports submitted by the 
health facilities in your division/s? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very often (most weeks) 0 - 
 
Somewhat often (more than once a month) 0 - 
 
Not very often (once or less than once a month) 3 60% 
 
Not at all often (twice or less) 0 - 
 
N/A 2 40% 
7 
In your opinion, how accurately are the case definitions applied at the 
health facilities in your division/s? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very accurately 1 20% 
 
Somewhat accurately 4 80% 
 
Not very accurately 0 - 
 
Not at all accurately 0 - 
 
Unsure 0 - 
8 
In your opinion, what are the most common challenges for timely 
reporting? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Unable to speak with treating Medical Officer in a timely manner 3 60% 
 
Unable to speak with Divisional Medical Officer in a timely manner 1 20% 
9 
Do you think the number of syndromes reported to EWARS is 
appropriate? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 5 100% 
 
No - too many syndromes 0 - 
 
No - too few syndromes 0 - 
 
Unsure 0 - 
10 
How easy was it to amend the surveillance process when an additional 
syndrome (Zika-like illness) was added to EWARS? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very easy 4 80% 
 
Somewhat easy 1 20% 
 
Not very easy 0 - 
 
Not at all easy (very difficult) 0 - 
11 
How well do you think Event Based Surveillance has been integrated 
into EWARS? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very well 2 40% 
 
Somewhat well 2 40% 
 
Not very well 1 20% 
 
Not at all well 0 - 
12 
How well do you think EWARS is able to signal an early warning for 
potential disease outbreaks? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very well 3 60% 
 
Somewhat well 1 20% 
 
Not very well 1 20% 
                                                          
60
 For privacy reasons, qualitative data has not been included in the summary. 
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Not at all well 0 - 
13.1 Do you receive the EWARS weekly bulletin? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 5 100% 
 
No 0 - 
 
Unsure 0 - 
13.2 
How useful is the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin in 
assisting you in your role? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very useful 2 40% 
 
Somewhat useful 3 60% 
 
Not very useful 0 - 
 
Not at all useful 0 - 
13.3 How have you used the information in the EWARS weekly bulletin? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: identify disease trends in reporting areas 1 20% 
 
Theme: compare trends between divisions 2 40% 
13.4 How could the EWARS weekly bulletin be improved? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: include syndrome thresholds in graphs 2 40% 
 
Theme: separate data for <5yrs and >5yrs categories 1 20% 
 
Theme: link with laboratory data 1 20% 
13.5 
Do you ever distribute the information in the weekly bulletin to other 
persons or organisations? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Yes 4 80% 
 
No 1 20% 
 
Unsure 0 - 
13.6 Who do you distribute the information to? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Theme: focal points, health inspectors and medical officers 3 60% 
 
Theme: national public health colleagues 1 20% 
14 
How satisfied do you feel with the training that you received when 
EWARS was implemented? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very satisfied 2 40% 
 
Somewhat satisfied 3 60% 
 
Not very satisfied 0 - 
 
Not at all satisfied 0 - 
15 
How supported do you feel to be able to carry out your EWARS 
responsibilities? 
Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very supported 4 80% 
 
Somewhat supported 1 20% 
 
Not very supported 0 - 
 
Not at all supported 0 - 
16 Overall, how satisfied are you with EWARS? Number (n=5) (% total respondents) 
 
Very satisfied 4 80% 
 
Somewhat satisfied 1 20% 
 
Not very satisfied 0 - 
 
Not at all satisfied 0 - 
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Annex G. EWARS Roles and Responsibilities  
System contributors 
Key roles and responsibilities 
Information contributed to the system Information received by the 
system 
Divisional Medical 
Officers (DMOs) 
 Provide guidance to SOs on the 
verification and action of alerts 
 Mobilise sub-divisional and divisional 
outbreak response teams where 
appropriate 
 Monitor surveillance activity 
compliance 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin 
 Receive detailed information 
from SOs on syndrome alerts 
Focal points  
(MOs and nurses) 
 Ensure MOs and other practitioners 
are aware of their surveillance 
responsibilities and have the required 
forms and case definitions 
 Monitor compliance with surveillance 
responsibilities within the health 
facility 
 Collate site data and report it to 
EWARS on a weekly basis 
 Act as the primary liaison between the 
health facility and national or 
divisional surveillance activities 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin 
 Review report information 
and screen for potential 
outbreak signals 
 In conjunction with 
SOs/SDMOs/DMOs, 
instigate public health 
responses where necessary 
 
Medical Officers 
(MOs) / other clinicians  
 See patients and apply the surveillance 
case definitions 
 Complete the EWARS tally sheet for 
each reporting period 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin and use the 
information to inform 
clinical practice, including 
situational awareness of 
potential outbreak prone 
disease risks 
National surveillance 
coordinator 
 Overall responsibility for system 
functioning, including overarching 
coordination, training and 
development 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin 
 Disseminate the EWARS 
weekly bulletin to EWARS 
actors 
 Regularly review EWARS 
data to identify potential 
outbreaks 
 Participate in risk assessment 
activities 
 Monitor and/or coordinate 
surveillance activities, as 
directed by the National 
Communicable Disease 
Coordinator 
 
National Advisor 
Communicable 
Diseases  
 Overall responsibility for the 
implementation of EWARS 
 Supervision of the National 
Surveillance Coordinator 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin 
 Regularly review EWARS 
data to identify potential 
outbreaks 
 Participate in risk assessment 
activities, as required 
 Advise national, divisional 
or subdivisional response 
teams, as required 
Senior Officers within   Receive the EWARS weekly 
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the MOHMS bulletin 
 Advise response to public 
health events of concern, as 
required 
 
Surveillance Officers 
(SOs) 
 Ensure EWARS weekly reports are 
received by sentinel sites, follow up 
sites as required 
 Troubleshoot reporting and other 
problems encountered by sentinel sites 
 Verify alerts generated by EWARS 
through discussions with the site 
concerned, along with the DMO 
 Suppress or action alerts where 
required 
 Act as the primary liaison between the 
focal points and divisional/national 
MOHMS staff 
 Receive the EWARS weekly 
bulletin 
 Regularly review EWARS 
data to identify potential 
outbreaks 
 Participate in risk assessment 
activities, as required 
 Participate in public health 
response activities, where 
required 
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Annex H: Comparison between cases identified through EWARS and 
retrospective review of clinic records for epidemiological weeks 13 and 17 
across three EWARS sites, Fiji 2016 
Epidemiological Week 13 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Register EWARS Register EWARS Register EWARS 
Acute fever and rash 0 0 2 1 0 0 
Prolonged fever 0 0 4 5 0 0 
Influenza-like illness 33 67 39 17 7 10 
Watery diarrhoea 9 28 48 25 6 6 
Bloody diarrhoea 1 0 1 2 0 0 
Acute jaundice syndrome 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suspected meningitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suspected dengue 0 4 1 2 0 0 
Zika-like illness - - 0 0 0 0 
              
Epidemiological Week 17 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Register EWARS Register EWARS Register EWARS 
Acute fever and rash 0 0 0 0 0 48 
Prolonged fever 0 0 2 2 0 0 
Influenza-like illness 39 29 40 8 10 3 
Watery diarrhoea 11 24 19 8 23 0 
Bloody diarrhoea 0 0 0 1 0 29 
Acute jaundice syndrome 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suspected meningitis 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Suspected dengue 1 4 0 2 0 0 
Zika-like illness 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 
 
